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ABSTRACT 
 
Defining the Monster: The Social Science and Rhetoric of Neo-Marxist Theories of 
Imperialism in the United States and Latin America, 1945-1973 
 
by 
 
Christopher Cody Stephens 
 Drawing from a range of newly available archival materials gathered from multiple 
countries, my dissertation traces the North American academic reception of Latin American 
anti-imperialist intellectual traditions in the 1960s and 1970s. Obviously this is a broad 
story, to which I only contribute a piece. To limit the scope of the narrative, I have focused 
primarily on the intellectuals surrounding the independent socialist journal Monthly Review, 
and used that as a frame for bringing in other actors. The archival source base includes the 
personal papers of Paul Sweezy, Paul Baran, Andre Gunder Frank, and Harry Magdoff; the 
journals Monthly Review, Studies on the Left, American Socialist; and the international 
records of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers’ Party (SWP). The correspondence of the editors 
of Monthly Review and the records of the SWP reveal a broad and overlapping network of 
actors spanning virtually the entire globe. I have also drawn from a wide range of South 
American sources to provide the context and background for the intellectual currents these 
North American thinkers encountered when they turned their attention to South American 
thought, as indicated in their correspondence. Notable examples include the works of José 
Carlos Mariátegui, Silvio Frondizi, Milcíades Peña, Sergio Bagú, Theotonio dos Santos, 
  viii 
Ruy Mauro Marini, Regis Debray, and Adolfo Gilly as well as internal documents of the 
University of Chile’s Centro de Estudios Socioeconomicos, an interdisciplinary research 
center that housed many of the most influential dependentistas from 1966 to 1973. 
The narrative unfolds both chronologically and thematically. Chapter 1 introduces 
the reader to Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy—the two US-based Marxist economists who 
collaboratively did the most to work out the holistic theory of political economy behind 
1960s neo-Marxist imperialist discourse—and situates Sweezy’s magazine Monthly Review 
in the context of the early Cold War New York intellectual scene. Through examining 
Baran’s and Sweezy’s early academic careers, we can see the space briefly opened for 
academic Marxism by the political and social context of the late 1930s and the Great 
Depression. Prior to the Cold War, Sweezy and Baran personified the blurry, liminal space 
between Popular Front fellow-traveler and New Deal policy-oriented intellectual. Monthly 
Review came to life amid the erosion of that social-intellectual space. The “independent 
socialist” journal’s editors and regular contributors experienced the erosion as the collapse 
of their social and material foundations, and the traumatic experience would have a deep 
impact on their theoretical system. Chapter 2 narrates the solidification of Baran’s and 
Sweezy’s unique brand of Marxism against the backdrop of the dominant political and 
intellectual trends of the United States in the 1950s.  
Chapter 3 follows the propagation of Monthly Review’s brand of Marxism to early 
New Leftists through the magazine editors’ role in constructing a certain interpretation of 
the origins and significance of the Cuban Revolution. Sweezy and MR co-editor Leo 
Huberman offered the first book-length analysis interpreting Castro’s Cuba as a “socialist” 
  ix 
state. This perspective reached an audience of New Left campus radicals through Monthly 
Review’s influence over the founders of Studies on the Left. 
Chapter 4 follows the intellectual biography of a young development economist 
named Andrew Frank through his radicalization by the Cuban Revolution, subsequent deep 
immersion in Latin American thought, and emergence as Andre Gunder Frank to introduce 
dependency theory to English-speaking scholarly audiences in North America. In contrast to 
the story usually told by historians and social scientists, I argue that a legacy of Latin 
American Marxist thought dealing with questions of hegemony (in Lenin’s sense) and 
uneven and combined development (in Trotsky’s) are crucial to understanding the origins 
and historic significance of Frank’s version of dependency theory. Frank was swept up in 
the same currents locally that fed into the early New Left. From a solid development 
economics insider, he became a critic of US imperialism and of modernization theory as its 
justifying ideology. Motivated by his break with his profession, and what he perceived as an 
inability to properly understand Latin American underdevelopment from within any of the 
North American academic disciplines, Frank lived among and absorbed the ideas of Latin 
American academic leftists. In his synthesis of the intellectual currents he encountered, he 
was most influenced by a long tradition grappling with the relation between the short-term 
goals of the nationalist struggle against imperialism and the longer struggle for socialism. 
Unfamiliar with these debates, or their longer Marxist antecedents, Frank cognized them 
according to Cold War mental categories and synthesized them with the neo-Marxist ideas 
he had absorbed through reading Monthly Review and Paul Baran’s Political Economy of 
Growth. 
  x 
The fifth and final chapter locates Neo-Marxism as a mobilizing political ideology as 
it operated in three terrains: US New Left campus radicalism, Santiago-based social science 
discourse during the “Chilean road to socialism,” and US social science discourse in the 
transition from the “New Deal Order” to the “Age of Fracture.” In each case, would-be 
revolutionaries struggled to weaponize their academic theorizing against the monster, and 
the institutional context of the actors and deeply ingrained assumptions about the theory 
proved unequal to the task. US campus radicals assumed corporate liberalism locked the 
American working class in a mass false consciousness for the indefinite future, which led 
them not even to pose, let alone answer, the question of “hegemony” in the classical Marxist 
sense. In Chile, dependency theorists did pose the question, and they engaged in a real 
struggle to win Chilean rural and urban workers over to a program of revolutionary 
socialism. But they lost to a coalition of local and imperialist reactionary forces, laying the 
groundwork for the first ever structural adjustment program that would come to be known as 
the Washington Consensus. North American academics mobilized by Neo-Marxist theory 
tried to secure a foothold for Marxist scholarship within the academy and use this vital 
strategic point within the cultural apparatus to disrupt the process of cultural reproduction 
through which imperialism maintained domestic social stability. Ultimately, this was the 
most successful effort. The long-run result has been an academic Marxist discourse that has 
adopted the genre conventions and idioms of the disciplines in which it is embedded. 
Defining the Monster brings together historiographies of modernization theory and 
development economics, the history of the left in the United States, and global intellectual 
history to make broad and more narrow interventions. Historians of modernization theory 
show the role of ideas in history by demonstrating the direct influence that academic thought 
  xi 
exerts over the ideologies of policy-makers. This literature tends to portray the evolution of 
academic thought primarily on the plane of ideas, then traces those ideas as they become 
embedded in various public and private institutions with influence over public policy. My 
project, in contrast, focuses on academic intellectuals who orient their ideas toward real or 
imagined counterhegemonic social movements, hoping to shape public policy by generating 
or gaining influence within publics that will replace or redirect the energies of existing 
policy-making institutions. By showing how policy-makers come to be constrained in their 
actions and how academic discourse becomes a site of social contestation, this approach 
grounds the evolution of academic thought in material social forces and offers a fuller 
understanding of the role of ideas in historical processes. 
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Introduction: 
Awakening Inside the Monster 
 
 “We [in the US] have the advantage over all other socialists of being situated right in 
the lair of the monster.” Paul Sweezy and Leo Huberman, 1965.1 
 
“As people who are located inside the monster, revolutionary Americans are in a 
position to do decisive damage to the U.S. ruling class’s plans to continue and expand its 
world rule.” Ted Gold, 1970.2  
 
“There is an old Wobbly poster showing a prisoner behind bars,” wrote Eric Mann to 
Harry Magdoff in 1971. “He says, ‘we are in here for you, you are out there for us.’” Mann 
wrote to Magdoff from a prison-cell in Concord, Massachusetts, where he was serving a two-
year sentence for vandalism and assault after leading a chapter of the militant student group 
Weathermen to invade the Harvard Center for International Affairs in the fall of 1969. 
Magdoff, for his part, had recently assumed co-editorship of Monthly Review, a radical 
journal that catered to academic Marxists. Monthly Review was best-known for advancing a 
specific political economic theory of imperialism. That focus fascinated Mann, who noted, 
“When I get out we should talk. I want to understand more about the economics of the 
empire…I still have virtually no real understanding of how an imperialist economy operates. 
But I am getting a lot better at learning how to destroy it.”3 
                                                 
1 Paul Sweezy and Leo Huberman, “Tell the Truth,” Monthly Review 17/2 (June 1965), 1-
6 at 2.  
 
2 Quoted in Kirkpatrick Sale, SDS, (New York, NY: Random House, 1973), 593. 
 
3 Eric Mann to Harry Magdoff, 31 January, 1971, Harry Magdoff Papers, Box 6, Folder 
labeled “New School Class,” Tamiment Library, New York University. Hereafter I will use 
the abbreviation HMP to refer to the collection. Magdoff’s papers remain unsorted, so 
sometimes nothing more than a box number will be used to guide researchers. Where 
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Mann walked a fairly typical path through the tumult of 1960s youth radicalism. 
When he began his activism with Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in 1965, the 
broad-based social opposition historian Van Gosse coined the “movement of movements” 
had reached full force. Boasting a diverse spectrum of political and social outlooks, the 1960s 
protest movement eludes simple ideological classification. Historians trying to unravel the 
ideological threads feeding into the tapestry of the New Left have emphasized radical 
liberalism, pacifism, anti-racism and the Beat counterculture. After being weaned in the early 
phases of this movement, characterized by its conscious decentralized structure and 
ideological diversity, Mann, like hundreds of his generation of radicals, veered sharply in the 
opposite direction in the late 1960s. Disciplined, ideologically exclusive splinter groups 
replaced the amorphous ecumenical movement of movements. The Weathermen, Mann’s 
group, took discipline and ideological coherence to the extreme, requiring members to 
sacrifice worldly possessions and interpersonal relationships for the single-minded purpose 
of killing “the monster,” US imperialism. Biographically, Mann thus personifies the 
consensus narrative, captured and broadly circulated in Todd Gitlin’s conception of the 
“years of hope” and “days of rage” as the dichotomous phases of the New Left.4 
                                                 
possible, I refer to folders as labeled by Magdoff, which are very frequently misleading as to 
their actual content. For the incident that led to Mann’s arrest, see: Sale, SDS, 602. 
 
4 Histories of the ideological origins of the New Left stressing pacifism, radical 
liberalism, and the Beat counterculture are legion. See: Kevin Mattson, Intellectuals in 
Action: The Origins of the New Left and Radical Liberalism, 1945-1970, (University Park, 
PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002); Maurice Isserman, If I Had a Hammer: The 
Death of the Old Left and the Birth of the New Left, (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1987); 
Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage, (New York, NY: Bantam Books, 
1987), 12-77. For a semi-auto-biographical account of sixties radicals in their revolutionary 
Third World Marxist phase, see: Max Elbaum, Revolution in the Air: Sixties Radicals turn to 
Lenin, Mao and Che, (New York, NY: Verso, 2002). For a more historical account of New 
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Such a sudden and sharp reversal begs historical explanation. Historians have 
portrayed sixties radicalism largely through the lens of the generation’s own self-perceptions. 
The term “New Left” originated in England and quickly caught on with the explosion of 
student radicalism in the United States in the early 1960s. The nomenclature remains current, 
not simply to honor the self-identity of a group of historical actors, but also as a frame to 
periodize the broader history of the US Left. Sixties radicals, in the consensus narrative, 
differed from earlier iterations along virtually every dimension. They hailed from different 
social backgrounds, organized around different axes of struggle, and, especially, rejected the 
tired and clichéd theories of an Old Left forged in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution of 
1917. While histories of the New Left have expanded to encompass ever-wider social layers 
and geographic horizons, discontinuity with the Old Left has remained a central theme. This 
sense of rupture is often captured with the metaphor of “death” and “rebirth,” or the image of 
the New Left arising phoenix-like “out of the ashes” of the Old.5 
                                                 
Left “neo-Bolshevikization,” see: Howard Brick and Christopher Phelps, Radicals in 
America: The U.S. Left Since the Second World War, (New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), 121-217. 
 
5 Imagery of death and rebirth, Maurice Isserman, If I Had a Hammer. Phoenix metaphor: 
Lisa McGirr, “Port Huron and the Origins of the International New Left,” in Richard Flacks 
and Nelson Lichtenstein eds., The Port Huron Statement: Sources and Legacies of the New 
Left’s Founding Manifesto, (Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 2015), 50-64, 
at 53 then repeated at 54. Christopher Phelps, “Lefts Old and New: Sixties Radicals, Now 
and Then,” in Howard Brick and Gregory Parker eds., A New Insurgency: The Port Huron 
Statement and Its Times, (Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan Publishing, University of Michigan 
Library, 2012), makes a valuable contribution, noting that the New Left created the category 
“Old Left” to denote the discontinuity between themselves and older versions of U.S. 
radicalism. Phelps argues the categories, though meaningful to the generation at the time, 
simply dissolve on closer historical scrutiny. 
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Resituating the intellectual history of radical thought in the US around changing 
theories of imperialism helps better understand the New Left’s transmutation from pacifist 
proponents of participatory democracy to revolutionary anti-imperialists dedicated to slaying 
the monster. Centering discourses of imperialism, a dialectic of quantitative and qualitative 
change replaces the resurrection metaphor as a means of thinking through continuities and 
discontinuities along several dimensions of ideas and programs at the far-left of American 
politics. A “Neo-Marxist” theory of imperialism compelled the extreme voluntarism of the 
late 1960s, of the variety that led college students to blow up buildings.6 But the image of 
classical Marxism “reborn” for a generation of 1960s youth accurately captures neither the 
features of Neo-Marxism, nor the social dynamics behind its propagation into the 
organizations of student radicalism. Tracing the evolution of the Marxist theory of 
imperialism in US discourse from the 1930s through the onset of the Cold War helps identify 
important lines of continuity linking the ideas of the Old Left to the those of the New. 
Historians of the American left have portrayed the rise of the Communist Party following the 
Russian Revolution as a deviation in American radical thought. By vesting progressive 
agency in the Soviet Union over and above local class struggle, the Communist Party 
appeared to be controlled by a foreign element; an image opponents successfully leveraged to 
create a rift between the party and the deep-seated, long-running tradition of American 
                                                 
6 In employing this terminology, I am following the lead of scholars largely referring to 
Paul Baran’s and Andre Gunder Frank’s interventions into the subfield of development 
economics. See: Aidan Foster-Carter, “Neo-Marxist Approaches to Development and 
Underdevelopment,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 3/1 (1973); Gilbert Rist, The History of 
Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith fourth edition, (New York, NY: Zed 
Books, 2014 [1996]), 109-122; H.W. Arndt, Economic Development: The History of an Idea, 
(New York and London, 1987), 116-120.  
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radicalism.7 Yet, by focusing on a continuous and sustained critique of US imperialism as it 
evolved from the 1930s to the 1970s, we see that the New Left not only repeated this error, 
but did so by replacing the Soviet Union with the Third World in the analytical and 
programmatic framework of “imperialism” coming out of 1930s Stalinized Marxism.  
Highlighting this broad continuity does not discount real and important changes in 
discourse of imperialism from the 1930s to the 1960s, but rather recasts those changes as 
incremental and cumulative impressions shaped through the way dissident intellectuals 
experienced evolutions in the structure of world capitalism, engaged with the liberal “vital 
center” of North American thought, and tried to situate their ideas in a rapidly changing 
institutional context for the production and dissemination of ideas. Intellectuals who saw the 
US as an imperialist power had to modify classical Marxist definitions of imperialism to 
adequately apply them to the structure of post-World War Two international relations. 
Following the war, the US emerged as the unrivalled economic and military leader of the 
capitalist world. Clearly, the post-war generation no longer lived in the multipolar world 
order in which Rosa Luxemburg, Rudolf Hilferding, and V.I. Lenin applied their 
interpretations of Marx’s Capital to explain the economic motives behind the scramble for 
territory at the turn of the twentieth century. In place of a multipolar world order stood a 
                                                 
7 This argument is made most explicitly by: James Weinstein, The Decline of Socialism 
in America, 1912-1925; Theodore Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia: The 
Formative Period, (New York, NY: The Viking Press, 1960). The argument has received a 
more textured treatment recently by works from Jacob Zumoff and Bryan Palmer, who map 
the increasing subservience of the Communist Party to the Comintern against the changing 
political dynamics within the Soviet Union. See: Jacob A. Zumoff, The Communist 
International and US Communism, 1919-1929, (Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2014); 
Bryan D. Palmer, James P. Cannon and the Origins of the American Revolutionary Left, 
1890-1928, (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2007). 
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bipolar system of international relations perceived by contemporaries as an ideological 
struggle to the death between capitalism and communism. Internally, the capitalist bloc 
experienced something closer to what International Relations scholars call “hegemonic 
stability,” organized under Washington’s leadership.8 Thinkers working within the Marxist 
tradition had to reconcile important components of their theory of imperialism to fit the 
changed situation. Describing the US as an “imperialist” power under conditions of 
unchallenged US hegemony meant something other than overt political colonization to create 
spheres of influence against other imperialist rivals. Methods of coercion and exploitation 
within an organized capitalist bloc became subtler, if no less pernicious. Moreover, the 
dividends accruing to the metropolitan power in this new type of organized imperialism 
outweighed those of the earlier competitive variety, enabling Washington to seemingly 
permanently buy off domestic class struggle through super-exploitation on the capitalist 
periphery, thus reshaping class relations domestically. 
More even than structural changes to world capitalism, the academicization of 
intellectualism from 1945 to the 1960s transformed US discourse of imperialism. Throughout 
this period, concepts of “imperialism” and “colonialism” operated in a dual arena, as 
mobilizing rhetoric for counterhegemonic struggles, and in the academic subfields of 
development economics and modernization theory, where broad questions about 
                                                 
8 Hegemonic stability theory is a specific variant of International Relations realist theory. 
IR realists argue the structure of the international system—the relative power distributions 
among nation-states—is the most important independent variable determining the foreign 
policies of individual states within the system. Scholars trace the origins of HST to Charles 
Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939, (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1973). See also: Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); David Lake, “Leadership, Hegemony, and 
International Economy,” International Studies Quarterly, 37/4 (Dec. 1993), 459-489. 
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epistemology and holistic social theory were interpreted and debated within a positivist 
framework, analytically fractured to fit disciplinary conventions. The academy that stood at 
the center of this institutional context limited the ability to pursue certain lines of thought to 
the end. Subjects of my study tried to formulate a critical theory of global capitalism by 
rejecting any rigid epistemological separation between subject and object, the “thing in 
itself” and the “thing for us.” In other words, they saw studying the causes of 
“underdevelopment” as inseparable from mobilizing people in underdeveloped nations to 
break free from imperialist exploitation. Yet, they lacked the transnational organizations to 
make this theoretical unification between imperialist theory and anti-imperialist 
revolutionary subject concrete, rendering their theoretical articulations first objectivist and 
fatalistic, then desperate and voluntarist.  
This study attempts to grapple with some of these questions of continuity and change 
in the discourse of imperialism as a motivating program for the US left from the era of the 
Popular Front to the New Left. It does so by focusing on an intellectual bloc centered 
primarily around the socialist journal Monthly Review, and its printing press Monthly Review 
Press. Throughout the 1950s, Monthly Review editors and a small but significant network of 
regular contributors insinuated a critique of US imperialism into public intellectual discourse. 
They did so through the most extreme period of the Second Red Scare, against the backdrop 
of the migration of public intellectuals into academic departments in the expanding university 
system, and the decline of the Soviet Union as a utopian symbol for the left. As it gathered 
around it a network of credentialed professional economists, historians, sociologists, and 
anthropologists, Monthly Review advanced a theory of imperialism alternately clothed in the 
formalistic language of social science and the more accessible rhetoric of radical journalism. 
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As social science, it arose in discourse with the subfield of development economics, and was 
peculiarly slanted toward debates over the correct state-led policies to expedite economic 
development and social, cultural and political modernization in ‘backward’ countries. As 
public rhetoric, the Monthly Review variant of Marxist theory of imperialism engaged a 
different set of questions, bound up with competing interpretations of the nature of the state 
in modern society, and of the “publics” to which it was nominally bound. These two aspects 
of their ideas always stood in tension with one another. As academic or academic-adjacent 
intellectuals critiquing the various disciplinary expressions of modernization theory, neo-
Marxists seemed to be interested in honing technocratic theory. But, on the other side, they 
pitched their revolutionary rhetoric toward vague and undefined publics, which effectively 
meant toward no one in particular, and its hollow ring dissipated into thin air. This structural 
asymmetry between real, flesh-and-blood academic and non-academic audiences ensured the 
steady migration of Neo-Marxism into the realm of academic social science. 
In focusing on anti-imperialism as the theoretical foundation for an intellectual bloc 
formed amidst the “death” of the Old Left, I recharacterize some of the well-recognized 
antecedents to New Left thought. In addition to bringing those squarely in the Monthly 
Review orbit more fully into light, the following narrative makes a case for rethinking 
“radical liberalism” as a way to understand the contributions of C. Wright Mills and William 
Appleman Williams to the programs and strategies of student radicalism in the 1960s. 
Historian Kevin Mattson advanced the radical liberalism interpretation most explicitly in his 
book that combines intellectual biographies of Williams and Mills alongside those of Dwight 
Macdonald, Paul Goodman, Arnold Kaufman, and the academic radical journal Studies on 
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the Left.9 Here, I portray Williams and Mills—each in their own way, and to varying degrees 
at different moments—in theoretical agreement with the fundamental features of the neo-
Marxist theory of imperialism as propounded on the pages of Monthly Review and in the 
books released by Monthly Review Press. Doing so is not necessarily to discard the label 
“liberal” as applied to Williams and, especially, Mills, but rather to think through the clear 
similarities in theory and outlook between Mills and Williams at the left end of liberalism 
and MR editors and contributors as the main precursors to academic Marxism, and how their 
theoretical and programmatic positions were formulated discursively in relation to each other 
and to broader intellectual currents. The features of this intellectual affinity changed over 
time, but in general can be characterized by a few broad positions that collectively set this 
“left-liberal” anti-imperialist bloc apart from the mainstream of Cold War US intellectual 
life. The main characters of the following narrative all: (1) both assimilated and demurred 
from the “main drift” or “vital center” of US intellectual life; (2) rejected the validity of a 
pluralist conception of American democracy, in favor of a conception of hierarchically 
structured power relations executing public policy and constructing social stability; (3) 
refused to concede any critique of US foreign policy based on the logic of the 
totalitarian/democracy dichotomy endemic to Cold War liberalism; (4) viewed skeptically the 
prospects for the US social structure to produce any internal, bottom-up forces of social 
                                                 
9 Kevin Mattson, Intellectuals in Action: The Origins of the New Left and Radical 
Liberalism, 1945-1970, (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
2002), esp. 43-96; 145-186. Mattson is simply the most direct target. A similar interpretation 
of the significance of Mills underlies many of the histories of the New Left written by New 
Lefties after they entered the academy. See: Gitlin, Sixties, 12-77.  
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change in the foreseeable future; (5) critiqued academic social science, with special focus on 
the epistemological premises of “abstracted empiricism” in economics and sociology. 
The Neo-Marxist discourse of imperialism fits uneasily into the mold of New Left 
intellectual historiography, in which historians portray pacifism, democratic socialism, and 
counter-culturalism as the ideological seedlings that sprouted into the amorphous movement 
of movements of the 1960s. Throughout the 1950s, each of these ideologies operated 
relatively free from persecution on the left wing of the Cold War liberal consensus that 
dominated and structurally shaped the era’s intellectual life. These variants of Cold War 
leftism wrestled with contradictions in their worldview. Self-identified democratic socialists, 
such as those writing for Dissent or Liberation or those organized in SDS parent organization 
League for Industrial Democracy, had trouble squaring their commitments to pacifism, non-
interventionist foreign policy, and democracy with their acceptance of the Soviet aggressor 
image of the Cold War. As proponents of world-wide democracy (or, more accurately, 
republicanism), 1950s left-liberal intellectuals wanted to mobilize domestic pressure groups 
behind electoral strategies that would result in a less interventionist US foreign policy. But as 
cold warriors, they often accepted and defended Washington’s rationale for those 
interventions, premised on the need to protect underdeveloped states against the global 
aspirations of Soviet totalitarianism. These contradictions came to a head in the public 
debates swirling around interpretations of the Cuban Revolution. Left, even “socialist,” 
liberals such as Waldo Frank and Carleton Beals represented Castro’s forces as the progeny 
of the American republican revolutionary tradition, and urged Washington to nurture and 
support the regime as it flowered into a new, more egalitarian form of Western democracy. 
To buttress their public appeals, they constructed a narrative of U.S. foreign policy 
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characterized by mostly altruistic interventions punctuated by the occasional error. Armed 
with the political economy of their neo-Marxist theory of imperialism, Monthly Review 
intervened with a narrative that celebrated Cuba’s transition to socialism as a logical, 
inevitable, and desirable outcome resulting from decades of US colonialism. Mills and 
Williams picked up the broad parameters of Monthly Review’s interpretation, and propagated 
it to their devoted graduate students who constituted the intellectual core of the bourgeoning 
New Left, properly speaking. 
While democratic socialism, pacifism, and radical liberalism characterized the early 
New Left, these ideologies offer little help in understanding the meanings constructed around 
the term imperialism by the latter half of the 1960s. By the time 1960s radicals began 
referring to the U.S. as “the monster,” as in the epigraphs above, they had come to feel 
alienated from and hostile to the political process responsible for U.S. interventions in the 
Third World. “Imperialism” no longer connoted a set of policies associated with a bloc 
temporarily in control of a pluralist polity, removable through electoral politics or capable of 
being swayed by peaceful protest. For this more militant group of radicals, “imperialism” 
described a systemic process, driven by an objective logic rooted in the very structure of 
American society. When the objectivist interpretation of imperialism displaced pluralism, 
peaceful protest seemed futile and blowing up buildings seemed a logical, even heroic 
response to an unjust social order.  
To understand the origins and evolution of Neo-Marxism, in its various forms, we 
must understand the predominance of a specific interpretation of Marxism in American 
consciousness throughout the period from the 1930s through the 1960s, constructed in the 
orbit of the Popular Front era of the Communist Party. Historians have understood the 
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Popular Front as a broad advance of the American left. Grounded in the first instance in a 
rearticulation of social forces along class lines during the Great Depression, Communist 
influence over 1930s social and intellectual radicals has been deployed to understand the rise 
of new cultural forms expressing proletarian experiences, the origins of the coalitions of race 
relations that would feed into the Civil Rights movements of the 1950s and 1960s, the 
stimulus behind industrial unionism, and even the era of progressive domestic politics known 
as the New Deal Order.10 Conscience of the successful inroads Communists made into the 
groundswell of social opposition following their readjustment from the far-left third period to 
the collaborative Popular Front, historians have defined the strategy itself in terms of the 
fusion of radical thought and mass social movement that took place as a result. But, the 
political motives for the Popular Front as a top-down policy, handed down from the Soviet 
                                                 
10 For social basis of the Popular Front see: Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: 
Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
1990). For general overviews of the American Communist Party under the Popular Front 
strategy, see: Maurice Isserman, Which Side Were You On?: The American Communist Party 
during the Second World War, (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1982); Harvey 
Klehr, The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade, (New York, NY: 
Basic Books, 1984). For Popular Front and race relations see: Michael Honey, Southern 
Labor and Black Civil Rights: Organizing Memphis Workers, (Urbana, IL: University of 
Illinois Press, 1993); Robin D. G. Kelley, Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists During 
the Great Depression, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1990). For 
cultural and intellectual ramifications of the Popular Front, understood as a broad social 
movement, see: Michael Denning, The Cultural Front: The Laboring of American Culture in 
the Twentieth Century, (New York, NY: Verso, 1997); Robert Cohen, When the Old Left was 
Young: Student Radicals and America’s First Mass Student Movement, 1929-1941, (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993). For Communists in the radicalization of labor, 
see: Bert Cochran, Labor and Communism: The Conflict that Shaped American Unions, 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977); Harvey Levenstein, Communism, Anti-
Communism, and the CIO, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981).  
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Union, get lost in this historiographic trend, as do the theoretical justifications for the about 
face and their implications for the longer history of Marxist thought.11 
After solidifying power in the early 1930s, the Stalinist bureaucracy wielded the 
Third International as a tool of Russian diplomacy, leveraging the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union’s (CPUS) influence over worldwide national Communist Parties to turn them 
into pressure groups in local politics. Rather than foment revolutions, Stalinized nationalist 
Communist Parties after the Popular Front primarily sought to influence their government’s 
foreign policy toward the Soviet Union.12 To this political reorientation corresponded a 
change in the theoretical articulations of Marxism along several interrelated dimensions, 
collectively amounting to an inversion of the Marxist theory of imperialism. Still bearing the 
prestige of the 1917 Revolution, Soviet-affiliated Communist Parties shaped Marxist 
discourse, and the theoretical articulations of Popular Front Marxism radiated outward into 
broader public discourse, influencing popular perceptions of Marxism for a generation. As a 
                                                 
11 For Popular Front as a turning point in the Third International, see: Edward Hallett 
Carr, The Twilight of the Comintern, 1930-1935, (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1982). 
For its influence on Marxist thought internationally, see: Perry Anderson, Considerations of 
Western Marxism, (London: NLB, 1976); Emanuele Saccarelli, Gramsci and Trotsky in the 
Shadow of Stalinism: The Political Theory and Practice of Opposition, (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2008).  
 
12 In the felicitous words of Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World 
Interventions and the Making of Our Times, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 66: “It was as if Stalin- having started the climb toward socialism in 
one country- was deliberately kicking away the ladder for others to follow.” Throughout this 
study, I use “Stalinism” to denote not the policies of Stalin as an individual, but rather the 
process of bureaucratization. For a theoretical justification of this terminology, see: Palmer, 
“Rethinking”; Saccarelli, Gramsci. This usage originates in the writings of Leon Trotsky. For 
a very thorough historical treatment of the evolution of Trotsky’s thought on Soviet 
bureaucratization, see: Thomas M. Twiss, Trotsky and the Problem of Soviet Bureaucracy, 
(Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014). 
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mode of thought in the United States, Popular Front Marxism represented the drawing 
together, or “convergence,” of liberal and Marxist thought, and forms something of a 
rightward shift among radical intellectuals that allowed them to meet the leftward shifting 
liberal intellectuals in a common middle ground. 
Neo-Marxist imperialist discourse of the 1960s took shape gradually through the late 
1940s and 1950s as the left-liberal convergence of the Popular Front/New Deal era polarized 
under the centrifugal forces of the Cold War, and then reconvened in the late 1950s on the 
basis of a shared interpretation of the structures of power in the United States and the world 
historic significance of the Cuban Revolution. Several interrelated structural and institutional 
factors contoured the debates that emerged at the left end of the vital center, which would 
constitute the major intellectual camps vying for ideological influence over the social 
movements of the 1960s. The resolution of World War Two secured an unprecedented era of 
prosperity for American capitalism.13 Concurrently, spurred in part by the passage of the GI 
Bill, the modern system of higher education took shape. College enrollments doubled in the 
decade between 1945 and 1955, and the increased demand for faculty drastically extended 
the one institutional base for intellectuals to pursue their ideas with material security and 
relative independence.14 Much of the social foundation for the intellectual convergence 
between Popular Front Marxists and New Deal liberals collapsed when labor became more 
bureaucratized, as a consequence of patriotism and the no-strike pledge during the war, and 
                                                 
13 For the structure of American capitalism following World War Two, see: Leo Panitch 
and Sam Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American 
Empire, (New York, NY: Verso Books, 2012), esp. 67-107.  
14 Stanley Aronowitz, Taking it Big: C. Wright Mills and the Making of Political 
Intellectuals, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2012), 76. 
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when the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 purged labor organizations of radicals and severely 
limited their scope of action.15 
Against this backdrop of changing meanings of both Marxism and liberalism, 
academics in the US turned their attention to third world “underdevelopment,” and it is 
within the context of these debates that the theoretical postulates of Neo-Marxism took 
shape. As subfields of academic thought, development economics and modernization theory, 
in their origins and theoretical assumptions, quintessentially expressed the convergence of 
Popular Front Marxism and New Deal liberalism. In the 1930s and early 1940s, at the height 
of the Popular Front/New Deal alliance, precursors to post-World War Two “development 
economics” felt free to abstract lessons for state-led growth from the Soviet industrialization 
experience. In doing so, they only emulated the pragmatic experimentalism practiced in the 
New Deal state, where Roosevelt Brain Trusters Rexford Tugwell and Stuart Chase 
unabashedly praised Soviet state planning. Economists in the United States trying to explain 
perpetual economic and social stagnation of “backward” nations in the 1940s drew from 
Marxism as much as Keynesianism, and abstracted their models from the empirical case of 
Soviet industrialization.16 As the Marxist economist Paul Baran noted in his critique of the 
sub-discipline, the very existence of development economics amounted to a tacit admission 
that the “normal” case of capitalist development could not be replicated in backward 
                                                 
15 For bureaucratization of labor during the war, see: Nelson Lichtenstein, Labor’s War at 
Home: The CIO in World War II, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
16 For influence of Soviet industrialization on US theories of development economics and 
modernization theory, see: David C. Engerman, Modernization from the Other Shore: 
American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2003), esp. 153-243; Alexander Erlich, The Soviet Industrialization Debate, 
1924-1928, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960). 
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countries, and the state must be more active in the economic sphere.17 Recently, historians 
have drawn parallels between modernization theory and “orthodox” Marxism as competing 
forms of “high modernism,” and have used this as a lens for understanding the Cold War as a 
global phenomenon permeating all diplomatic and economic relations among nation-states 
from the 1940s to the 1980s.18 This perspective presents a historically specific, and 
politically constructed, interpretation of Marxism as a timeless orthodoxy, and then compares 
that orthodoxy to a historicized version of liberal thought.19 By applying the same sense of 
historical specificity to the rise and fall of orthodoxies within Marxist thought, we can get a 
stronger sense of the competing interpretations that vied for a hearing among the social 
movements of the 1960s, and thus a better understanding of the way social struggle and 
intellectual contestation interacted in the transition to new policies and theories of 
development in the 1970s. 
Throughout the 1950s, the Marxist critique of development economics and 
modernization theory remained hamstrung by the dominance of Popular Front Marxism as 
                                                 
17 Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, (New York, NY: Monthly Review 
Press, 1957), 10-11. 
 
18 Westad, Global Cold War, 33: “[Modernization theory] has many of the same 
positivist traits as Marxism, with which it self-consciously draws a comparison. Indeed, it 
could be argued that both constitute a form of ‘high modernism’ that emphasize, in a 
deterministic form, the unity of all modern development, centered on industry and 
technology.”  
 
19 For modernization theory as a specific moment in the historical development of 
liberalism, see: Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War 
America, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); Michael Latham, 
Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy 
Era (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); David Ekbladh, 
The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World 
Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
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the perceived orthodoxy in what remained of the North American intellectual left. By looking 
closely at the logical continuities linking the American New Left’s perceptions of Third 
World nationalism with the version of Marxism propagated internationally by the Soviet 
Union beginning in the mid-1930s, we can see long term consequences of the rise and 
solidification of the Soviet bureaucracy as the ultimate arbiter of orthodoxy in the 
international Marxist intellectual tradition. The left intellectuals who built the symbolism 
surrounding first Castroism then Maoism largely kept their theory of world history intact by 
shoehorning their interpretations of those revolutions within the framework they had 
absorbed in the 1930s. Western Neo-Marxist thought- including dependency theory and 
Third World Marxism- thus emerged not out of the collapse and rebirth of an intellectual left, 
but rather through a process of piecemeal evolution of Popular Front Marxism as it passed 
through the immediate post-World War Two era. Far from new, this accommodation between 
Marxism and anti-imperialist nationalism finds its origins in the orthodoxy constructed out of 
the struggle for leadership of the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s, a reflection of Stalin’s 
“socialism in one country” turned into a development model and projected outward onto 
decolonizing states throughout the world. 
The image of the Third World thus stepped into sixties radical consciousness draped 
in the garb of nationalism and statism. Rightly or wrongly, it was painted in shades of 
nationalism and technocratic economic development, and only in this image held up as an 
object worthy of admiration. By the late 1960s, US radicals of all stripes formulated their 
own goals and strategies through analogies to anti-imperialist nationalist movements in the 
de-colonizing world, leading to closer engagement with long-running debates over the 
strategies and tactics of anti-imperialist struggle. This dynamic led to engagement with and 
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partial recovery of a pre-Popular Front form of Marxist globalism, with a non-technocratic 
and transnational solution to the problem of underdevelopment, colonialism, semi-
colonialism or “backwardness.” Yet, lacking a transnational institutional base comparable to 
the Second and Third Internationals in their heydays, this intellectual breakthrough never 
managed to identify and fuse with a viable, transnational revolutionary agent. As the decade 
wore on, and social struggles mounted on a global scale, radical intellectuals in the United 
States became increasingly anxious to resurrect transnational, bottom-up organizations 
capable of coordinating and orchestrating anti-imperialist struggles at different points in the 
capitalist system. But, doing so meant addressing the long-standing theoretical détente 
between Marxism and nationalism, the lingering hangover of Popular Front Marxism. 
It is a peculiarity of history that these debates over the correct Marxist orientation 
toward nationalism constantly intermingled with prevailing trends in academic humanities 
and social sciences. The expansion of higher education in the decades following World War 
Two wrought far-reaching changes in North American thought. As academic departments 
increasingly monopolized intellectual production, it became narrower, more specialized, and 
less accessible to the public at large.20 Within this context, anti-imperialist nationalism 
emerged as both a foreign policy concern for Washington and Moscow, and an academic 
curiosity. In the 1950s, academics and policy-makers cohered around “modernization theory” 
as a consensus explaining Third World underdevelopment, and prescribing a solution. An 
offshoot of Cold War liberalism, modernization theory cloaked US political and economic 
interventions in the decolonizing states with a veneer of scientific legitimacy. Imperialism re-
                                                 
20 The best account of this process remains Russell Jacoby, The Last Intellectuals: 
American Culture in the Age of Academe, (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1987).  
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entered public discourse through a critique of both US foreign policy and the academic 
theories justifying it, and it came from intellectuals embedded in the university and 
accustomed to the conventions of academic discourse. Mobilized by the rhetoric of anti-
imperialism, student radicals mounted a campus insurgency to change the discourse or 
disrupt the empire, or both, but their battles on the “ideological front” were often waged on 
the terrain of academic social sciences, where their opponents held the high ground.  
While the prevalence of anti-imperialist sensibilities among 1960s radicals is well-
known, the intellectual roots of the theories of imperialism floating in American public 
discourse remain underexplored. In practical terms, campus radicals expressed their anti-
imperialist sentiments through their opposition to the war in Vietnam. Logically, many of the 
contradictions of development economics came to a head in Vietnam. There could be no 
clearer indication of the limits of prevailing theories than the most well-known development 
economist, Walt Whitman Rostow, serving as the “architect” of a disastrous effort to 
forcefully usher Vietnamese through his theoretical stages of growth. Youth understandably 
resented being sent against their will to die for such a futile, and morally dubious, cause. 
Yet, while anti-imperialist sentiment undoubtedly surfaced most concretely in 
opposition to the Vietnam War, earlier engagement with Latin American anti-Yankee 
thought laid the theoretical groundwork that would shape the programmatic responses 
campus radicals seized upon in their struggle against the war. The Cuban Revolution marked 
the first real intellectual movement out of the 1950s Cold War liberal consensus. Mills and 
Williams, well-known forebears of 1960s radical thought, joined with Baran and Sweezy to 
propagate the notion that US imperialism was responsible for the economic stagnation that 
led to the social unrest behind the revolution, and would continue to foreclose the possibility 
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for gradual development without major structural changes, including transfers of property 
ownership that would not sit well with US business interests. Following the spread of this 
interpretation into early cells of student radicalism, a wave of the young US academic 
intelligentsia created closer links to Latin American radical academic networks. Monthly 
Review helped cultivate these transnational intellectual networks, and served as a pipeline for 
translating and circulating South American revolutionary debates among English-speaking 
North American audiences.  
We as historians must grasp the dynamic of social struggles as they unfolded around 
the axis of imperialist discourse on a world scale in the 1960s and early 1970s. In this 
admittedly limited study, I have focused on the way neo-Marxism emerged as a unique, 
holistic set of theoretical coordinates in the minds of a small group of North American 
intellectuals in the 1950s, how it received a tremendous push in the early 1960s through 
cross-fertilization with Latin American anti-imperialist programmatic debates, and how the 
ensuing fusion operated rhetorically inside and outside the academy in the United States and 
parts of Latin America in the 1960s and early 1970s. The specific features of neo-Marxist 
theory emerged in relation to the changing structures of global capitalism, the psychological 
toll of isolation and repression in the Second Red Scare, and the constant effort to stake out a 
uniquely Marxist perspective in discourse with other major 1950s American intellectual 
trends. Proponents of the theory, organized around Monthly Review, articulated the most 
ambitious and coherent synthetic model tying together radical impressions of the 1950s. This 
model circulated internationally, especially after their own intense interest in Latin American 
development following the Cuban Revolution. By the late 1960s, various offshoots of neo-
Marxist imperialist thought wound their way into student radical movements, informing their 
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revolutionary programs during the days of rage. Throughout the same period, Neo-Marxism 
also infiltrated academic disciplines, igniting debates over social scientific epistemology and 
the validity of overt anti-imperialism as a legitimate scholarly posture. As the social 
movements of 1960s waned in the early years of the 1970s, student radicals settled into 
secure academic posts, ensuring these epistemological debates would be the most lasting 
legacy of the 1960s interest in neo-Marxism, which in their suspicion of claims of “value-
neutral” scholarship inadvertently contributed to the post-structuralist turn in North American 
academic thought. 
The following narrative unfolds both chronologically and thematically. Chapter one 
introduces the reader to Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy—the two US-based Marxist economists 
who collaboratively did the most to work out the holistic theory of political economy behind 
1960s neo-Marxist imperialist discourse—and situates Sweezy’s magazine Monthly Review 
in the context of the early Cold War New York intellectual scene. Through examining 
Baran’s and Sweezy’s early academic careers, we can see the space briefly opened for 
academic Marxism by the political and social context of the late 1930s and the Great 
Depression. Sweezy and Baran prior to the Cold War personify the blurry, liminal space 
between Popular Front fellow-traveler and New Deal policy-oriented intellectual. Monthly 
Review came to life amid the erosion of that social-intellectual space. The “independent 
socialist journal’s” editors, regular contributors, and, presumably, readership experienced the 
erosion as the collapse of their social and material foundations, and the traumatic experience 
would have a deep impact on their theoretical system.  
Chapter two narrates the solidification of Baran’s and Sweezy’s unique brand of 
Marxism against the backdrop of the dominant political and intellectual trends of the United 
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States in the 1950s. Here I make a case for thinking of Baran, Sweezy, Mills, and Williams 
as an intellectual bloc whose individual experiences shaped similar worldviews and political 
orientations by the end of the decade. A shared distaste for intellectual conformity and US 
foreign policy pushed them to ponder the social role and responsibility of intellectuals, with 
increasingly sharp criticism of academic social sciences. From their respective liberal and 
Marxist predispositions, they asked the question “knowledge for what,” which from either 
direction led them to think through the ways corporate capitalism wielded the state and the 
cultural apparatus to achieve social and economic stability, at the cost of mass psychological 
and cultural degradation. These ideas were as much impressions of their personal experiences 
with social isolation and political repression as their engagement with and synthesis of 
broader intellectual currents, such as fiscal Keynesian economics and functionalist sociology. 
They were not the only ones of their era to see pernicious elite power dynamics rather than 
genuine cultural consensus behind the appearance of social and economic equilibrium 
spanning from the end of World War Two to the 1960s, but they were among the relatively 
few who attributed the causes to the objective logic of the political economic structure, still 
perceived as capitalist and imperialist. 
Chapter three follows the propagation of Monthly Review’s brand of Marxism to early 
New Leftists through the magazine editors’ role in constructing a certain interpretation of the 
origins and significance of the Cuban Revolution. Sweezy and MR co-editor Leo Huberman 
offered the first book-length analysis interpreting Castro’s Cuba as a “socialist” state. Mills 
and Williams quickly stepped in to buttress this interpretation. The Cuban Revolution 
solidified Mills, Williams, and MR as a bloc, on the basis of their shared interpretation of the 
nature of Castro’s regime and its significance for the disruptive, anti-capitalist potential of 
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Third World nationalism. This perspective reached an audience of early New Lefties through 
the University of Wisconsin, where Williams and Hans Gerth had influence and where 
students would form Studies on the Left. Contrary to the idea of the New Left evolving from 
“radical liberalism” to terrorism, the theoretical framework that informed the voluntarist 
strategies during the “days of rage” was already in place before even the Port Huron 
Statement. This included a model of revolution which saw middle-class or white-collar 
intellectuals as the group capable of uniting underprivileged groups behind its hegemonic 
program of anti-imperialist nationalism, an epistemology of science critical of the methods of 
academic social science and its practical or problem-solving role, and the contradictory fact 
that these intellectuals remained themselves embedded in the university, which framed their 
political orientation. 
Chapter Four follows the intellectual biography of a young development economist 
named Andrew Frank through his radicalization by the Cuban Revolution, subsequent deep 
immersion in Latin American thought, and emergence as Andre Gunder Frank to introduce 
dependency theory to English-speaking, North American, scholarly audiences. In contrast to 
the story usually told by historians and social scientists, I argue that a legacy of Latin 
American Marxist thought dealing with questions of hegemony (in Lenin’s sense) and 
uneven and combined development (in Trotsky’s) are crucial to understanding the origins 
and historic significance of Frank’s version of dependency theory. Frank was swept up in the 
same currents locally that fed into the early New Left. From a solid development economics 
insider, he became a critic of US imperialism and of modernization theory as its justifying 
ideology. Motivated by his break with his profession, and what he perceived as an inability to 
properly understand Latin American underdevelopment from within any of the North 
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American academic disciplines, Frank lived among and absorbed the ideas of Latin 
American academic leftists. In his synthesis of the intellectual currents he encountered, he 
was most influenced by a long tradition grappling with the relation between the short-term 
goals of the nationalist struggle against imperialism and the longer struggle for socialism. 
Unfamiliar with these debates, or their longer Marxist antecedents, Frank cognized them 
according to Cold War mental categories and synthesized them with the neo-Marxist ideas he 
had absorbed through reading Monthly Review and Paul Baran’s Political Economy of 
Growth. 
The fifth and final chapter locates Neo-Marxism as a mobilizing political ideology as 
it operated in three terrains: US New Left campus radicalism, Santiago-based social science 
discourse during the “Chilean road to socialism,” and US social science discourse in the 
transition from the “New Deal Order” to the “Age of Fracture.”21 In each case, would-be 
revolutionaries struggled to weaponize their academic theorizing against the monster, and in 
each case the institutional context of the actors and deeply ingrained assumptions of the 
theory proved unequal to the task. US campus radicals assumed corporate liberalism locked 
the American working class in a mass false consciousness for the indefinite future, which led 
them not even to pose, let alone answer, the question of “hegemony” in the classical Marxist 
sense. In Chile, dependency theorists did pose the question, and engaged in a real struggle to 
win Chilean rural and urban workers over to a program of revolutionary socialism. But they 
lost to a coalition of local and imperialist reactionary forces, laying the groundwork for the 
                                                 
21 The classic study of the New Deal Order is Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle ed., The Rise 
and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1989). Age of Fracture comes from Daniel T. Rogers, Age of Fracture, (Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011).  
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first ever structural reform program that would come to be known as the Washington 
Consensus. North American academics mobilized by Neo-Marxist theory tried to secure a 
foothold for Marxist scholarship within the academy, and use this vital strategic point within 
the cultural apparatus to disrupt the process of cultural reproduction through which 
imperialism maintained domestic social stability. Ultimately, this was the most successful 
effort. The long-run result has been an academic Marxist discourse that has adopted the genre 
conventions and idioms of the disciplines in which it is embedded. 
The afterward and conclusion ties together the threads, and draws out the 
contemporary and historiographic significance of the intervention, which here I can only 
summarize preliminarily. The study unifies previously discrete narratives of left intellectual 
history and the rise and fall of “modernization theory” as a paradigm in academic thought 
and public policy of Third World development. Historians of Cold War Third World 
development equate modernization theory and orthodox Marxism as similar holistic social 
theories grounded in teleological metanarratives of progress. This ignores historical 
construction and social contestation over definitions of Marxist orthodoxy, and more 
specifically ignores the way intellectuals borrowed categories from the Marxist theory of 
imperialism to cognize their opposition to US Third World development programs and the 
structural functionalist sociology and abstracted empiricist methods used to justify them. The 
study also contributes to a new direction in scholarship of the “international New Left,” by 
looking more closely at the formation of “shared ideas, networks, repertoires of protest, and 
sense of imagined community” along the axis of U.S.-Latin American foreign relations, 
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while simultaneously taking a critical posture toward the academic context in which those 
ideas germinated, circulated transnationally, and seeped into local social movements.22 
The study also makes an intervention that might be called methodological. It provides 
a historical analysis for rethinking how scholars measure the truth content of social and 
economic theories. Here, dependency theory meets modernization theory as an antithesis in 
both the sense of an academic paradigm and as mobilizing rhetoric for political actors. 
Ensuing conflict played out in multiple institutions, determining the new synthesis around 
neoliberalism as the ideological glue for the global historical bloc spanning from the 1970s to 
the early twenty-first century. The rise and fall of paradigms on Third World development in 
the American academy—modernization theory, dependency theory, and the neoliberal 
Washington Consensus—did not play themselves out merely on the terrain of ideas. Rather, 
intellectual proponents simultaneously purveyed these theories rhetorically to their respective 
“publics,” in the state or social movements, and these theories engendered ideologies that 
partially determined the way conflict played out among social groups. The outcome of social 
struggles in turn influenced the ideational debates within the academy, all claims to scholarly 
neutrality notwithstanding. With this historical method, we see the way policy change 
emerged out of a triangular relation between ideas, social forces, and political institutions. 
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Chapter One 
Fellow-Travelling Alone: 
Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy Amid the Onset of Cold War Liberalism 
 
 Paul Sweezy was not impressed with James Burnham’s influential book, The 
Managerial Revolution. The book’s “super-objective tone of fatalistic inevitability,” wrote 
Sweezy in a review for the scholarly Marxist journal Science and Society, merely masked its 
ex-Trotskyist author’s “disillusionment with political activity,” and served to justify his 
retreat into the ivory tower.23 Burnham’s book predicted industrialized nations throughout the 
world had converged around similar dystopian social forms dominated by a bureaucratic 
ruling class. The tone of Sweezy’s denunciation revealed his sense of urgency to combat this 
intellectual trend, but the method and form of his critique met Burnham on the academic 
terrain the two authors shared. Like Burnham, Sweezy was, after all, a trained and 
credentialed Ph.D. As such, he proposed to test the managerial revolution theory by weighing 
the historical record against Burnham’s “crucial theses.”24 On the thesis that the United 
States was no longer capitalist, Burnham fell short by placing far too much stock in the 
recently discredited notion of “absentee ownership.”25 On the thesis that Nazi Germany was 
not capitalist, Burnham failed to understand that increased state control and management of 
the German economy benefitted “capital as a whole.”26 And, finally, Burnham erred when he 
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classified the Soviet Union as managerial instead of socialist, because he failed to grasp the 
single party political regime as a necessary stage on the way to socialism.27  
 In rejecting Burnham’s thesis, Sweezy staked his position against one of the earliest 
expressions of what would become the dominant intellectual trend in the United States 
throughout his most fruitful and productive years. As the intellectual historian Howard Brick 
has shown, 1950s academic social scientists, and many public intellectuals, held that modern 
industrial societies had entered a “post-capitalist” phase.28 This “post-capitalist vision” was 
characterized by a belief that sharp lines delineating socialist and capitalist societies had 
become passé in a world in which modern states had the capacity and political will to oversee 
a “social economy,” combining private ownership of the means of production with socially 
conscious regulation. Burnham’s widely read and widely criticized book described a dark 
post-capitalist future—a vision shared by critics of the New Deal inspired by the work of 
Friedrich von Hayek—but many social theorists saw the same developments in a more 
optimistic light. For this group, the New Deal brought the promise of democratic socialism to 
the United States, and left intellectuals needed only to press forward for greater reforms. 
While certainly widespread, the post-capitalist vision was not unanimous, and shifting 
our focus onto continued critiques of U.S. capitalism helps us better make sense of the 
intellectual trends that competed to shape the programs of the social struggles that emerged 
in the 1960s. The form, content and trajectory of the continuous critique of the United States 
as a capitalist, imperialist social system throughout the period of the post-capitalist vision 
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illuminates the types of discourse of imperialism that intersected with a new generation of 
radicals in the 1960s. As the co-editor and leading theoretical mind behind the independent 
socialist journal Monthly Review, Sweezy played a central role in maintaining an “anti-
capitalist vision” articulated discursively against the era’s dominant “post-capitalist vision.” 
In doing so, he and his friend and co-thinker Paul Baran synthesized the classical Marxist 
texts on imperialism, and borrowed categories to cognize the changing structure of post-
World War Two capitalism. They thus form a crucial link in the ongoing reception of the 
Marxist tradition in US thought.  
 Monthly Review in the 1950s offers a compelling lens to deepen our understanding of 
some of the major dilemmas in the history of American radical thought. The editors and 
small coterie of regular contributors stand somewhere between the Popular Front and the 
New Left, and through a close look at their story we get a sense of the way structural and 
institutional changes in the manner of producing and circulating ideas manifested themselves 
in the orientation and program of left discourse. Channeling the mood of the Popular Front 
era, MR took an ecumenical approach. The editors opened the pages to a wide range of left-
liberal ideas and exerted a light editorial touch. Affiliated with no organization or party, they 
nominally avoided the simplicity of a party line, but effectively propagated a definite 
message of a certain and specific social layer. Anticipating the 1960s New Left, the 
perspective espoused on the pages of Monthly Review was already deeply rooted in academic 
Marxism, with its increasingly narrow, disciplinary, and specialized focus. A distinctly MR 
brand of Marxism thus incubated within the institutional context of the academicization of 
public intellectualism described by historian Russel Jacoby, which would have tremendous 
implications for their ability to conceive of a viable agent of social change. 
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Paul A. Baran and the Origins of Development Economics 
“It’s very easy to accept formulas. It’s very hard to think the way Marx thought, 
for whom formulas were not really of any great importance. The tendency of the 
falling rate of profit, the forces of production and the relations of production, modes 
of production- all of these things are easily formulated as schemas or models, which 
is very dangerous because you find yourself being guided by seemingly established 
truths which become the reality rather than simply a guide to the way you organize 
your thoughts.” Paul M. Sweezy, 1999.29 
 
 Though Baran’s and Sweezy’s early lives differed markedly, through their respective 
paths they had each arrived at a very similar set of ideas about the world by the time they met 
at Harvard in 1939. Baran hailed from a Polish family that had lived variously in Russia and 
Ukraine in the years immediately preceding and following his birth. His father had a 
background in Menshevism. He fled to Vilna after the Bolshevik phase of the Revolution, 
where young Paul gained Polish citizenship. From there the family moved to Dresden where 
he underwent his formal schooling at gymnasium. In 1926, he went to study economics at the 
Plekhanov Institute in Moscow, but found the climate in the Soviet Union at the height of the 
factional struggles within the Communist Party stultifying, and so jumped at the opportunity 
to return to Germany when it presented itself. Baran worked as an assistant at the Institute for 
Social Research in Frankfurt, where he focused on the Soviet economy and wrote a 
dissertation on planning. In 1934, he returned to Moscow to escape Nazi Germany, and from 
their made his way to the U.S. via Poland. Upon his arrival to the U.S. then, he was a trained 
economist with a strong background in Marxist theory and an intellectual interest in 
“planning.”30 
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 The transient nature of Baran’s early life and his cosmopolitan European education 
broadened his worldview, and would forever subsume his economic analysis within a holistic 
framework. Baran absorbed the multi-determinate approach practiced at the Frankfurt 
Institute. Later, as a Stanford professor of economics, he would resist the statistical and 
econometric turn in the American economics profession. His published contributions to the 
profession- always presented in the form of a prose essay lacking equations or formal 
models- often considered psychological, cultural, and social determinants of an evolving, 
holistic system that at its roots grew out of economic soil. He remained friendly with Herbert 
Marcuse, the other, more famous, American-based representative of the Frankfurt School. 
While not delving as deeply into Freudian psychology as Marcuse, Baran undoubtedly 
carried with him the multi-dimensional analytical framework he acquired as a researcher at 
the Frankfurt Institute. 
 His personal experiences in the Soviet Union also left their mark, both intellectually 
and politically. Baran’s first return as an adult to the polity from which his father had felt 
compelled to flee came in 1926, the most tumultuous year of debates over control of the 
Party. Baran later claimed to find the whole affair off-putting, but as a student of economics 
at the Plekhanov Institute at the very height of the industrialization debate, he was privy to 
the evolution of Marxian political economy from a tool for analyzing inherent contradictions 
in capitalism to a tool for state-led development of a backward country. When he returned to 
Moscow in the 1930s, he took a course with Evgenii Preobrazhensky, who had been the chief 
economist behind the platform of the Left Opposition in the 1920s, in which role he 
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pioneered the concept of “primitive socialist accumulation.”31 This level of familiarity with 
Soviet economic thought, in the early 1940s still something of a rarity in the economics 
profession in the United States, proved an asset for Baran.  
 In the 1930s, American economists joined social theorists and philosophers in a 
broad-based intellectual shift to the left, away from a belief in the infallibility of markets. 
Images of domestic suffering in the Great Depression offered a contrast to reports coming 
back from the Soviet Union, which by the early 1930s seemed to have accomplished the 
historically unprecedented feat of moving into the ranks of a modern industrialized nation 
through the execution of a state-led five-year plan. Though officially it would remain in the 
ultra-left “third period” until the announcement of the Popular Front strategy at the Seventh 
Congress of the Third International in 1935, the American Communist Party began toning 
down its sectarian rhetoric in 1933-1934, and had made significant inroads into the labor and 
social movements that surged by the middle of the decade. A smaller but substantial group of 
intellectuals were attracted to the fascist ideology of Benito Mussolini.32 Encroached on both 
ends of the political spectrum, liberal intellectuals sought to adapt their ideals in an act of 
self-preservation. They did so largely by tacking to the left, elevating a statist current over 
the traditional liberal posture of laissez faire. Editors of prominent liberal magazines, such as 
Freda Kirchway at The Nation or Bruce Bliven at the New Republic, demonstrated increasing 
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enthusiasm for the Soviet planned economy, and advocated similar policies for the U.S., 
short of social revolution. 
 Buttressed by this liberal sanction, and with the incentive of growing opportunities in 
the New Deal state, professional economists felt increasingly liberated or compelled to 
impugn the profit-motive as a mechanism for regulating the allocation of societal resources 
into industries and branches of production. Economists within Franklin Roosevelt’s “Brain 
Trust” evinced a strong admiration for Stalin’s five-year plan. Stuart Chase, author of the 
1932 book A New Deal, and original Brain Truster Rexford Tugwell advanced an 
underconsumptionist explanation of the Great Depression. In doing so, they departed 
methodologically from neoclassicism, which assumed price signals in an unfettered market 
would optimize allocation of factors of production, including the price and quantity of labor 
power. Under this model, “underconsumption,” a disparity between society’s ability to 
produce and ability to consume, should not have been possible. Informed by the philosophic 
pragmatism of John Dewey and the institutionalist economics of Thorstein Veblen, both 
Chase and Tugwell advocated experimenting with Soviet-style state-led planning, though to 
stave off rather foment a revolution. It is important to emphasize how incommensurable this 
position was with the central theoretical assumptions that dominated the economics 
profession for the first decades of the twentieth century. By questioning the ability for 
markets to efficiently allocate societal resources, Chase, Tugwell, and other statist liberal 
economists in the New Deal struck right at the heart of the neoclassical theory of value.  
 While the U.S. economics profession turned an eye to the Soviet Union as the model 
of planning, Soviet economists, wrapped up in the 1920s struggle for power, debated the 
meaning and continued significance of the Marxist theory of value. In the lead up to 1917, no 
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Bolshevik theoretician envisioned a scenario in which Marx’s Capital would serve as a 
policy guide for modernizing a backward country. Leon Trotsky’s theory of permanent 
revolution and, later, Lenin’s April Theses expressed the rationale for pressing workers to 
channel their opposition to Tsarism into the direct transfer of power to their own, 
independent institutions, thus bypassing the “bourgeois democratic” phase of the revolution 
and setting the stage for the immediate transition to socialism. But nowhere did they base 
their argument on the claim that the Party had at its disposal the theoretical technocratic tools 
to guide an isolated Russian economy into the modern era. After the revolution, when they 
found themselves largely isolated from the international division of labor, the party 
leadership leveraged the political economic theory they had mastered to make sense of the 
pressing, and at times seemingly insoluble problems plaguing the Russian economy, and 
threatening to topple the political regime.  
A big part of this debate hinged on the extent to which the “law of value,”—
capitalism’s mechanism for distributing resources into different branches of production—
pertained to a socialist society. In fact, in the 1920s the Soviet Union had faced a problem 
very similar to that plaguing the US economy in the 1930s: how to level out the growing 
price disparity between agricultural and industrial goods. The circumstances differed though, 
as the theoretical problem in the Soviet Union centered on which class, the proletariat or the 
peasantry, would provide the economic surplus that the state-planning agency required for its 
ambitious industrialization plan. In a polemic with Nikolai Bukharin, Baran’s teacher 
Preobrazhensky articulated the law of “primitive socialist accumulation” as the regulating 
mechanism of a planned economy, standing diametrically opposed to capitalism’s law of 
value. Capitalism achieves productivity increases under “dynamic equilibrium” because the 
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spontaneous interplay of supply and demand leads labor power—the social cost of 
maintaining and reproducing the laborer—to sell below the real value of the goods produced 
by workers and appropriated and sold by capitalists. A workers’ government could not make 
recourse to this law of value without maintaining a class living off the surplus-value of 
laborers and thus setting the stage for the return of capitalism. It must, therefore, deliberately 
extract the surplus needed for productivity increases from unequal exchange with non-state 
sectors of the economy, and specifically the nascent rural bourgeois class forming out of the 
redistribution of land in the countryside. 
 Thus, Paul Baran entered the US economics profession at a historical moment in 
which economists in both the United States and the Soviet Union were in the throes of 
revamping major elements of their theoretical scaffolding to think through the implications of 
increasing state involvement in the economic sphere. Both dealt with how to equip a ruling 
bureaucracy to make difficult decisions about centralizing social wealth, the result in the final 
instance of exploited labor, and reinvesting in strategic industries to ensure optimal levels of 
growth. Baran’s significance as an economist in the United States from the late 1930s 
through World War Two rested primarily on his familiarity with theoretical debates over 
Soviet industrialization, which he quickly leveraged into the first English-language Marxist 
critique of the emerging sub-field of “development economics.” Many early contributions to 
development economics came from Russian-speaking economists keeping abreast of 
theoretical debates in Soviet economic thought. Two of the most important contributors to 
the early field to come out of the American economics profession, Evsey Domar and 
Alexander Gershenkron, resembled Baran in biography if not intellectual training or political 
orientation. All three economists were born into ethnically non-Russian territories within the 
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Russian Empire on the eve of its collapse, and all three migrated to the United States in the 
1930s to escape the tumult of the impending war that would rip apart their Eurasian 
homelands. Though more hostile than Baran to the Soviet political regime, both Domar and 
Gershenkron followed Soviet industrialization with keen interest as an economic 
phenomenon. Like Baran and Sweezy, Domar received his PhD in economics from Harvard, 
and he and Baran went through the program together in the early 1940s.  
Conceptually, Domar’s, Gershenkron’s and Baran’s work in the mid-to-late 1940s 
reveals the overlap in interests among Marxist and non-Marxist economists at the height of 
the New Deal/Popular Front social formation. Domar, like much of the profession in the 
early 1940s, was a Keynesian, but his early work drew liberally from both Keynesian and 
Marxist economists and considered questions ill-suited to the methods or theoretical 
assumptions of neoclassicism. Beginning from the assumption that markets optimally 
distribute societal productive resources, that the invisible hand can and should be allowed to 
regulate investment decisions, neoclassicists had little room to develop the methodological 
tools for considering the causes of disproportionality or imbalance among the various 
branches of production, precisely the set of concerns running through Soviet 
industrialization, the economic theorists in and around the New Deal brain trust, and 
development economics as a blueprint for backward nations. As an economist, Domar 
generally wrote about problems of maintaining proportionality amid capital accumulation. 
His early work cited institutional Keynesians, such as the Polish Michal Kalecki, Soviet 
economist Eugen Varga, and Marxists in the American profession such as Paul Marlo 
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Sweezy.33 Theoretically, maintaining balance in the circulation among economic sectors in 
an accumulating economy was essentially the same problem that had plagued Rosa 
Luxemburg in her massive and influential book Accumulation of Capital, though Domar did 
not make that link to earlier Marxist thought. Domar’s contribution to development 
economics, a 1946 article entitled “Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth and Employment,” 
intervened in the tradition of diminishing returns on capital investment, which in the Marxist 
tradition is determined by the growing organic composition of capital and in turn partly 
determines the tendency for the rate of profit to decline, and he attributed its development to 
a “Little Seminar” whose participants included Paul Baran.34 Generally considered the 
inaugural text establishing the subfield in the United States, Domar’s brief article contributed 
to the Harrod-Domar model, which posited that self-sustaining growth in backward countries 
could be achieved by sufficient initial capital accumulation. As historian Alexander Erlich 
pointed out, at its moment of inception development economics in the United States 
prescriptions echoed the Soviet Union’s resolution of its own industrialization debates.35 
Alexander Gershenkron took more of a historical approach, but a view of his work 
equally reveals the blurry line separating Marxist economists from the mainstream of the 
profession coming out of the 1930s. His early concentration rested on following Russian-
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language economic publications, and gleaning from them data about the Soviet economy that 
were readily available in the 1940s.36 His 1951 essay, Economic Backwardness in a 
Historical Perspective, posited a universal linear path to development, similar to the “stages 
of growth” that would become more famously associated with Rostow. But, surprisingly, the 
essay adopted something very similar to the Marxist concept of combined development to 
suggest that backward countries, by appropriating the technology of earlier developing 
countries, will actually benefit in their industrialization process from the advantages of 
backwardness.  
Baran was situated right within the thick of these precursors to 1950s modernization 
theory. Like virtually every other young economist at Harvard, Baran worked for the Office 
of Strategic Services during World War Two. On returning from the war, he secured a 
position as a researcher for the New York Federal Reserve, where he worked from 1946 until 
accepting a professorship at Stanford in 1949. During this period, like Domar and 
Gershenkron, much of Baran’s claim to fame in the profession derived from his Russian 
language skills and his familiarity with major trends in both Soviet and Western economic 
thought. Though placed in charge of the British desk at the Fed, Baran was also tasked with 
keeping up on developments in Soviet economics, and every one of his published works from 
the late 1940s dealt with the latter topic.37 Substantively, these works touched on a range of 
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issues relating to the opportunities and challenges associated with central planning, as 
opposed to markets, as an interactive mechanism for allocating productive resources and 
distributing goods and services. Prescriptively, Baran geared his interventions in professional 
economic discourse toward incorporating the lessons of Soviet industrialization in the hopes 
that the expanded state control of the economy begun under the New Deal would move in the 
direction of more planning. 
Baran was disturbed when his colleagues began to apply their familiarity with the 
Soviet experience to articulate a defense of Washington’s newfound foreign policy interest in 
promoting growth in “backward countries,” and he began critiquing this line from an anti-
imperialist perspective as early as the late 1940s. He launched his critique at the annual 
meeting of the American Economic Association. Responding to a panel titled “Economic 
Progress: General Considerations,” he slotted the legion obstacles facing backward countries 
largely into the framework of Soviet industrialization debates of the 1920s. The “foremost 
need of underdeveloped countries is a substantial and rapid increase of total output,” he 
claimed, which could only come from a proportional growth in technological investment in 
the agricultural and industrial sectors. He basically agreed with development economists that 
modernization of agricultural production depended on industry to supply “agricultural 
implements” and, more importantly, an outlet for the rural labor that would be displaced by 
more advanced productive techniques. So far, this does not sound different from the 
“balanced growth” consensus then prevailing in development economics, which drew 
directly from the experience of dealing with agricultural and industrial disproportionalities in 
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Soviet industrialization. Baran diverged from his colleagues, however, by arguing that their 
prescriptions could not be realized without a revolution that would modernize and centralize 
the state apparatus necessary to enact the balanced development program. Because markets 
cannot stimulate investment necessary for sustained growth in backward countries, argued 
Baran, the state must do it. But, backward states remained under the control of feudal 
oligarchies, and thus required structural transformation to achieve the institutional 
prerequisites necessary to begin the process of development. The development discourse 
gaining momentum in the United States presented economic development as the alternative 
to revolution, in part of the Cold War dynamic, and in doing so, for Baran, took the very 
prerequisite necessary to achieve the prescription of balanced growth off the table. 
Baran’s critique of the still-emerging subfield of development economics reveals and 
sets the tone for a specific orientation in the postwar period. As he and Sweezy would do in 
the generation of the ideas undergirding Political Economy of Growth and Monopoly Capital, 
he ceded much prescriptive ground to his opponents, but insisted that political control and 
economic exploitation of imperialist powers effectively blocked the policies being 
prescribed. Baran’s intervention essentially inverted that of a Rexford Tugwell or a Stuart 
Chase. Whereas they said technocratic methods of Soviet planned economy could be 
emulated by a centralized US developmentalist state, short of advocating full-scale 
revolution, Baran said intellectuals could apply the lessons of Soviet industrialization only if 
a change in property ownership took the planning apparatus out of the hands of private 
interests, who would otherwise invariably inhibit the full benefits of planned economy from 
working their course. At least at this juncture, Baran conceived of economic and social 
development of backwardness areas as a technocratic problem, and objected only to the 
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forms of property ownership enshrined in the constitution of the state executing a widely 
agreed upon set of policies.  
Paul M. Sweezy: Monopoly Market Structure and World-Systems Analysis 
Many years later, Paul Sweezy would claim an instant fondness for Baran when the 
latter looked him up in Cambridge, on the advice of their mutual friend, the Polish economist 
Oskar Lange. “He and I,” wrote Sweezy of Baran in 1965, “were drawn together at once, and 
our intellectual and personal friendship became ever closer and more meaningful to both of 
us during the next 25 years.”38 Unlike Baran, Sweezy’s early biography lacks any diasporic 
themes. He was, rather, quintessentially American in birth, education, culture and physical 
locale throughout his life. His father worked as a banking executive, affording young Paul a 
childhood experience that bordered on high bourgeois. He did his prep-school education at 
the elite private Phillips Exeter Academy, and his undergraduate and graduate training in 
economics at Harvard.  
Harvard of the 1930s offered a fine environment for Sweezy to cultivate a 
sophisticated Marxist critique of the American economics profession. Sweezy studied under 
Joseph Schumpeter. Though staunchly anti-Marxist, in public and private, Schumpeter 
treated the Marxist system of political economy with more intellectual honesty than many 
anti-Marxist economists, and he proved willing to push a bright young student with an 
interest in Marxism to pursue his ideas to the fullest.39 Schumpeter profoundly respected 
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Sweezy’s intellectual capabilities. When the latter returned from the Second World War to 
find a much less open intellectual climate at Harvard than he had left, Schumpeter alone in 
the department pushed to reinstate Sweezy to the faculty, and even pushed for him to get 
tenure. In a confidential letter to dean Paul H. Buck, Schumpeter bluntly stated that Sweezy’s 
capabilities as an economist far surpassed those of John Dunlop, the other candidate for the 
position. Schumpeter praised Sweezy’s first publications in economic journals as “striking 
proof of outstanding analytic ability.” Monopoly and Competition, the book published out of 
Sweezy’s dissertation project, deserved recognition for “the felicitous manner in which 
economic theory is made to serve historical interpretation.” Theory of Capitalist 
Development, Sweezy’s second book, offered “a remarkable exposition of the Marxian 
system of thought. This task, which has been attempted by dozens of economists of all 
countries, has never been done so well.”40 Sweezy knew Schumpeter had defended him, but 
he did not see the letter until Schumpeter’s wife, Elizabeth, mailed it to him after his 
mentor’s death in 1950. At a time when the profession had shunned Sweezy, the letter caused 
Sweezy to reflect on the difference between Schumpeter- who never allowed personal views 
to “influence his judgments of scientific ability and promise”- and “the smaller men who 
constitute the bulk of the academic…community.”41 
As an economist, Schumpeter passed on to his promising young student the notion 
that Marxist political economy offered useful insights into the laws governing the business 
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cycle and the secular trend of increasing concentration and centralization of capital. In 
Theory of Economic Development, published in the original German in 1911, Schumpeter 
took issue with the implication of a static economy that must logically flow from the 
assumption of exchange equilibrium built into marginal utility models. Classical political 
economists, such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo and even Karl Marx, took a favorable view 
of markets as spurs to innovation, increasing productivity and thus expanding the total pool 
of goods and services. Marginalists justified markets on different grounds- the most efficient 
allocation of an implicitly given, or static, quantity of goods and services. Market signals 
arranged production such that scarce resources would optimize value, understood as the 
expression of subjective wants. For Schumpeter, marginalism, which was a new trend in his 
early career, explained the systemic forces leading to stability much better than those leading 
to instability. Much like the critique C. Wright Mills would level against Talcott Parsons’s 
functionalist sociology nearly fifty years later, Schumpter went so far as to accuse 
marginalists of lacking any theoretically consistent basis for explaining economic growth or 
change. He endeavored instead to present a “purely economic theory of economic change 
which does not merely rely on external factors propelling the economic system from one 
equilibrium to another.” Apparently only later did he conclude “this idea and this aim are 
exactly the same as the idea and the aim which underlie the economic teaching of Karl 
Marx.”42  
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Marx occupied a peculiar place in Schumpeter’s economic thought and general 
worldview. Apparently independently from his engagement with Marx’s work, Schumpeter 
developed a holistic critique of the method of modeling from behavorialist assumptions 
already well under way in the economics profession in Europe and the United States. A 
contemporary of Thorstein Veblen, Schumpeter similarly stressed the importance of social 
institutions and historical context for economic analysis. Turning to a closer engagement 
with Marx’s work, he found much to commend. He lauded the synthesis of Marx’s system, in 
which “sociology and economics pervade each other,” although he simultaneously cautioned 
against such a lofty ambition in the hands of thinkers without the same “extensive command 
over historical and contemporaneous fact,” not to mention “erudition in the field of economic 
theory.”43 More importantly, for Schumpeter, Marx “was the first economist of top rank to 
see and to teach systematically how economic theory may be turned into historical analysis 
and how historical narrative may be turned into histoire raisonnée.” This latter point, for 
Schumpeter, was of vital significance from the perspective of economic methodology, as 
only a theory organically built on uncovering the structural logic of economic change over 
time could possibly explain periodic crises without recourse to exogenous determinants. On 
the whole, Scumpeter’s outlook could be characterized as deep respect for Marx, guarded 
sympathy with certain elements of Marxist political economy, disdain for “Marxists,” and 
skepticism about the desirability of socialism as an alternative to capitalism.  
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 Sweezy adopted his advisors research agenda, focusing on questions relating to 
recurrent crises and institutional changes arising out of secular economic trends, but he saw 
much greater value in contributions from the Marxist tradition after Marx than Schumpeter 
had. With prodigious effort, Sweezy read broadly into Marxist theoretical texts to mine out 
the tradition’s contributions to the pressing questions facing the economics profession of the 
1930s. Fluent in German, Sweezy was able to read and synthesize Marxist works that had not 
yet become widely available in English translations. As a student of Capital, he clearly went 
beyond his academic advisor, reading and assimilating all three volumes plus Theories of 
Surplus-Value, which had not yet been translated into English, and immersing himself in 
interpretative debates such as Marx’s theory of crisis. At the same time, he remained fully 
engaged with the contemporary economics profession, and kept current with theoretical 
developments in the United States and Europe. 
 Intellectual historians have remembered Sweezy’s second book, Theory of Capitalist 
Development, as an accessible synthesis of key debates in the history of Marxist thought. As 
an expression of Marxism, this either understates or overstates the book’s importance, 
depending on one’s perspective. Sweezy did indeed synthesize key theoretical debates 
derived from competing interpretations of Capital. But he also weighed those debates against 
contemporary evidence of capitalist development, took definite positions, discarded elements 
of the Marxist system he considered outdated, and offered conditional prognoses on the 
future trajectory of capitalism as a world-system. It is hard to view the book as anything less 
than a formative experience in his self-identification as a Marxist theoretician, as it contains 
in various stages of development virtually every aspect of the brand of Marxism that would 
find its fullest expression in Monopoly Capital, a book he co-authored with Baran and 
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published nearly a quarter century later. In particular, in Theory of Capitalist Development 
Sweezy adopted a stance on what he saw as the fundamental contradiction of capitalism, 
which he would carry over into his political economic analysis throughout the 1950s and 
1960s. 
In a move that went beyond mere synthesis, Sweezy dissolved the distinction between 
underconsumptionist and proportionality explanations of crisis, considering them instead as 
two aspects of the “realization problem.” The idea that they are distinct theories of crisis has 
no precedent in Marx, according to Sweezy, but rather originated in the thought of the non-
Marxist Russian economist Mikhail Tugan-Baranovsky, and only gained popularity in the 
Marxist tradition when Rudolf Hilferding picked it up from Tugan.44 Producing the right 
quantities of producer and consumer goods, ensuring that all commodities are use-values, and 
thus able to realize their value in terms of socially necessary labor time, has always been a 
delicate balancing act under the law of value, capitalism’s anarchic distribution mechanism. 
Yet, for the most part, the system has managed through the invisible hand to complete 
circuits of distribution and renew production on an expanded scale. Attributing crises to 
“disproportionality,” for Sweezy, meant little more than pointing out that the interlocking 
circuits of production and circulation of individual capitals produce numerous choke points, 
at any of which commodities failing to complete the circuit can clog the arteries of the 
system, leading to crisis. While this is true, the observation does not get us far toward 
understanding why such congestion in capitalism’s circulatory system appears with periodic 
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regularity. 45 Sweezy found it more useful to question whether capitalism has any inherent 
tendencies to periodically produce systemic imbalances between the departments, and 
whether those structural contradictions tend to increase or decrease as capitalism develops. 
The classic position on this question, that espoused by Marx himself in Capital: Volume III, 
was that capitalism as a system had an inherent tendency to ever deeper systemic crises 
grounded, in the final analysis, from the growth in the organic composition of capital and the 
resultant tendency for the rate of profit to decline. Sweezy definitively rejected that 
perspective in Theory of Capitalist Development, and he sustained that position into the 
1950s and 1960s. Of all classical theorists, only Kautsky advanced the question when, in his 
polemic with Eduard Bernstein, he posited a decreasing ability for markets to absorb 
consumer commodities as capitalism becomes increasingly concentrated and productive. This 
perspective, that capitalism has a progressive tendency leading to chronic depression caused 
by structurally insurmountable lack of demand, would underlie Baran’s and Sweezy’s 
analysis of stagnation in Monthly Review, Political Economy of Growth, and Monopoly 
Capital, and surface in many of the ideas about capitalist dynamics held by student radicals.46 
While Sweezy’s exposition drew deeply and extensively from Marxist literature, he 
also channeled more mainstream economic currents of his era. In the 1930s and early 1940s, 
before falling under the crosshairs of the perpetrators of the Second Red Scare, Sweezy had 
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respectable standing in the American economics profession, and had carved out a niche for 
himself as something of an expert on the effects of monopolization on the price structure. His 
first publication, appearing in 1939 in the respected Journal of Political Economy, introduced 
the “kinked demand curve” to illustrate the tendency for prices to rise continuously in an 
oligopolistic market.47 His reputation as an expert on monopoly earned him a position after 
graduate school with the Security and Exchange Commission, making him a low-level 
technocrat in the expanding New Deal state apparatus. Created in 1934 as Roosevelt’s 
response to the unchecked securities exchange perceived to have contributed to the financial 
collapse of 1929, the SEC in the late 1930s housed many figures who would become 
cornerstones of New Deal liberal statism. As a researcher at the SEC, Sweezy demonstrated 
an aptitude for historical economic analysis when he headed up an investigation into the 
“proxy wars” that gripped Chesapeake and Ohio Railways following the death of O.P. Van 
Sweringen. O.P. and his brother M.J. Van Sweringen had controlled the C & O lines through 
a complicated system of interlocking directorships. The combined economic collapse of the 
Great Depression and O.P.’s death set investors on a cutthroat competition to monopolize 
control of the railroad through speculation in the various holding companies. In a series of 
concise memoranda prepared for his SEC bosses, Sweezy followed the complicated 
maneuvers that culminated in the consolidation of control under the Allegheny holding 
company, headed by Ralph Robert Young. His reports adroitly dissected the web of 
competing ownership claims, which no doubt provided Sweezy with a level of practical 
understanding of the ownership and management structure of the modern corporation. It is on 
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this dual basis, as both a pioneer of the micro-economic theory of market structure under 
monopoly and as a state technocrat with close practical knowledge of the ownership and 
management of the railroad industry, that Sweezy in Theory of Capitalist Development 
critiqued Berle and Means famous thesis of the separation of ownership from control, and 
established the pattern of thought on the distinction between Marxist and liberal theories of 
monopoly he would maintain throughout the “post capitalist” 1950s.48 Berle and Means 
thesis implied a corporate managerial elite without control of private property, directly 
informing Burnham’s thesis. Sweezy, in contrast, claimed corporate monopolization 
exacerbated rather than alleviated the potential for a small group to gain both ownership and 
effective control over not only individual enterprises, but large sections of the economy.  
In addition to a mutual desire to insinuate a Marxist current into the American 
economics profession, Baran and Sweezy shared a similar political orientation founded on 
their shared interpretation of the path to socialism. Sweezy carved out his life-long niche as 
the most sophisticated American Marxist economist in the mid-to-late 1930s, just as the 
Communist Party reoriented itself behind the Popular Front strategy. Assuming a non-
antagonistic posture toward Roosevelt and the New Deal, the CP helped create the social and 
intellectual space in which the distinctions between Marxist and non-Marxist reforms 
blurred. Journalists surrounding leading liberal periodicals The Nation and New Republic 
were willing to entertain Marxist ideas and form coalitions with communists to oppose 
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fascism.49 The economics profession in which Sweezy was embedded moved toward 
institutionalist analysis and policy prescriptions increasingly willing to look to the Soviet 
Union as positive model. Sweezy’s participation in the New Deal state was not anomalous. 
Many other Marxists or socialist sympathizers secured similar posts, including a New Yorker 
with personal ties to the old left wing of the Debs-era Socialist Party, Harry Magdoff, who 
would later serve as Sweezy’s co-editor.50 Becoming Marxist in this era left a strong 
impression on Sweezy’s political sensibilities. As editor of Monthly Review (discussed 
below), and as a perceived expert on Marxism, Sweezy in the immediate post-World War 
Two period had repeated opportunities to publicly explain his conception of socialism, all of 
which revealed the formative impact of his experience in Popular Front/New Deal United 
States. While he believed a wholesale transformation of property ownership necessary to 
build a socialist society, he perceived the New Deal state as objectively driving in that 
direction.51 
As economic theorists, Baran and Sweezy were products of their time. Each 
insinuated a Marxist point of view into vibrant subfields of 1930s economic thought. Sweezy 
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showed how the Marxist tradition offered a rich set of tools for understanding changes to 
circulation and crises under conditions of monopoly capitalism, problems with obvious 
salience to 1930s economists. Baran, for his part, overtly pointed to the Soviet Union as the 
model for future development of what was then still called “backward” regions and which 
would come to be known as the Third World. Sweezy in the 1930s focused on explaining the 
dynamics of monopoly capitalism, and in doing so conceded corporate/state collusion had 
invalidated much of the logic of earlier, more anarchic versions of capitalist mechanisms of 
circulating goods and services, and that these changes to “circulation” redounded back upon 
the system as a mode of social productive relations. Baran, abstracting generalizable laws 
from the experience of Soviet industrialization, proceeded analytically from the assumption 
that “socialism” could be defined as a set of developmental policies administrated 
bureaucratically in an isolated nation-state, and could and should replicate the brutal 
mechanisms of capitalism’s stage of “primitive accumulation” to achieve its goals. Prior to 
their intellectual collaboration, and in its early stages, each defined one of the two poles of 
the coming Cold War outside of pure ideal type dichotomies such as capitalism/communism 
or democracy/totalitarianism. Yet, they insisted that changes to capitalism modified rather 
than invalidated categories of classical Marxist political economy, and that policy-making 
under U.S. monopoly capitalism remained more elite-driven and fundamentally anti-
democratic than under real or imagined socialist regimes. 
Monthly Review and the Diminishing Room for Fellow Travelers 
“I’ve always insisted that it’s very hard for an intellectual in this culture, without 
an independent income or a secure academic job, to be a left intellectual in any 
meaningful sense.” (Paul M. Sweezy, 1999). 
  
  
52 
 
 The reaction and domestic repression that gripped post-World War Two American 
society emerged piecemeal, through a series of successive stages. Baran and Sweezy 
experienced the onset of the Second Red Scare as a slow vice, gradually closing in on the 
opportunities to direct their abundant talents toward meaningful social change. Their 
experience, and its impact on the trajectory of their ideas, offer invaluable insight into the 
psychological effects of terror and ostracism. By the mid-1950s, the pressure to conform to 
Cold War strictures would reach tremendous proportions. But in the latter half of the 1940s, 
the vice had only begun to turn, and Sweezy for one had little reason to believe that the left 
could not regroup. In this environment, he and Leo Huberman established Monthly Review. 
Carrying the subtitle “An Independent Socialist Journal,” the small magazine self-
consciously set out to serve as a rallying point for the left that had already begun to lose 
strength and voice in American society. Though the small publication did little to reverse the 
withdraw of left intellectuals from the public sphere, it did provide a forum to stay 
connected, and to continue to generate a real-time critique of American political life 
according to Marxist categories. The journal and its editors stood at the hub of a network of 
radical critics committed to carrying forward a long and theoretically rich tradition viewing 
modern U.S. history through the lens of imperialism. 
 Returning to the US following World War Two, Sweezy quickly tried to orient 
himself in what he accurately predicted would be an increasingly hostile environment for 
Marxists. His outlook on the prospects for the left was sober, but not yet full of despair. By 
June of 1946, he correctly predicted capitalism and socialism would divide the globe into two 
worlds, the demarcation line between them “dividing Germany into two parts,” and that this 
international situation would unleash a “strong wave of American fascism attributing all our 
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ills to Bolshevism abroad and at home.” In this international and domestic conjuncture, 
Sweezy formulated a plan to establish a periodical around which socialists in the United 
States could cohere and defend their position. By the summer of 1946, Sweezy felt a strong 
sense of urgency for establishing such a journal, which could only weather the coming 
depression if it had already established a market. He hoped to issue a “pilot copy” as soon as 
possible, which could be used to drum up investments, which he hoped would reach as much 
as $500,000, to secure a small staff of dedicated writers.52 In the event, it would still be 
another three years until this project saw the light of day, and then thanks only to a fortuitous 
investment secured when the socialist Harvard literary scholarly F. O. Mathiessen passed on 
a portion of his unexpected windfall inheritance. Mathiessen’s contribution, “a commitment 
of $5000 for three years in succession, totaling $15,000,” while far more modest than 
Sweezy’s $500,000 projection of necessary funds, was enough to get the project off the 
ground.53 
 By the time Sweezy announced his presence on the New York intellectual scene with 
the launch of Monthly Review, the “little magazine” as a forum for independent leftists to 
speak to a broad, educated public audience was in decline. Its heyday had been the 1930s; its 
social foundation the radicalized workers united in the overlapping layers of labor and 
political organizations that pushed the decades political reforms. The working masses 
organized to consciously intervene in the political decisions governing their material 
conditions, and in doing so stimulated demand for pamphlets and journals purporting to 
                                                 
52 Sweezy to “Paul” (probably Baran), June 23, 1946, Box 10.  
 
53 See Christopher Phelps, “Introduction: A Socialist Magazine in the American 
Century,” Monthly Review 51/1 (May 1999), 1-30 at 2.  
  
54 
 
explain social and historical processes, and infuse high-brow culture with representations of 
proletarian experiences. The general radicalization drove a demand-fueled upswing in the 
production and circulation of political and literary little magazines, providing a viable 
material foundation for intellectuals to make a modest but independent living writing articles 
and books for a general public audience. One can of course question just how much market 
pressures limited independence even in this period. Contemporaries grappled with this 
question in the form of debates over “commitment.” Partisan Review and Modern 
Quarterly—the two most prominent magazines of the literary left—held repeated forums 
discussing issues of political commitment and independence, which in turn reflected the 
growing pressures to cater art to the political and labor organizations responsible for their 
expanding market.54 
 New York had been the hub for independent journalistic and literary leftism, and the 
most prominent of the New York Intellectuals in the 1930s and early 1940s had been 
attracted to anti-Stalinist Marxism as a political orientation, a posture best represented in the 
US and internationally by the figure of Leon Trotsky. Exiled from the Soviet Union for his 
outspoken criticism of bureaucratization and Stalin’s autarkical development program, both 
of which he claimed betrayed the revolution, Trotsky was himself a gifted and prolific 
journalist, a sophisticated thinker, and an accomplished literary critic, all of which made him 
an appealing figure for US intellectuals drawn leftward by the shifting gravity of American 
politics. Anti-Stalinist Marxism offered a political vision in which a full-scale structural 
transformation of American capitalism would not lead to the bureaucratism of the Soviet 
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Union. Partisan Review, often considered the exemplar of New York intellectual leftism in 
the 1930s, came under the editorship of Trotskyist sympathizer Dwight Macdonald in the 
1930s after a bitter internal rivalry ousted the Stalinist founding editors.   
 This was the intellectual environment in New York and nationally in which Monthly 
Review launched, and the goals of the new journal reflected the disorientation accompanying 
the evaporation of the social basis for a viable left-liberal intellectual sphere. Articles would 
contribute “expert reporting and analysis rather than a programmatic declaration,” but, 
nonetheless, in the editorial process would be “rewritten and arranged to present a pretty 
uniform ‘line.’”55 This sort of ecumenical approach mirrors the hopes of the political 
movement then rapidly regrouping around the Progressive Party. Hoping to reclaim the 
progressive legacy of the New Deal, the Progressive Party drew in many of the Socialist, 
Communist and left-liberal actors who had cut their teeth in the politics of the 1930s. It 
played out as a last-ditch effort of the Popular Front, and Sweezy reprised his role as fellow-
traveling intellectual by actively participating in the New Hampshire chapter of the 
Progressive Party. As conceptualized, Monthly Review would have served as the organ to 
widely propagate the ideas, goals and strategies of a left with deep cultural and intellectual 
roots in American society and political representation in a viable third party. In the actual 
event, the first issue- published in May of 1949- circulated among a disheartened left shortly 
on the wake of the humiliating implosion of the Progressive Party.  
From its inception, the journal carried an undertone of futility, as expressed in the 
unfortunate series “Cooperation on the Left” that sporadically dotted the pages of the first 
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two annual volumes. Intended as a forum for the splintering left to publicly strategize how to 
rebuild, the series did nothing but reveal the sharp dividing lines separating the end goals, 
strategy and tactics of the various ideological currents that had cooperated in the more 
promising radical climate of the 1930s. In initiating the discussion, the editors defined “the 
Left” as “all classes and strata of the population which are, either actually or potentially, 
hostile to monopoly capitalism—workers, small farmers, lower middle classes, Negroes, 
nationality groups, a large proportion of professionals and students.”56 The strategic 
difficulties surfaced immediately. In the first issue following the editors’ call, IF Stone 
criticized Henry Wallace for breaking with the Communists, not out of any ideological 
affinity with the Communist Party, but because if the Communists fell, “the popular-fronters 
[would] follow; and when [they had] been taken, the ADAers and the liberals [would] be the 
next in line of fire.” 57 Wallace, in his contribution, signaled his unmistakable intention to 
concede the center of the gravity to the growing anti-Communist sensibilities, and spoke only 
of reuniting the “liberalism” of the halcyon days of FDR.58 The debate ran for several more 
issues, and boasted contributions from dozens of renowned intellectuals from the Popular 
Front era. Many, such as Stone, Harvey O’Connor, Corliss Lamont, Cedric Belfrage, and 
Scott Nearing would remain, however loosely, in the Monthly Review orbit throughout the 
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decade. But the series itself, though a strong indication of the reach and influence of Monthly 
Review at its inception, merely revealed the deep, unbridgeable rifts that had emerged in the 
increasingly isolated left. After a few issues, it simply petered out without anything 
approximating a resolution or a platform for moving forward with a renewed Popular Front. 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the disheartened political tone, Monthly Review stood 
out among early 1950s little magazines, and in doing so laid the basis for solidarity with the 
few other prominent intellectuals to dissent from the dominant tendencies of Cold War 
thought, most notably C. Wright Mills and William Appleman Williams. Mills had moved 
from Maryland to New York City in 1945, to be closer to the heart of intellectual life. After a 
stint with the Bureau of Applied Research, which contributed to his lifelong distaste for 
methodological fetishism, he took a teaching position in the sociology department at 
Columbia University.59 Though Mills counted well-known New York intellectuals such as 
Macdonald, Daniel Bell, and Irving Howe among his friends throughout the 1940s, one-by-
one these friendships deteriorated over significant ideological and political disagreements. To 
put it simply, Mills moved to the left while the rest of his intellectual cohort moved to the 
right. With his characteristic knack for branding social processes with pithy colloquial 
phrases, Mills dubbed the rightward shift the “American celebration.” In his standout 
contribution to Partisan Review’s symposium “Our Country and Our Culture,” Mills 
displayed his disdain and contempt for American celebrants, denouncing their “shrinking 
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deference to the status quo,” “soft and anxious compliance,” and “feeble search to justify 
[their] intellectual conduct.”60  
Monthly Review opposed these perspectives from the outset in at least three 
analytically distinct but interrelated ways: by maintaining an instrumentalist class analysis of 
the US state, by extrapolating the mechanisms of coercion and control to the level of the 
world economy, and by depicting Washington as the aggressor in the Cold War. Their pro-
Soviet orientation ensured a longer path to traverse between Marxism and anti-Communism, 
making them stand out from the anti-Stalinist New York intellectuals. But their ideological 
commitment to Marxism differentiated them from the liberal pragmatists who had been 
willing to draw on the Soviet Union as an experimental model for state-led development. 
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Chapter Two: 
Knowledge for What in the Age of Academe 
 
While writing The Cultural Apparatus—a manuscript that would remain unfinished at the 
time of his death—C. Wright Mills had recourse to revisit his 1944 essay “The Powerless 
People.” He was struck by just how much thematic continuity linked his earlier and later 
work. “It may be that I have had no really new themes since then,” he wrote in the 
manuscript’s preface, “although I have of course had many topics.” Mills had spent the better 
part of his academic life trying to understand the role of intellectuals in society. Though this 
was a subset of his broader concern, the link between biography and social structure, it 
nonetheless constituted a specific issue that absorbed a large share of his mental energies. 
Most of this intellectual effort had taken place under a cloud of disillusion. But his 
immersion in a new transnational network of left intellectuals and, especially, the excitement 
generated by his firsthand observation of Fidel Castro’s revolutionary government energized 
him and infused a hint of optimism into The Cultural Apparatus not seen in any of his work 
since New Men of Power. For the first time, Mills in the unpublished Cultural Apparatus and 
in his published “Letter to the New Left” overtly called on the “young intelligentsia” to 
leverage its position within the cultural apparatus to mobilize “oppositional publics” behind a 
new left program.61 
The Monthly Review crowd shared Mills’s newfound sense of optimism in the late 1950s. 
This general mood, which was certainly in the ether, contributes to the New Left resurrection 
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narrative. Yet when the groundswell of social opposition began bubbling to the surface at the 
end of a decade remembered for conformity, Mills, Sweezy, Baran, William Appleman 
Williams and others met it with a set of mental categories that bore the indelible stamp of 
their experiences and mental trajectories over the two decades stretching from the late 1930s 
to the late 1950s. Their enthusiasm stood out in contrast to the depths of their previous 
despair, but they could not and did not shed their experiences with isolation and repression, 
nor the profound consequences of those experiences on their world outlooks. As they took 
intellectual leadership of campus radicalism, they passed on to the “New Left” ideas deeply 
imbued with 1950s contestations over the fate of theories, strategies and programs of the 
“Old Left.”  
In this chapter, I make a case for understanding Baran and Sweezy as the two most 
important figures to synthesize 1950s dissident thought into a holistic political economic 
theory of US-led world imperialism, which following the Cuban Revolution would wend its 
way into 1960s campus radicalism, and from there get rearticulated in various academic 
disciplines as a social scientific theory explaining the causes and solutions to Third World 
underdevelopment. In the course of working out and articulating this theory, Monthly Review 
gathered around it a bloc of intellectuals solidified in the latter half of the 1950s around a 
firm rejection of the pluralist view of the state, in favor of a vision in which economic and 
political power remained in the hands of interlocking networks of corporate and state 
executives. The prerogatives of this group, whether described as a “ruling class,” “power 
elite,” or “corporate liberals,” were the most abundantly apparent in foreign policy, which 
was formulated in the interests of the material beneficiaries of the “permanent war 
economy.” By formulating a theory in which objective imperatives rooted in the political 
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economic structure drove US imperialism, Baran and Sweezy stood out from even the more 
critical, left-leaning intellectuals of their era. Yet, they shaped their ideas isolated from any 
mass social movements and in discourse with other intellectuals, which effectively meant 
they assimilated and inverted rather than transcended major trends in US Cold War thought.  
Unpacking this theory of imperialism, which would come to be known as Neo-
Marxism, offers important understandings of the way impressions of 1950s American social 
and economic life were woven into the variants of liberal and Marxist thought that emerged 
from the 1930s. As seen in the last chapter, Sweezy had founded Monthly Review amid 
polarization of the Popular Front/New Deal social alliance, and the corollary implosion of the 
secure space for intellectual radicalism. From the late 1940s to the late 1950s, the market for 
socialist journalism shrank and career opportunities in academic humanities and social 
sciences expanded dramatically. As Mills, Williams, Baran and Sweezy launched their 
respective critiques of the “main drift” or “vital center” of American thought, they grappled 
in real time with the implications of the transformation of the institutional basis for producing 
and circulating socialist ideas. A persistent problem of audience plagued their ability to 
articulate a viable anti-imperialist program, which in turn built a certain inertia into their 
theory of imperialism. They chose other intellectuals as their interlocuters, which 
increasingly meant subjecting their attempts at holistic theorizing to the compartmentalizing 
effects of academic disciplines. By implicitly choosing academic disciplines as their terrain 
of struggle, they ensured much of their mental efforts would go toward justifying holistic 
theorizing as a fundamental part of the scientific enterprise, and one poorly suited to the 
narrow methodological empiricism coming to dominate the major social scientific disciplines 
of the era. They passed this legacy onto New Left campus radicals, many of whom were 
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equally entrenched in academic social sciences, ensuring that, to an unrecognized extent, 
much of the neo-Marxist challenge to modernization theory revolved around questions of 
epistemology and the potential for seizing the university to disrupt the reproduction of 
consensus at a major institutional hub of the cultural apparatus. 
 
Repression and Isolation in Cold War America 
“Shortly after the war, there was a kind of conscious planning to disrupt and 
disintegrate this feared regrouping of the left, with ominous consequences for further 
down the road. The Cold War, McCarthyism, and redbaiting were connected to the 
necessity to split up and fragmentize all those remnants of the 1930s, a very 
important part of the shameful history of the period from about 1948 to 1956 or 
1957.” Paul M. Sweezy, 1999.  
 
Both Baran and Sweezy faced significant persecution within the witch hunt 
atmosphere of McCarthyist America. While they handled this persecution admirably, even 
heroically, it undoubtedly took a psychological toll. For Baran, McCarthyism was a slow, 
dull ache, manifested in the form of the ever-present fear of being driven from his Stanford 
position and thus having the material rug pulled from underneath him. Occasionally the 
drumbeat would grow louder, and meetings with his department chair, provost, or the 
university president would lead him to formulate concrete plans for finding a small place on 
the East Coast, near Sweezy, to retrench and support himself as a freelance writer.62 For 
Baran, the sense of utter isolation heightened the trauma of the experience. Aside from 
                                                 
62 Baran frequently described intolerable conditions at Stanford. See: PAB-PMS, January 
9, 1953; PAB-PMS, March 3, 1953. For plans to quit and move to New Hampsire, see: PAB-
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Moses Abramowitz, not a single Stanford economist defended Baran’s academic freedom 
and, if his letter’s to Sweezy are to be believed, he was personally and professionally 
ostracized within the department. 
If Baran’s McCarthyist experience resembled a chronic tooth-ache, Sweezy’s 
resembled an appendicitis: a sharp, potentially life-threatening pain leading to full recovery 
upon surgical removal. In October of 1953, New Hampshire State Attorney General Louis C. 
Wyman summoned Sweezy to answer questions regarding allegations of a ‘subversive’ 
lecture on socialism Sweezy had delivered at the University of New Hampshire for three 
consecutive years.63 The summons set off a three-year-long ordeal that would ultimately 
result in Sweezy’s victory in 1957 in the Supreme Court case Sweezy v. New Hampshire. The 
outcome seems almost foreordained in the strategy Sweezy consciously adopted even prior to 
his first public grilling in January of 1954. Sweezy went into his initial hearing with two 
concerns in mind. Behavior in front of witch trials was a moral issue among what remained 
of the left in postwar America, and Sweezy approached the hearing conscious of his public 
image and resolved not to grovel.64  
Secondly, Sweezy approached the hearings with a deliberate strategy aimed at 
exposing the unconstitutionality of McCarthyism. The strategy he called the “Huberman-
Larchmont” line had been tested by Huberman a year earlier, and was ultimately inspired by 
                                                 
63 “Academic Freedom and the Sweezy Case,” November 29, 1954, PMS, Box 11.  
 
64 As an indication of the extent to which this mattered to Sweezy and Baran, see their 
reaction to long-time Shigeto Tsuru’s cooperation in 1957: PMS-PAB, “probably May 20,” 
1957, 
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Einstein and Ghandi.65 This strategy entailed refusing to cooperate on First rather than Fifth 
Amendment grounds. But, refusal at the initial stage risked losing the battle for public 
opinion by relinquishing the opportunity to make it clear that one is neither a communist nor 
a subversive threat. So, Sweezy agreed to be sworn in, and agreed to answer questions at his 
discretion without conceding that the state had the right to ask them. He confirmed that he 
considered himself a Marxist and a socialist, but denied being a Communist to establish the 
record. Beyond denying that he had publicly advocated violent revolution he refused to 
answer questions about the UNH lecture, and refused to answer any questions at all 
pertaining to his involvement in the New Hampshire Progressive Party on the grounds that 
such questions were irrelevant to the line of inquiry. Wyman charged Sweezy with contempt, 
and the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the verdict in March of 1956. Applying the 
“Huberman-Larchmont” line throughout every phase, Sweezy successfully appealed the case 
to the Supreme Court in 1957. The Supreme Court verdict in New Hampshire v. Sweezy has 
since been considered a landmark ruling on academic freedom, and an indication of the 
thawing of the worst phase of McCarthyism. 
In addition to state repression, Baran, Sweezy suffered personally and intellectually 
from their sense of being alienated from any progressive social forces. The intellectual 
radicalization of the 1930s, in which they had cut their teeth as left academics, was closely 
linked to the dramatic upsurge of labor militancy in that decade. In the immediate post-World 
War Two period, labor leaders such as Walter Reuther still considered themselves 
democratic socialists, and intellectuals on the left still thought labor would be the institutional 
                                                 
65 Huberman case and link to Einstein and Ghandi, PMS-PAB, July 24, 1953. 
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basis for pressing the New Deal order in a socialist direction. However, during the war labor 
had become bureaucratized and closely tied with the Democratic Party, and the onset of the 
Cold War solidified these processes. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 purged radicals and 
required loyalty oaths from union leaders, and it routinized labor-management negotiations. 
Both measures institutionalized the labor movement as a permanent feature of American 
politics, while simultaneously restricting the possibilities for the type of spontaneous 
militancy industrial unionists had displayed at the height of the Great Depression. Henry 
Wallace’s campaign, which Sweezy participated in as a delegate for the New Hampshire 
Progressive Party, sought to channel the progressive democratic socialist elements around 
labor into third party, which would take up the mantle of the New Deal. Truman’s reelection 
in the 1948 presidential campaign stymied the effort and solidified the close relationship 
between the AFL-CIO bureaucracy and the Democratic Party that endures two decades into 
the twenty-first century. 
C. Wright Mills set the tone for 1950s left intellectual discussions about the 
implications of labor bureaucratization for radical thought in general and for Marxism in 
particular. His widely read trilogy sought to build a comprehensive image of the US social 
structure from the bottom-up. New Men of Power (1948) examined labor, White Collar 
(1951) the salaried professional classes, and The Power Elite (1956) the interlocking military, 
corporate, and governmental institutions holding the preponderance of power. These works 
collectively portrayed an American social and political order defined by the concentration of 
power in the hands of a small group of self-interested elites. Written at different times, they 
also reflect Mills’s changing assessment of the prospects for mobilizing the subjects of the 
first two volumes in opposition the subjects of the third. Along with articles intended for the 
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educated public, two book-length polemical pieces, and his unfinished manuscripts, Mills’s 
oeuvre also reveals an underlying discourse with the Marxist tradition, the best-known 
outcome of which was his critique of the unwarranted, what he saw as faith-like assumption 
in the historically progressive agency of the proletariat. 
But before Mills became known for his rejection of the Marxist “labor metaphysic,” 
he briefly envisioned a future for himself as a “labor intellectual,” operating in a liminal 
space somewhere between the academy and the labor movement. When Mills came to New 
York City to work for the Columbia sociology department’s Bureau of Applied Social 
Research (BASR) in 1945, many of his friends on the New York intellectual scene had 
already moved away from a progressive social vision premised on the objective antagonism 
between capital and labor. In 1946 Dwight Macdonald published “The Root is Man,” 
declaring the need for a moralist humanism to resolve the crisis of Enlightment ideas of 
progress, in which he included the Marxist view of class struggle. Mills, then friendly with 
Macdonald and Daniel Bell and contributing regularly to politics and New Leader, the 
magazines they respectively edited, resisted Macdonald’s turn away from labor. While at the 
BASR, he contributed to J.B.S. Hardman’s Inter-Union Institute for Labor and Democracy, 
where he participated in a roundtable on the role of intellectuals in the labor movement and 
served as contributing editor to Labor and Nation. His concurrent research for the BASR 
employed state-of-the-art sociological methods to survey hundreds of labor leaders, which 
provided the empirical data that would go into New Men of Power. Though the book, Mills’s 
first, criticized the bureaucratization of the labor movement and contained some ambiguity 
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for the way forward, it nonetheless placed labor at the center of any program for the socialist 
left.66 
Virtually by the time the book went to the press, Mills had shifted toward the position 
he would maintain until his death, and for which he would be more rightly remembered. 
Already New Men of Power displayed ambivalence about the prospect of a labor-centered 
progressivism. Mills believed labor could be the institutional base for a new radicalism, but 
only if a new labor intellectual managed to shake off the bureaucrats. His outlook was not 
exactly optimistic, as indicated in his bleak closing sentence: “Never has so much depended 
upon men who are so ill-prepared and so little inclined to accept the responsibility.”67 By the 
time he completed his next book, White Collar, Mills had grown much more skeptical about 
prospects for bottom-up social change. Published in 1951, White Collar identified salaried 
professionals as the new cornerstone of the American economy. Mills exhaustively examined 
the middle-class occupations that had been created by 1940s transformations of American 
capitalism, and he analyzed the structural pressures exerted on these workers by their place 
within the bureaucratized structure. Though this analysis yielded insights about the 
mechanisms of social control, the subjects of the book are portrayed as more-or-less passive 
recipients of structural pressures, and mindless regurgitators of mass culture. Mills doubted 
white collar workers could be mobilized to oppose capitalism. 
                                                 
66 For Macdonald’s essay, see: Gregory D. Sumner, Dwight Macdonald and the politics 
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67 C. Wright Mills, New Men of Power, pp. Quoted in Geary, Radical, 104. 
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The minds behind Monthly Review had no direct ties to labor, but suffered a similar 
disorientation toward the organized political left with the collapse of “fellow-traveler” as a 
common and more-or-less socially acceptable category. Privately, they maintained doubts 
and criticisms of the Soviet Union, but they agreed that to criticize it publicly only provided 
fodder for reactionaries.68 Even in private, they rationalized many Soviet atrocities that 
repelled so many liberals. When rumors of Soviet gulags began circulating in American 
media, Sweezy and Baran partially dismissed them as “fantastic exaggerations,” partially 
deflected by equating them to semi-slave labor in the United States, and partially justified 
them as necessary growing pains for the sake of building a better future.69 Throughout the 
1950s, they categorically rejected any talk of “Soviet imperialism,” and argued that spreading 
socialism to Soviet “satellites” was historically progressive, even when it involved deceit 
and/or force.70  
If they were ambivalent about the Soviet Union, they held much firmer views on 
Stalin as a person and of the Leninist party as an instrument in the struggle for social 
                                                 
68 See, for example, exchange over Baran’s efforts to enter Soviet Union to see his dying 
mother. He says it’s hard not to join the baiters. Sweezy defends the importance of protecting 
the iron curtain, and advises against any public criticism. PAB-PMS (and Huberman), March 
28, 1950; PMS-PAB, March 31, 1950. 
 
69 Quotation from PMS-PAB, January 25, 1951. Equivalency to U.S. labor see: PMS-
PAB, February 28, 1951; PMS-PAB, April 6, 1951.  
 
70 See defense of “Czech affair” on ground that the masses have “to be bribed, tricked, 
maneuvered into tolerating and cooperating with the government while it carries out social 
transformation which later on will make those bribes unnecessary,” PAB-PMS (and 
Huberman), November 29, 1952. PAB-PMS, January 18, 1955, Baran ridicules the very 
notion of “Soviet imperialism.” PAB-PMS, April 6, 1957: “To speak of ‘colonial 
exploitation’ on the other side of the iron curtain is really insane.” 
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revolution. Toward the latter they assumed an invariably derisive posture, while upon Stalin 
as a leader and Marxist theorist they lavished no end of praise. On the surface, these two 
positions may seem incommensurable, but in fact their hostility toward “sectarianism” and 
their appreciation of Stalin as the promoter of cross-class alliances both come from the 
foundational influence of the Popular Front in their political consciousness. They called 
Stalin “Uncle Joe” and praised his originality as a thinker. In particular, they were impressed 
with Stalin’s 1952 booklet “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR,” calling it 
“Marxism at its truly best,”71 which “proves conclusively that Joe belongs with Marx, 
Engels, and Lenin as general theorists. I am even inclined to believe that it puts him above 
Lenin in this regard.”72 Their praise largely focused on Stalin’s reinterpretation of the law of 
value in both monopolistic capitalism and socialist societies. This insight set off a flurry of 
correspondence interpreting, debating, and drawing conclusions from the implications of 
Stalin’s analysis, all of which strongly point to Stalin’s booklet as the major impetus setting 
in motion the ideas that would undergird both Political Economy of Growth and Monopoly 
Capital.73 It also indicates something of a notion of “convergence” in economic thought in 
socialist and capitalist countries underlying and corresponding to the idea of peaceful 
coexistence and similar academic approaches to the question of diplomatic relations between 
the first two worlds and the third.  
                                                 
71 PAB-PMS, October 12, 1952. 
 
72 PMS-PAB, November 20, 1952. 
 
73 In addition to two already cited, see: PAB-PMS, October 19, 1952; PAB-PMS, 
November 22, 1952.  
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Stalin’s genius stood in inverse proportion to the simple-minded idiocy of your 
average CP member, which in turn stemmed from the blind fanaticism required for party 
membership. Notwithstanding their own adoration for Stalin, they routinely used religious 
terminology to describe the faith-like behavior of Stalinists.74 Party members were 
“fanatics,” when the CP critiqued Monthly Review it came from “the Bible,” and on the 
whole they saw Stalinists as a group incapable of articulating any idea not directly handed 
down from Stalin himself.75 This seemingly contradictory political attitude, characterized by 
a commitment to the Soviet Union as the leading force in the global transition to “socialism” 
while simultaneously assuming a hyper-critical attitude toward the revolutionary party as an 
organizational form, constitutes an important line of continuity connecting the Monthly 
Review School to the New Left near the end of the decade and start of the 1960s. Cold War 
liberals saw the bureaucratized Soviet Union as the logical, and inevitable outcome of 
Marxist-Leninism. In the US in the 1950s, one could advocate socialism, and even do so 
from within a small, sectarian organization, but only on the condition of unfaltering criticism 
of the Soviet Union as the aggressor in the Cold War. This was the posture espoused by 
“Third Camp” socialists such as Max Shachtman’s Independent Socialist League and, after 
1954, Irving Howe’s and Lewis Coser’s magazine Dissent, both of which retained currency 
on the New York Intellectual scene. The first real disputes between the young generation of 
radicals and their organizational forebears occurred over the tentative and cautious 
willingness to portray the US as the main aggressor on the world stage, while simultaneously 
                                                 
74 Sweezy very consciously puts forth this formulation in PMS-PAB, June 4, 1951. 
 
75 PMS-PAB, December 30, 1950. 
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professing boredom and/or moral aversion to the organizational forms of the “Old Left.”76 
Monthly Review certainly stands out as a precursor to this position more than some of the 
other groups that have been identified as the bridge between the Old Left and the New. 
Monthly Review frequently ran editorials or articles advancing a class analysis of 
American society, but primarily in relation to explaining the formulation and beneficiaries of 
public policy. In 1951 Sweezy ran a two-part article defining the term “ruling class” as 
applied to American politics, and outlining an instrumentalist view of the American state. 
Drawing on the sociology of Lester Ward and William Graham Sumner, Sweezy put forth a 
social theory of class as both a logical category for social analysis and as an expression of 
elite self-consciousness. The unit of class membership, he argued, is the family, and the 
defining feature of family class affiliation is the realistic ability to intermarry. Property 
ownership largely determined familial intermarriage, but imperceptible shades rather than 
sharp lines separated class gradations. For Sweezy, this commitment to class analysis 
garnered a single fundamental analytical insight: the ability to understand how the ruling 
class rules. The interlocking family networks of large property owners shape policy in their 
own interests by governing directly, by hiring and firing those who do govern, or by funding 
the political machinery.77  
                                                 
76 Richard Pells, The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals in the 
1940s and 1950s, (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 1985) characterized the 
dominant intellectual trend in this era as “popular front liberalism,” which entailed a 
commitment to Keynesian economics combined with firm anti-Communism. 
77 Paul Sweezy, “The American Ruling Class,” Monthly Review 3/1 (May 1951), 10-17; 
Paul Sweezy, “The American Ruling Class: Part II,” Monthly Review 3/2 (June, 1951), 58-
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 In 1958 Monthly Review published an issue on labor jointly edited with American 
Socialist, which shows the extent to which they had assimilated Mills’s positions on the 
“labor metaphysic.” Though brief-lived, American Socialist like Monthly Review anticipated 
many of the themes of early 1960s New Left theory. Bert Cochran, Harry Braverman, and 
George Clarke started the magazine in 1954 after their split with the Trotskyist Socialist 
Workers’ Party. In the factional dispute that precipitated the split, the “Cochranites” pushed 
to Americanize the party and foster greater alliances with organized labor. During the 1930s, 
Cochran had worked as a labor organizer within Michigan and Ohio metal and auto 
industries on behalf of the SWP and its precursor Trotskyist and Musteite groups. Through 
his experience as a labor organizer, Cochran established close contacts with militant workers 
in the 1930s, who would go on to hold positions in the more bureaucratized labor movement 
of the 1950s.78 Harry Braverman also had a past in labor. He had come to Marxism when he 
was recruited as a rank-and-file metal worker by Trotskyists within the Young People’s 
Socialist League. In the post-World War Two period, the Cocrhanite faction began pushing 
the SWP party to back away from its allegiance to Trotsky, a figure they believed seemed 
arcane and foreign to most American workers, prompting SWP leader James P. Cannon to 
accuse the Cocrhanites of currying favor with union contacts who had abandoned their 
thirties radicalism as they gained social standing through their status in the union 
bureaucracy.79 
                                                 
78 See, for example, his personal obituary of MESA leader in American Socialist. 
79 See: Bryan Palmer, “Before Braverman: Harry Frankel and the American Workers’ 
Movement,” Monthly Review 50/8 (Jan., 1999) 33-46, esp. 40-41; Robert J. Alexander, 
International Trotskyisim, 1929-1985: A Documented Analysis of the Movement, (Durham 
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 As editors of American Socialist, Cochran and Braverman sought to execute their 
Americanization agenda by writing about contemporary labor issues and by hearkening back 
to the pre-Russian Revolution era of US radicalism. Speaking to a group of supporters in 
Chicago at the end of the journal’s third year, Cochran identified the central propositions 
under which he and the other editors had launched their enterprise. They saw the need for a 
left publication “friendly to the work of socialist building in Russia and elsewhere,” that 
recognized “splinters and groups were impotent and valueless, and a new cooperative 
beginning had to be made.”80 These stated goals closely aligned with those of Monthly 
Review at its inception half a decade earlier, and American Socialist brought the same 
intellectual network into its orbit before its collapse in late 1959 after a six-year run. In its 
last two volumes, for the years 1958 and 1959, regular Monthly Review contributors William 
Appleman Williams, Harvey O’Connor, and Arthur K. Davis sat on American Socialist’s 
board of contributing editors, and the two magazines organized collaborative speaking tours, 
in which C. Wright Mills would participate. Editorials and articles by Cochran routinely 
invoked memories of the early twentieth-century Debsian Socialist Party as the “heyday” of 
American radicalism, and lamented the ascendency of the Communist Party as an 
unfortunate deviation opening a schism between Marxist thought and American radical 
traditions. This is a position with which Williams agreed, and that he would pass on to the 
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New Left through his influence over editors of the Studies on the Left, especially James 
Weinstein. 
The 96-page American Socialist/Monthly Review collaborative issue on labor came 
out in the summer of 1958. Contributors to the issue included Sweezy, Huberman, Cochran, 
and Braverman. Most of the contributions to the labor issue read like a conversation with 
Mills, in which the authors concede Mills’s major premise but try to rebut some of the 
derivative claims circulating in public discourse.81 Marxism, in the United States and 
elsewhere in the world, had a long tradition of condemning the labor bureaucracy. But the 
contributors to the MR/American Socialist labor issue went further than denouncing the 
bureaucrats as “mis-leaders” of the working class. Following the logic of Baran’s and 
Sweezy’s developing theory of monopoly capitalism (discussed below), the political 
economy of the labor issue assumed American capitalism had virtually limitless, or at least 
indefinite, ability to coopt the labor rank-and-file as well as the bureaucrats. Cochran, who 
devoted his best years organizing auto-workers in the 1930s, concluded that the US 
proletariat at mid-century was “kept reasonably contented… with bread and circuses” and, 
thus, “the outlook of the ranks [had] grown philistine.”82 While it is debatable how central 
the “labor metaphysic” is to a Marxist analysis, it is clear that Monthly Review and American 
Socialist were trying to preserve Marxism against what they perceived as the clear lack of a 
progressive proletariat on which to pin their hopes, at least for the foreseeable future. 
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82 Bert Cochran, “American Labor in Midpassage,” Monthly Review 10/3&4 (July-
August 1958), 76-88 at 81. 
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Intellectualizing Personal Despair 
“I though the Soviet Union was on a good course. Later on, we did take a position 
on the Soviet Union which was much more critical. But in 1957, I think there were 
still quite a few illusions.” Paul M. Sweezy, 1999.83 
 
Though they both behaved admirably, and Sweezy won a significant victory, the 
cumulative effects of McCarthyism, deteriorating faith in the Soviet Union and the inability 
to locate a political subject in the United States took a psychological toll on both Baran and 
Sweezy. By the middle of the decade, they began to speak increasingly of “fascism” in 
reference to more than just the political establishment in the United States. At Stanford 
Baran’s alienation turned to contempt for faculty and student body alike, the latter he 
described as “a horde of stupid, selfish, greedy animals.” Stanford was worse than Nazi 
Germany; whereas Nazi’s at least had an ideal, at Stanford the “feeding, chewing, spitting, 
scheming potential or actual juvenile (or adult) delinquents believe nothing, think nothing, 
aspire nowhere.”84 Marx believed cultural degradation under advanced capitalism would only 
affect the bourgeoisie; for Baran in postwar America it affected the entire nation, which was 
irremediably lost for any but the most reactionary politics. Sweezy was not given to such 
vitriolic outbursts, but he undoubtedly shared the essence of Baran’s skepticism. 
 Baran and Sweezy suffered recurrent bouts of deep depression that would virtually 
paralyze their productivity for weeks at a time. Their correspondence frequently dealt with 
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their low “stimmung” (German word for “mood”).85 They discussed its effect on their work 
habits, ruminations on its origins—alternately located in the constitution of the human 
psyche or in the social and cultural irrationality of late capitalism—and methods for coping 
and managing depression. While their main expertise lay in Marxist political economy, 
personal experience with depression, continual dialogue with Baran’s old Frankfurt academy 
comrades, and, at least for Baran, extensive psycho-analytic treatment, gave the pair more 
than passing familiarity with psychological theory and terminology. To the extent that he saw 
unhappiness as a perennial feature of the human condition, as opposed to a historically 
specific feature of 1950s American society, Baran attributed it to the “asymmetry of positive 
and negative sensations.” In other words, the suffering caused by the absence of a thing was a 
weightier emotional experience than the joy of fulfilling that desire.86 Sweezy agreed with 
Baran’s theory, adding that for the child life in general is such a “negative sensation,” the 
fulfillment of which invariably does not provide the positive satisfaction of childish 
anticipation.87 This view, which both Baran and Sweezy seemed genuinely to share, resulted 
in a positively bleak outlook for anything other than a miserable adulthood, regardless of 
existing social conditions. 
Aside from the enormous and constant psychological pressure exerted by the 
repressive environment of Cold War America, there is an indication that Baran and Sweezy 
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understood the adverse psychological impact of being a Marxist with no confidence in the 
revolutionary potential of the proletariat, or any other class for that matter. In the wake of 
Khrushchev’s revelations of Stalin’s crimes at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, Baran and Sweezy had to deal emotionally with the abrupt 
loss of their faith in the moral superiority of the Soviet Union. Initially Monthly Review 
responded favorably to the 20th Congress, viewing it as an indication that the Soviet Union 
had veered in a more democratic trajectory. Baran and Sweezy had long been prone to 
rationalize the coercive methods through which the Soviet bureaucracy achieved 
industrialization, either denying the most extreme forms of repression or justifying them as 
necessary means of overcoming Russia’s historical backwardness. The editorial in the 
summer double edition of Monthly Review hailed the 20th Congress as the indication of the 
dawn of a new era in Soviet history. Though the coming epoch would be characterized by 
socialist democracy, this democratization ultimately rested on the social foundation of the 
elevated standard of living and sweeping social and cultural changes brought on by 
industrialization. Stalin achieved “good ends through bad means” and still deserves to be 
seen as “one of the greats of Soviet history.”88 As long as they viewed the Soviet Union as a 
workers’ state moving in a more egalitarian and ultimately more democratic trajectory, they 
felt their sacrifices were connected to proletarian agents somewhere in the world, even if not 
directly linked to any mass movement of their own. 
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By November of that year, the editorial line and the tone of private correspondence 
shifted, and it would be hard to exaggerate the psychological toll. Baran explicitly linked a 
low stint in November of 1956 to his loss of confidence in the East as the bastion of 
“Reason” in an irrational world. “The miserableness of personal existence in all of its 
elements has much to do with this dimness of outlook.”89 Sweezy for his parted noted “I 
don't especially like the form that events are taking in the USSR” but claimed to be “too 
dispirited to care.”90 When literary scholar, long-time friend and initial financier of Monthly 
Review F.O. Matthiessen committed suicide in 1950, Sweezy may have been projecting when 
he speculated that “Matty’s” depression stemmed from wanting but not finding an authentic 
social movement.91 Later, in the fall of 1957, in the midst of a prolonged “lack of zest for 
life” and “complete lack of confidence that we will ever make the contribution that we 
theoretically can make”92 Sweezy wondered if Matty had not “adopted the right strategy.”93 
While this is probably better viewed as a passing comment than any genuinely suicidal 
tendencies, the despair underlying the comment surfaced consistently on both sides of the 
correspondence, and the anguished need to make a lasting theoretical contribution to Marxist 
thought gained intensity as their contempt for American “fascist” culture extended to broader 
and broader layers of society. 
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The combined effect of the 1950s left the Monthly Review crowd in a theoretical 
haze. Sweezy openly contemplated the divergence between his personal despair and the 
necessity for feigned optimism on which his livelihood depended. “I'm afraid that the 
horrible truth, which I have long resisted, is that there is not a scintilla of hope for this 
country,” Sweezy wrote to Baran in 1958. “And it is obvious that MR couldn't survive a year 
purveying the kind of black pessimism (for the US) which I know in my bones to be the 
truth. All of which adds up to intellectual confusion, moral doubt, and psychic torture.”94 It 
would have been impossible to separate such internal turmoil from intellectual production, 
and throughout the late 1950s an unquestionable undertone of defeatism crept into the 
editorial line of Monthly Review, and was built into the theoretical scaffolding for Baran’s 
and Sweezy’s larger intellectual projects. 
 
 
Anti-Imperialism Against the Main Drift 
“Then the second theme is Baran’s breakthrough on the relation between the 
developed and underdeveloped parts of the capitalist world. The theory that 
capitalism doesn’t spread by creating a homogenized system in the image of the 
advanced countries that lead the way, but rather creates a polarized global system 
between the developed and the underdeveloped areas, so that the two are 
dialectically interrelated as parts of a single whole, but not homogenous parts and 
not ones that are ever going to become homogeneous.” Paul M. Sweezy, 1999.95 
 
 What Mills called the American celebration found unique expression in various 1950s 
academic disciplines, according to their distinct methodological and theoretical boundaries. 
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In his 1959 book The Sociological Imagination, Mills famously lambasted its expression in 
his own discipline by translating impenetrable passages of Talcott Parsons’s structural-
functionalist “Grand Theory” into plain English.96 Parsons saw sociology as the supreme 
social science, and sought to construct a holistic “general theory of action” that could 
subsume the concerns of other social sciences. He especially hoped to dethrone economics, 
which many saw as the most “scientific” of the social sciences. For Parsons, economic theory 
should be “construed as a special case of a more general theory of social systems,” and only 
sociologists could develop the more general theory that would explain not just economic 
rationality as a subset of human behaviors, but the entire gamut of norms and values that 
orient human action. Enormous amounts of public and private funds flooded the university to 
aid the scientific advancement that would help win the Cold War, which helps explain this 
anxiety to establish sociology as a legitimate social science, emulating the rigor of economics 
and the natural sciences.97 As the founder of Harvard’s Department of Social Relations, 
Parsons oversaw an ambitious effort to synthesize findings from other social sciences into an 
all-encompassing theory, resulting in Toward a General Theory of Action, a volume he co-
edited with Edward Shils. In the General Theory of Action, Parson and Shils posited social 
and cultural systems “institutionalize” actors into roles. Based on shared values and 
expectations, members of society enforce these roles, or patterns of action, by enacting their 
own roles and sanctioning asocial behavior. Much like Schumpeter’s criticism of 
neoclassicism, structural-functionalist theory depicted a society with strong tendencies 
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toward equilibrium, and had a hard time accounting for social change based on factors 
endogenous to their theory.98 
The Cold War elevated development studies from a relatively minor subfield of 
economics to a thriving, well-funded interdisciplinary research paradigm. Historians of Third 
World development disagree over its origins, but generally agree that a policy consensus 
around “modernization theory” had crystallized by the 1950s. Harry Truman’s Point Four 
serves as good inflection point. At his inaugural address in 1949, Truman’s fourth foreign 
policy point proposed the US government should mobilize technological know-how to 
facilitate economic growth in underdeveloped nations. In his second term, Truman 
established an agency in the State Department to oversee what came to be known as “Point 
Four Programs.” While Truman’s speech channeled ideas in circulation more than 
originating a new line of thinking, he did initiate a foreign policy agenda that would run at 
least through the Johnson administration, and, as historian Michael Latham argued, was 
resurrected in spirit with the nation-building rationale given for the twenty-first century 
invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.99  
The ideology underpinning modernization theory mirrored that of the predominant 
academic paradigms, and social scientists contributed to state-led Third World development 
programs in their research and as policy advisors. Modernizers abstracted their image of 
modernity, the goal toward which Third World nations should strive, from a particular 
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reading of the US history and present. Consensus historiography portrayed an America “born 
free,” lacking a legacy of class division comparable to other Western nations. In this 
historical narrative, the cultural, political and economic modernity achieved by the United 
States in the twentieth century could be attributed to the steady progress of a functional 
society with a shared set of values. In identifying functionalist sociology as the most 
important intellectual precursor to modernization theory, historian Nils Gilman pointed out 
that the abstract ahistorical schematic “blueprint” for modernization derived from Talcott 
Parsons’s pattern variables characterized “modernity” itself as value orientation “uncannily 
similar to Parsons’s understanding of his own contemporary United States.”100 
Modernization theory drew together elements of the discrete academic expressions of the 
American celebration into a single metanarrative of progress abstracted from a mythologized 
image of the shared values and configuration of political and economic institutions 
responsible for the nation’s twentieth century economic dynamism, then projected that 
metanarrative onto third world states. But to spread the benefits of American-style liberal 
modernity, modernization theorists in academia and the state resorted to illiberal means. This 
contradiction opened a chink, which critics would eventually exploit to pierce the myth of a 
liberal national consensus at its weakest point. Against the holistic narrative of a society fully 
integrated around liberal values, Neo-Marxists would level a counternarrative in which the 
domestic social integration depended on imperial expansion. But the holistic theory behind 
modernization was implicit. Taken at the level of assumptions, its empirical dimensions were 
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fractured in a division of labor spread out across disciplines. The efforts to formulate a 
holistic counternarrative butted up against these disciplinary fractures. 
For Baran and Sweezy, that meant primarily operating in the discursive field of 
professional economics. In the context of their disillusion and despair, they channeled their 
intellectual energy into working out the abstract laws governing capitalism in its monopoly 
phase. They waged a struggle on a terrain of pure abstraction, into which they poured all their 
frustration and anger with the existing social order. Their opponent in this great battle was 
the profession that had ignored and ostracized them, and a victory would entail rescuing 
basic principles of Marxian economic analysis. To do so, they had to define the debate on 
their own terms, which meant in the first instance refusing to engage the extent of 
monopolization or concentration of the American economy on empirical grounds. They 
lacked the material resources to harness data on the scale of the profession at large. They 
agreed to begin by working out an ideal-type model of monopoly capitalism and formulate its 
essential laws of motion.101 Only then would they proceed to concrete empirical referents, 
organized and arranged with a new appreciation of their underlying causes. The more cynical 
they grew about the prospects for witnessing socialism in their lifetime, the more desperately 
they clung to their “opus,” vesting in it all their now vanquished youthful idealism.  
At the most basic level, Baran’s and Sweezy’s analysis of monopoly capitalism 
envisioned a system free of inherent tendencies toward cyclical booms and busts, and, 
especially, crises caused by the falling rate of profit due to the rising organic composition of 
capital. Their whole theoretical system hinged on the concept of “economic surplus.” Baran 
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and Sweezy had first visited the idea of writing a comprehensive analysis of the inner-
workings and dynamic of monopoly capitalism in 1952, spurred by their laudatory reception 
of Stalin’s ruminations on the Marxist concept of value in the Soviet Union. By the mid-
1950s, after years of intense theoretical dialogue, their conception of monopoly capitalism as 
a historically specific mode of exploiting labor and distributing surplus had largely taken 
shape, and the scaffolding for their 1966 collaborative work was in place.  
In its earlier phase, competition among many capitalists had driven the logic of 
innovation, as rival capitals could increase their share of the total, aggregate surplus-value by 
lowering their production costs. But, in an economy in which monopoly and oligopoly 
constituted the dominant form of economic organization throughout key industrial sectors, 
large firms colluded on prices and market share, virtually eliminating the effects of 
competition. The concept of economic surplus, mentioned in 1951 but taking firmer shape 
near the middle of the decade, posited the excess of total output over the socially necessary 
costs of producing that output as the central contradiction in the era of monopoly capitalism. 
In the place of business cycles, the mounting economic surplus would act as a constant, and-
ever more severe drag on monopoly capitalism, which could dispose of this surplus (and thus 
keep the profit-system cycling) only by increasingly “wasteful” expenditure, including 
military production, unnecessary product differentiation, advertising to boost consumer 
spending, and, when compelled by class pressures, redistributive measures through the 
welfare state. Although actual surplus continued to rise under conditions of monopoly 
capitalism, potential surplus was hindered by wasteful expenditure. Taking the Soviet Union 
under Stalin as a model, Baran and Sweezy argued that socialist societies made greater use of 
potential surplus by avoiding wasteful expenditure and reinvesting the maximum possible 
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surplus into productivity increases, realized in productive consumption in a rationally 
organized society. Their lever for mobilizing social opposition hinged on the ability to 
articulate the difference between actual and potential surplus. The cycle of wasteful 
expenditure would proceed into the indefinite future, but only at the expense of chronic 
stagnation and irrational forms of wasteful expenditure, which would come to stand out in 
contrast to the rationality of a planned economy. 
Understanding the effort to take it big, to level a holistic political economy from 
within the compartmentalized academy, helps understand the significance of Paul Baran’s 
1957 book Political Economy of Growth, which was simultaneously an ambitious attempt at 
holistic theorizing (a rough draft for Monopoly Capital) and the summation of Baran’s 
cumulative interventions into the subfield of development economics. Like in his earlier 
intervention, Baran saw a tension between the logical prescriptions for third world 
development flowing from predominant theories of economic development and the political 
possibilities given the real interests involved. Keynesianism had stabilized the US economy, 
and locally the American profession was returning to bourgeois economic concerns of 
inflation. But Baran saw the problem of development of “backward” countries (a 
terminology still in use) as in essence a political problem for Washington driven by the 
pressures of Cold War international relations. Requiring more dynamic rates of growth in the 
backward regions, development economics, led by Baran’s old Harvard cohort Evsey Domar 
and his British counterpart Roy Harrod, continued to consider the market as an institution 
poorly suited to balancing investment and consumption decisions, which would be required 
to channel surplus behind a program of robust growth. Much like Williams (discussed 
below), but for different reasons, Baran depicted a tragic tension between the ideals and 
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political possibilities behind US-led economic development projects. The Cold War narrative 
of triumphant capitalism compelled “various government agencies and private foundations, 
economists, anthropologists, social psychologists, and other social scientists” propagating 
Washington’s development policies to rewrite the history of Western capitalism as the 
product of a long period of slow growth. But in doing so, they delegitimized the technocratic 
tools that could make a viable development program possible. 
Intellectual historians have remembered Baran’s book as an intervention in 
development economics, notable for insinuating a neo-Marxist line in US thought that would 
mature into dependency theory following the 1960s cross-fertilization with concurrent trends 
in Latin American development though.102 But it was far more ambitious than simply a 
polemic in the subfield of development economics. Rather, Baran sought to synthesize major 
trends in postwar economics, sociology, and social psychology into a counter-narrative 
explaining domestic equilibrium in terms of a US ruling class benefiting from world 
exploitation and local political and ideological manipulation. Political Economy of Growth 
contained in underdeveloped form many of the themes that would appear in Monopoly 
Capital in 1966. Denying the same tendencies toward crises, Baran critiqued capitalism in its 
monopoly phase largely for causing cultural degradation through its various forms of 
wasteful expenditure. In polemic with his profession, he argued against models built on 
ahistorical assumptions about consumer behavior. Consumer decisions, like social action 
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generally, are shaped by social institutions, and under monopoly capitalism, unnecessary 
product differentiation and the sales effort help “absorb” the growing surplus, while 
simultaneously degrading the culture. While sill underdeveloped in 1957, this part of his 
analysis very much resembles Mills and other contemporaries critical of salesmanship and its 
effects on mass culture.  
William Appleman Williams offered a similar holistic theory of imperialism from 
within the discipline of history. Whereas Baran’s work polemicized primarily with 
Keynesian and “post-Keynesian” economists, Williams took on the so-called consensus 
school of US history that expressed a similarly non-antagonistic view of American society. 
Williams body of academic work returned to the Progressive historiography that had been 
eclipsed by the consensus school. His PhD dissertation, American-Russian Relations, unified 
Fredrick Jackson Turner’s thesis with the Charles Beard’s economic interpretation of the 
founding and government of the United States. Williams argued economic elites pursued an 
imperialist foreign policy at the end of the nineteenth century to resolve the crisis of the 
closed frontier by turning the world into its market.103 
Informed by his historical research, Williams regularly wrote on the pages of Monthly 
Review, The Nation and American Socialist to argue against the Soviet aggressor explanation 
of the Cold War. Major framing issues of Williams groundbreaking 1959 book, The Tragedy 
of American Diplomacy made their first public appearance in articles published on the pages 
of Monthly Review. Read in tandem with the book, Williams’s more polemical Monthly 
Review articles offered a richer sense of the way economics and ideology interact in his 
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theory of history. His first article, “A Second Look at Mr. X”- published in August 1952 
before the appearance of his first book- already contained the combination of economics and 
ideology that Williams would later wrap up in the concept of weltanschauung. He criticized 
George Frost Kennan’s famous telegram both for failing to recognize “the relationship 
between economic forces and foreign policy” in the U.S. and for failing to acknowledge the 
symbolic potency of the Soviet Union as an alternative to capitalist society. Williams 
depicted a subtle tension between ideology and material interests interacting in the psyche of 
policy-makers, offering a far more sophisticated view than Kennan’s essentially 
mythologized liberal interpretation of U.S. foreign policy. In a January 1953 article in 
Monthly Review titled “Republican Foreign Policy from McKinley to Eisenhower” Williams 
linked the emergence of an imperialist faction of American policy-making elites with the 
rising production indexes of the gilded age, compelling corporate capital to “sit in at the 
game of dividing the markets and the sources of supply throughout the world.” In this 
account, economic interests quite formally linked the need for expansion to the coming glut 
of overproduction, as articulated in no uncertain terms by Brooks Adams, a close friend to 
the Teddy Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge wing of the Republican Party orchestrating the turn 
to empire.104 Much of this article would make its way into Tragedy, in which Williams 
presented a narrative of U.S. imperialist foreign policy motivated by the reformist impulse of 
American Progressivism. In this account, Williams did not question the legitimacy of 
reformists’ good intentions, but argued they coincided with, indeed were indelibly wrapped 
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up in, a worldview in which the greatest human good would be advanced through securing 
liberal governments abroad to simultaneously ensure stable markets for American exports.105 
Williams synthesized his ongoing 1950s critique of US foreign policy into his most 
famous work, Tragedy of American Diplomacy. First released in 1959, In Tragedy, Williams 
simultaneously took on the historical narrative of US foreign policy used to justify the policy 
of containment, and the consensus historiography that portrayed domestic US history in 
terms of broad-based social unity behind shared liberal values. He wrapped these two 
critiques into a single package, analytically linking foreign expansion and domestic stability 
as two aspects of single process. From the closure of the frontier at the end of the nineteenth 
century to the Cold War, Washington pursued the foreign policy of the Open Door to secure 
markets for US agricultural and manufacturing exports and supplies of raw materials. 
Dumping excess production in foreign markets decreased farmer unrest by buttressing 
agricultural prices, and it decreased labor antagonism to capital by allowing corporate elites 
to continually expand production without cutting into profit margins by undercutting their 
own demand. The Open Door contrasted to other forms of empire by specifically negating 
the strategy of creating spheres of influence with protected trading rights. With its unmatched 
productive potential, the US economy had more to gain from dismantling such self-enclosed 
trading blocs in favor of an Open Door, which would allow all industrialized states equal 
access to export markets in underdeveloped countries, especially China. Williams linked this 
foreign policy to the regulatory and redistributive state that had developed in tandem with 
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America’s imperialist presence on the world stage. For Williams, reformist US statesmen 
from Robert La Follette, through Woodrow Wilson and a recuperated Herbert Hoover, to 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt understood the preservation of liberalism in the corporate era 
depended on constantly expanding the market for American commerce.106 Perhaps the most 
nuanced of the critiques of the liberal consensus myth behind modernization theory, 
Williams did not impugn liberal motives by questioning the sincerity of their desire to extend 
the benefits of liberal capitalism throughout the world. He simply argued that the belief in the 
value of spreading commerce stemmed from a world-view that simultaneously happened to 
rationalize policies that directly served the material interests of American corporate 
capitalism, and facilitated the liberal reforms domestically necessary to maintain private 
ownership against the threat of revolution. 
On some level, Mills’s holistic social theory is revealed across his entire corpus of 
work. But in another sense, it culminates in Power Elite. Published in 1956, Power Elite 
established Mills’s reputation as a lone maverick; a rebel from the university and an 
independent dissident standing outside the main currents of Cold War thought.107 In The 
Power Elite, the third book in his trilogy on the American social structure, Mills focused on 
the interlocking networks of executives in control of the US corporate, military, and 
governmental institutions. He rejected the prevailing pluralist view of the American state. 
Upper-class “cliques” centered in the major economic sectors—banking, retailing, industry, 
etc.— “judge and decide the important community issues, as well as many larger issues of 
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state and nation in which the ‘the community’ is involved.”108 A structure of corporate, state, 
and civil society organizations extends from the cliques to the “rank-and-file of the 
professional and business strata.” The lower level of this hierarchical structure of 
organizations includes the leaders of the strata Mills examined in White Collar. But power 
resides at the national level. The mid-level organizations serve primarily to integrate lower 
class into the social system. For Mills, foreign policy most abundantly demonstrated the lack 
of real power vested in the working and middle classes. He saw foreign policy formulated at 
the nexus of corporate, military, and state-bureaucratic directorates. The entire political 
economic structure grew around the interests of the leaders of the military-industrial 
complex, and the policies of the “permanent war economy” reproduced and entrenched the 
hierarchy. 
A similar theoretical scaffolding undergirds the major works of Mills and Williams in 
the era and the Neo-Marxist theory of imperialism worked out by Baran and Sweezy. Even 
while taking pains to adapt the prose to appeal to broader publics, they were framed 
discursively against assumptions and methods behind the dominant paradigms in their 
respective disciplines. They did not participate in “normal science” of the dominant 
paradigms within their respective academic disciplines, but rather leveled big interventions 
that challenged those paradigms at the level of their basic assumptions and value-
orientations. Williams wielded interpretations from the Progressive era of US historiography 
against the consensus school that had eclipsed it. Baran tried to hold development economics 
up to the institutionalist theory and methods out of which it had emerged in the 1930s, while 
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the profession more broadly moved toward what he saw as empiricist fetishism. Mills, in 
White Collar and Power Elite counter-posed a theory of hierarchically organized power 
structures to the structural-functionalist sociology, with its assumptions that widely diffused 
values determined the tightly integrated social system. In all cases, the authors placed 
corporate capitalism at the center of a social system producing and reproducing disparities in 
power, and in all cases the institutions of government served those interests, though the 
authors varied in the degree of autonomy they ascribed to policy-makers from the corporate 
elite. Moreover, each tried to build a holistic social theory out of their conception of 
corporate capitalist political economy structure. Social, cultural, political, and economic 
phenomena hung together. The dynamics of continuity and change, equilibrium and 
disequilibrium, in any one of these analytical spheres could only be grasped in the inner-
connections with the others. 
But paradoxically, to a large extent each of these works affirmed more than they 
negated the impressions underlying the paradigms they critiqued, which is to say they 
acknowledged the same phenomena but attributed them to different underlying causes. At the 
end of the day, these works explain a social system that is indeed “functional,” in the sense of 
successfully producing and reproducing a stable society with shared values and common 
sense, and well-entrenched political and economic institutions. Baran made major 
concessions to Keynes and Alvin Hansen, but portrayed the system they lauded in a negative 
light. Mills, for as much as he ridiculed Parsons, held an essentially functionalist view of 
American society, defined in the first instance by overwhelming tendencies to stability and 
integration. Williams accepted and even admired the republican values that consensus 
historians saw binding Americans together in non-antagonistic history of steady progress, but 
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lamented the fact that maintaining those values at home depended on restricting them from 
neocolonial subjects abroad. Mills first, then Baran and Williams, articulated a vision of 
social reality that appeared “functional” (stable, in equilibrium), but theorized that apparent 
stability as the illusion behind which operated definite mechanisms of ideological control and 
repression. 
 
Hegemony of the “Independent” Intellectual 
  
From 1968-1971, dozens of North American cultural anthropologists debated their 
discipline’s epistemological premises on the pages of several volumes of the journal Current 
Anthropology. Influenced by 1960s anti-imperialist sentiment, scholars questioned the 
possibility of value-neutral social scientific knowledge, and the usefulness of assumptions 
about scholarly objectivity. While this challenging epistemological consideration has 
repeatedly extended into all social sciences, it was especially concerning to cultural 
anthropologists. If the US reined over a neocolonial empire, held together as much by 
ideological coercion as military repression, then the discipline of cultural anthropology was 
deeply implicated in colonialism. Their fieldwork into primitive cultures served the 
imperialist state in their efforts to catalogue and ultimately control world populations. While 
competing scholars in this debate invoked many names from the Western tradition of 
philosophy and social science to buttress their respective positions, C. Wright Mills and Paul 
Baran were commonly cited as the best articulations of the need for radically-committed, 
anti-imperialist social scientific scholarship. 
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Mills frequently wrote about the impossibility and undesirability of neutrality in the 
social sciences, while simultaneously defending the notion of an objective and objectively 
knowable truth. His two essays most directly related to this question were “The Powerless 
People,” published in Dwight Macdonald’s politics in 1944, and “On Knowledge and 
Power,” published in Dissent in 1954. These essays most clearly lay out Mills’s conception 
of what it means to be a “political intellectual” in a bureaucratized society. Mills saw a vital 
role for the intellectual in a society characterized by “organized irresponsibility,” but to play 
this role the intellectual must remain independent of the institutions of power and resist the 
de-skilling of intellectual production. Intellectuals should identify large structural causes of 
problems facing individuals, consider them objectively by remaining conscious of their own 
social position, then communicate knowledge clearly to the public.109 In these essays, Mills 
tried to thread a very fine-headed needle. He wanted to cast official social science as the 
purveyor of elite interest without abandoning the notion of objective truth. For Mills, there 
was such a thing as non-relative knowledge, and pursuing it was an act of moral will and 
intellectual courage on the part of the independent intellectual. 
In the late 1950s, the ideas that would undergird Baran’s “Commitment of the 
Intellectual” began to appear in his correspondences with Sweezy, reflecting the extent to 
which he was dabbling with the “independent intellectual” as the historically progressive 
agent capable of replacing the Soviet Union. Though Monthly Review had and would 
continue to criticize the sociology of C. Wright Mills for rejecting the “labor metaphysic” in 
favor of an intellectual agency, Baran’s thoughts on this question are undoubtedly cut from 
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the same cloth. By the late 1950s, on the eve of the radical revival that would sweep the ‘60s, 
Baran and Sweezy maintained no more than a rhetorical commitment to the working class. 
They had long since abandoned even the slightest confidence that American mass society 
would produce any historically progressive, let alone revolutionary force any time in the near 
future. The reactionary nature of the masses formed the base-line assumption motivating 
Baran’s rumination on the role of the intellectual in society. He attributed the quasi-fascistic 
nature of the American public to the intellectuals abandoning their social responsibility to 
pursue Reason, understood as thought that seeks to transcend the irrationalities of the given 
society and pursue a higher social order. To Reason he contrasted “Practical Intelligence,” 
which seeks to identify the sources of stability within the system. Anti-intellectualism in his 
own time stemmed from the prominence of Practical Intelligence among academic thought. 
Conflating all intellectual activity to the maintenance of the system they despised, the 
American working class threw its hands up in despair, rejecting Reason and Practical 
Intelligence alike. Relatively few continued to defend Reason in American society, among 
whom the paramount examples were none other than the self-same Baran and Sweezy.110 
The parallels to Mills’s contemporaneous analysis are indeed striking. Baran’s “pure 
Reason” equated with Mills’s “sociological imagination,” his “Practical Intelligence” with 
Mills’s dual promoters of the status quo, “grand theory” and “abstracted empiricism.” In The 
Sociological Imagination, Mills articulated most fully his view of the role of intellectuals in 
social change, at least until his unpublished Cultural Apparatus. Mills depicted a “public” 
desperate for intellectuals possessed of sociological imagination to advance a “quality of 
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mind” to “develop reason.” Imbued with the sociological imagination, intellectuals could 
explain to the public “how individuals, in the welter of their daily experience, often become 
falsely conscious of their social positions.”111 Explaining social stability in terms of 
widespread “false consciousness,” Mills saw no way to move society forward outside of 
independent intellectuals such as himself galvanizing them out of their complacency. Baran’s 
“The Commitment of an Intellectual” similarly began from the assumption that the “intellect 
worker”—a category identical with Mills’s salaried professional middle-class in White 
Collar—had become the “faithful servant, the agent, the functionary, and the spokesman of 
the capitalist system.”112 The “intellectual” in Baran’s account differed from the “intellect 
worker” in precisely the same way those possessed of “sociological imagination” in Mills’s 
differed from the “journalists and scholars, artists and publics, scientists and editors” locked 
in a mass false consciousness. In both cases, the good intellectual was concerned with “the 
larger historical scene” in Mills’s words or “the entire historical process” in Baran’s.113 As 
elaborated by Baran, the intellectual as opposed to the intellect worker necessarily pursued 
holistic theorizing, “systematically seeking to relate whatever specific area he may be 
working in to other aspects of human existence.”114 
In contrast to Baran’s pure Reason and the Mills’s sociological imagination stood 
academic intellectuals concerned with narrower issues of Practical Intelligence, abstracted 
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empiricism, or Grand Theory. Practical Intelligence and abstracted empiricism, much like 
Reason and sociological imagination, were virtually identical terms. Both connoted 
something very similar to what Thomas Kuhn would describe as “normal science” in his 
influential 1962 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, or what International Relations 
theorist Robert Cox called “problem-solving” in contrast to “critical theory” in his 1981 
article “Social Forces, States and World Orders.”115 All described a type of intellectual 
division of labor producing narrow knowledge that, while perhaps objectively true, did not 
and could not answer questions of its own usefulness, or weigh in on the desirability of the 
social order it helped reproduce. For Mills, Grand Theory and abstracted empiricism were 
equally complicit in this narrow type of knowledge production. By seeking a universal grand 
theory of explaining all social systems everywhere, structural-functionalists such as Talcott 
Parsons worked at such a level of abstraction they failed to acknowledge the real-world 
impressions from which they abstracted their general models. At this height of abstractions, 
practitioners of Grand Theory could not logically get back down to the level of empirical 
observation, the fundamental concrete failure of which was the inability to recognize what 
they “value orientations” and “normative structure” are actually “master symbols of 
legitimation” masking relations of power and exploitation.116 Grand theorists snuck value-
laden terms in through the backdoor, such as when it employed the “universalistic-
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achievement” pattern variable to characterize modernity “with no mention of the changing 
nature, meaning and forms of success characteristic of modern capitalism, or of the changing 
structure of capitalism itself.”117 By failing to recognize the historical particularity of the 
social systems from which they draw their models, grand theorists end up reifying and 
legitimating forms of domination. 
Abstracted empiricism, more directly resembling what Baran meant by Practical 
Intelligence, similarly legitimated existing power structures by rejecting criticism in general 
as a part of the scholarly pursuit of knowledge. With the increased funding flooding the 
university system, social scientists tried to emulate the rigor of natural sciences by recreating 
a laboratory mindset and limiting themselves to pursuing objective knowledge with clear 
empirical referents. For Mills, any research produced under such self-imposed arbitrary 
epistemological limitations could only by of administrative significance, but never merit the 
label social science.118 Similarly, Baran argued the important criterion of science was not 
whether truth was being told, “but also what constitutes truth in any given case as well as 
about what it is being told and about what it is being withheld.”119 
Given that the most ardently Millsian New Left intellectuals were also the most prone 
to denounce the inherent authoritarianism of Leninism, it is worth dwelling for a moment on 
the implications of the conception of the role of intellectuals in social change articulated here 
by Mills and Baran. By the end of the 1950s Mills had indeed become more optimistic about 
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the prospects for generating opposition, but in many ways his orientation toward real social 
forces had not changed from the time he wrote White Collar in the early 1950s. His second 
book offered a structural analysis of the psychology of the new salaried professional middle 
classes that had replaced the traditional artisanal and independently employed middle classes. 
Much like Sweezy and Baran, Mills sharply criticized the hierarchical power structures 
responsible for alienation and conformity of the new middle class that composed the core of 
American “mass society.” Sales and advertising homogenized and degraded middle-class 
culture. De-skilling and division of labor dumbed down intellectual production. But the 
middle classes themselves were portrayed as passive recipients of these cultural stimuli, with 
little or no agency to react against the structures determining their social realities. Following 
on the wake of his disillusion with labor, Mills viewed skeptically the prospects for 
organizing white collar workers. This outlook for white collar resistance as a form of 
working class struggle had not changed by the time Mills posited a vanguard role for the 
“young intelligentsia.” Those intellectuals capable of mustering the moral strength could 
work within the cultural apparatus to redirect its socializing functions to create radically 
conscious rather than conformist “publics.” Mills saw the cultural apparatus performing this 
socializing function, but argued that intellectuals within that system could harness it for more 
radical ends. 
A well-defined sense of contempt for the masses underlies both Mills’s and Baran’s 
stance on the role of intellectuals, reflecting the internalization of their experiences of 
isolation in 1950s society. In “Powerless People,” Mills placed the blame for “organized 
irresponsibility” on mass society. While he attributed the lack of political will to a sense of 
despondency in a public going against the centralized decision-making of a modern 
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bureaucratic state, to the extent that individuals have agency they choose to sit on the 
sidelines and watch.120 We see an even more pernicious hostility toward mass culture in 
Baran’s private correspondence with Sweezy. This came out most strongly in his reaction to 
the “Czech affair,” which probably referred to the Stalinist Czechoslovakian state’s 
repression of riots in 1953. For many left-leaning intellectuals internationally, the actions of 
the government further strengthened disillusion with the autocratic methods of Soviet rule. 
Baran drew different conclusions. He suggested that under the ideology of “bourgeois-feudal 
repression” bottom-up change could only be reactionary. According to Baran, the “vox 
populi” should be repressed, only to be restored after it had been shaped under the hand of a 
socialist government.121 His first published critique of development economics struck a 
similar tone.122 The editorial line of Monthly Review throughout the period supported the 
policy of the Soviet “peace offensive,” suggesting that a truce between Washington and 
Moscow would allow the slow, gradual evolution to world socialism to run its course, 
without any need for radical transformation.123 On the American side, the left could facilitate 
this process of evolution in, for example, Latin America by reviving the popular front and 
putting in a government that like FDR would act as a good neighbor and allow the twentieth 
century Latin American revolution, fundamentally bourgeois in nature, to run its course. It 
                                                 
120 C. Wright Mills, “Powerless People,” in Summers ed., Politics, 13-23 at 16. 
 
121 PAB-PMS and Huberman, November 29, 1952. 
 
122 Paul Baran, “Economic Development of Backward Areas,” MR 3/4 (Aug, 1951), 128-
32.  
 
123 Paul Sweezy and Leo Huberman, “RoM: The Peace Offensive and the Job Ahead,” 
MR 5/1 (May 1952), 1-4. 
  
101 
 
would take decades for the tasks of the bourgeois revolution to play themselves out before 
socialism could be put on the agenda.124 In both Mills and Baran, the “commitment of the 
intellectual” assumes a role toward their “publics” very similar to that of modernization 
theorists toward the Third World.  
 
Conclusion 
 Intellectual historian Kevin Mattson clearly identified his present-day political 
motives for placing Mills and Williams (along with Paul Goodman and Arnold Kaufman) at 
the center of his history of the 1950s origins of New Left thought. His subjects, who he 
characterized as “radical liberals,” offer a glimpse at “a non-Marxist and democratic model 
of political change” which, when retrieved “could help enliven contemporary political 
discussions.”125 While sharing Mattson’s concern over the state of contemporary political 
discourse, I find the category “non-Marxist” summarily unhelpful in thinking through what 
we stand to gain by revisiting the works of Mills and Williams, or Baran and Sweezy. Far 
more interesting are the shared assumptions underlying all their works, regardless of whether 
the authors considered themselves Marxist, non-Marxist or somewhere in between.  
Mills’s place in the pantheon of precursors to the New Left is well-established. Early 
1960s radical youth had a faith-like devotion to Mills. Writing more than fifty years after his 
role in founding Students for a Democratic Society, Tom Hayden described the mystical 
fascination with which his generation explored every page of Mills’s texts “like tea 
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leaves.”126 Historians of the New Left have unanimously recognized Mills as a founding 
influence.127 But, situating Mills discursively in relation to the intellectual network 
surrounding Monthly Review, and American Socialist changes our perception of “radical 
liberalism” as the most important legacy of Millsian thought. Of all the left-liberals to make 
peace with Marxism, few went further than Mills. In his last book, The Marxists, published in 
the year of his untimely death, Mills praised Marx’s holistic model while critiquing some of 
the subsidiary hypotheses derived from that model and outright rejecting some of its core 
elements. Contrary to predictions derived from Marx’s “misleading and unfruitful” theory of 
class, workers in “advanced capitalist societies” had improved their social standing and 
material comforts through the institution of labor unions.128 But, despite the general failure of 
this major aspect of dogmatic Marxism, radical intellectuals could still work within the 
tradition as long as they avoided the temptation to “save the theory by attaching to it 
supplementary hypotheses,” in the process rendering Marx’s elegant model “bulky” and 
“clumsy.”129 Mills identified, among others, Sweezy and Williams as examples of 
intellectuals applying Marx in this way, and thus advancing the tradition. Mills thus stands 
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out not simply for his radical liberalism, but as an indicator of an important shift in the way 
left-leaning academic intellectuals engaged with Marxism. 
Just as Mills and Williams would pass on a willingness to reconsider the value of 
Marxism to their student admirers, one of the era’s most dominant voices of Marxism had 
become theoretically very hard to distinguish from “radical liberalism.” Like Mills, Baran 
and Sweezy had a difficult time transcending the various expressions of the vital center of 
American intellectual life. The impressions of social stability, working-class and middle-
class complicity in the system, and seemingly permanent material affluence were too strong. 
Monthly Review did continue to espouse rhetoric of class struggle, but it also routinely 
acknowledged such struggle would not emerge any time soon. The private correspondence 
indicates the latter belief was much stronger. It permeated their entire conception of what it 
meant to be a Marxist, and determined their choices about political behavior. At the most 
basic level, this revealed itself in the continuous effort to establish a foothold for Marxist-
influenced scholarship in the US economics profession. Isolated from any real forces of 
social struggle, their revolutionary rhetoric was vague and abstract, and practically 
indistinguishable from Mills’s desire to build “radical publics” by seizing an advantageous 
position within the cultural apparatus. In this, at least, Monthly Review was of the spirit of the 
New Left.  
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Chapter Three: 
The Cuban Factor: 
Marxism and Anti-Imperialist Nationalism in Early New Left Thought,  
1959-1962 
 
 By the time Fidel Castro’s rebel forces seized control of Havana, the intellectual left 
in the US had weathered the worst phase of McCarthyism, processed Khrushchev’s secret 
speech, and grudgingly accepted the academy as the terrain on which they would make gains 
on the ideological front. Their experiences through the 1950s had taken a toll. Damaged but 
not defeated, they looked beyond their immediate surroundings for indications of mobilizing 
forces that could act as an agency of change within global capitalism. Thus-primed, they did 
not hesitate to throw their almost wholly uncritical support behind the new Cuban regime. 
Almost instantaneously, a symbolic, one-sided, representation of Latin American anti-
imperialism stepped into the void in American radical consciousness previously occupied by 
the Soviet Union, bifurcating liberal and left intellectuals in the process. The “independent 
socialist” intellectuals surrounding Monthly Review intervened in the initial collective 
cognition of events in Cuba. The narrative they constructed reached an audience of young 
aspiring intellectuals poised to play leading roles in articulating the goals and strategies of 
radical social movements in the 1960s. 
 Huberman and Sweezy set the tone of this narrative, and in doing so insinuated 
Baran’s and Sweezy’s political economy into broader public discourse. By the summer of 
1960, the MR editors had already adopted a stance that Cuba was objectively moving toward 
socialism. The intentions of Cuban revolutionary leaders were irrelevant in the analysis. 
Though Sweezy, Huberman, Baran, Mills and Williams held Fidel Castro and Che Guevara 
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in nothing but the highest esteem, the narrative of the revolution these authors insinuated into 
public discourse focused on objective processes inhering in the logic of international 
relations rather than deliberate socialist consciousness, either of leaders or the masses. Within 
the broader surrounding public discourse, this interpretation represented an intellectual bloc 
carving out a unique position, which became embedded in early organs of New Left thought 
as they polarized from the 1950s main drift. 
 But the recipients of these ideas, the first intellectuals of the New Left, were even 
more firmly rooted in the expanding university system than their predecessors. Set off by the 
dual spurs of the technological needs of the military-industrial complex and the student 
influx of the GI Bill, university growth galloped at a steady clip throughout the 1950s. This 
growth was sustained by a constant infusion of public and private funds motivated by the 
Cold War, and major Cold War tropes of “freedom” and “totalitarianism” lingered at the 
level of unexamined assumptions behind prevailing theories and methods of social science. 
The Cuban Revolution coincided with a new upsurge in university growth in response to the 
launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the shifting Soviet approach toward Third World diplomacy as 
part of Khrushchev’s destalinization campaign. This academic environment set the discursive 
parameters of the neo-Marxist interpretation of the world-historic significance of the Cuban 
Revolution. For Cold War liberals, Castro symbolized an escalating threat that 
decolonization would strengthen the socialist bloc. In the face of this threat, modernization 
moved from theory to practice, and became fully institutionalized in US foreign policy. For 
early adopters of the neo-Marxist theory of imperialism, Third World nationalism 
represented a non-capitalist, non-Communist future, and any effort by the US government to 
curtail the self-determination of that future was necessarily imperialist. Thus, the debates 
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surrounding the Cuban Revolution offer an interesting glimpse into the beginning of a 
process whereby rifts in public discourse and social cohesion came to be played out as 
competing paradigms of social science.  
 
From Despondent Stalinists to Ebullient Castroites 
“I though the Soviet Union was on a good course. Later on, we did take a position 
on the Soviet Union which was much more critical. But in 1957, I think there were 
still quite a few illusions.” Paul M. Sweezy, 1999.130 
 
 The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union impacted the left 
throughout the world, and the MR group was certainly no exception. Despite a good deal of 
private ambivalence on Baran’s and Sweezy’s part, publicly they continued to support the 
Soviet Union as the beacon of the future and the harbinger of a better world. In fact, they 
genuinely believed in that future, and the vision served an important psychological function 
for them through their travails in 1950s American society. As discussed in the last chapter, 
their changing outlook on the Soviet Union in the latter half of the 1950s drastically 
increased Baran’s and Sweezy’s sense of isolation and depression, which in turn influenced 
their still-developing theoretical system. Forced to reevaluate the moral leadership of the 
Soviet Union in the light of the crimes of Stalinism, they entered a period of doubt, that 
ultimately ended only when they managed to project their image of progressive agency on 
anti-imperialist struggles throughout the world, but particularly in Latin America.   
 Slowly, almost imperceptibly, third world revolutionary nationalism crept into the 
hole in their world vision left by disillusion with the Soviet Union. At the height of despair 
                                                 
130 Sweezy, “Interview,” 51. 
  
107 
 
with both the Soviet Union and the American public, Baran went back to the basics, re-
reading classic works of Marx, Engels and Lenin in preparation for a course on Marxism he 
was slated to teach at Stanford. What struck him most was the realization, already present in 
Marx’s early writings and more fully developed by Lenin, that it fell to the lot of the 
producing classes in the underdeveloped countries to “pay the bill” of capitalist irrationality. 
The real genius of Lenin lay in identifying the “complex, infinitely involved and conflict 
laden struggle of the underdeveloped countries for national and social liberation” as the most 
important battleground of struggle.131 Sweezy and Baran had always had contradictory views 
on this. Rhetorically, of course, they publicly supported national liberation struggles from 
imperialism. But when and where those conflicted with the goals of the Soviet Union, in the 
early decade they invariably came out on the side of stability and “peaceful co-existence,” 
the better to allow the objective historical growth of planning to play itself out. 
 Baran’s newfound appreciation of Lenin’s writings on anticolonial nationalism 
coincided with rapid changes in Cold War dynamics, and their cognitive reflections in 
American social science. The Twentieth Congress signified more than simply the public 
revelation of past atrocities committed by the Soviet bureaucracy. Khrushchev’s “de-
Stalinization” campaign sought to loosen the cult of personality, with its definite strictures on 
thought. Later, French Communist philosopher Louis Althusser would point to this as the 
moment in which European Communists could discuss Marxist philosophy from within the 
Communist movement without being hemmed in by the crusty mold of Stalin’s rigid 
interpretation of historical materialism. Perhaps more importantly, de-Stalinization marked a 
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shift in Soviet foreign policy, defined by overtures to form less antagonistic diplomatic 
relations with the West, while simultaneously increasing tensions by ramping up its own 
Third World aid programs, which was viewed very much as a provocation by Washington.  
This element of de-Stalinization, a renewed drive for peaceful coexistence hearkening 
back to the World War Two alliance, aggravated already-existing tension between the USSR 
and China. Although played out in the secretive domain of inner-party circles, rumblings of 
the Sino-Soviet split surfaced in the early 1960s, and intermingled with the first wave of US 
intellectuals’ serious efforts to make sense of the Cuban Revolution. Mao had long held the 
US represented a ‘paper tiger,’ strong in appearance but internally weak. As the CPSU’s de-
Stalinization program progressed, it became clear that its foreign policy doctrine would 
counter the aggressive anti-Americanism implied by the paper tiger theory. Rather than a 
push toward confrontation, Khrushchevism sought to take greater steps toward ensuring 
‘peaceful coexistence’ between the US and the USSR, the better to allow the latter’s rational, 
planned economic system to compete economically with the anarchy of capitalism’s law of 
value. Initially receptive to the liberalization of de-Stalinization, the Chinese Communist 
Party quickly initiated an anti-rightist campaign which indirectly criticized the entire 
program of the CPSU as a form of right-wing opportunism. From indirect “shadow boxing,” 
in the words of historian Gregory Elliott, these disputes came out in the open in October 
1961 when the CPC publicly condemned the resolutions of the Twenty-Second Congress of 
the CPSU.132 
                                                 
132 Gregory Elliott, Althusser: The Detour of Theory, (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 
2006), 4-5. 
 
  
109 
 
To understand the significance of Monthly Review’s response to the Cuban 
Revolution, it is necessary to situate it within their evolving world-historic outlook, which 
always played out on the terrain of international relations. In the first editorial after the 
Chinese Communist Party defeated the Kuomintang, Monthly Review hailed the victory as a 
step in the direction of the global evolution from capitalism to socialism. Sweezy predicted 
China’s future in largely technocratic terms. “Eventually,” he wrote, “after a period which 
will probably be measured in decades rather than years- these processes of economic 
transformation and development will have reached a point at which China will be ready to 
take the last step to full-fledged socialist planning.”133 Throughout the 1950s, Monthly 
Review and, later, American Socialist evaluated the significance of Third World 
revolutionary struggles primarily through a mirror reflection of Washington’s domino theory. 
The victory of the Chinese Communist Party enlarged the “socialist bloc,” and thus 
objectively weakened imperialism by hemming in the geographic territory in which it could 
resolve its economic contradictions.  
When the first signs of a rift between Beijing and Moscow began to circulate in 
international public discourse, Sweezy, Baran, and Huberman initially rebuked Chinese 
Communists for causing turmoil in the socialist bloc. The Chinese position offered “a typical 
example of dogmatic leftism” the MR editors wrote in their Review of the Month on the 
Sino-Soviet split in 1961. Provoking Washington could only disrupt the balance of global 
peace, vital for providing the space for planning to prove its superiority to capitalism.134 
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Baran buttressed this line with a technocratic application of the concept of uneven 
development, which illustrated the group’s mechanistic interpretation of the relationship 
between “economic development” and “socialist democracy.” The split, for Baran, derived 
from the “different stages of economic development” achieved by socialist countries, and 
their resulting unequal ability to “move forward along the road of balanced economic 
progress.”135 To unequal economic development corresponded unequal needs for political 
repression. In Russia, Baran argued, “Stalin [had] done his duty and Stalin must go.” But, 
less-developed China still required the methods of Stalinism, and Chinese workers and 
peasants understandably resented the flowering of political liberties in the Soviet Union. For 
Baran, Soviet leaders faced the difficult challenge of determining how much of their 
accumulating socialist surplus to direct toward increasing consumption domestically, and 
how much to direct to “aid” for developing socialist countries. Baran’s conception of the split 
in 1961 still fully reified the nation-state, and pitted the struggle for world socialism at the 
level of international relations, among states defined politically by social processes adhering 
within the confines circumscribed by national boundaries. 
As late as Spring of 1962, Sweezy still clung to this essentially mechanical Marxist 
interpretation of the worldwide evolution to socialist democracy. Socialism, he wrote, “first 
appeared in Russia, for the most part an extremely backward country, already ruined 
economically by an exhausting war and under attack by powerful external enemies. Under 
these conditions, it was inevitable that the authoritarian phase should last a long time, that its 
methods and practices should become thoroughly institutionalized, and that an elaborate 
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apologetic ideology should be developed.”136 But, as indicated by the program of the 22nd 
Congress of the, this regrettable but necessary authoritarian phase was rapidly giving way to 
a future “no honest person” could continue to believe would resemble a “nightmare of the 
kind described in Orwell’s 1984.”137 
In the Spring of 1963, the Monthly Review editors made a sharp reversal on the Sino-
Soviet dispute, and in doing so resolved a long-standing cognitive tension in different 
elements of early New Left thought. In the May 1963 Review of the Month, Huberman and 
Sweezy explicitly renounced their pro-Soviet editorial from December of 1961. The Sino-
Soviet debate, wrote the editors, went to the very heart of “the nature of the historical period 
through which the world [was] passing and what [could] and should [have] been done to 
advance the cause of world socialism.” The Russians believed that peace must be maintained 
at all costs, to avoid unprecedented destruction and to demonstrate “the superiority of 
socialism over capitalism.” Moscow’s strategy flowed from the erroneous assumption that 
imperialism could contain its objective expansionary tendencies, and was thus desirable but 
not realistic. Instead of “peaceful coexistence,” the coming period would require aggressive 
struggle against imperialism “conducted on all levels and by all available methods.”138 
The Monthly Review crowd used these shifting alignments among the nations of the 
socialist bloc as their compass for their own rudderless political orientations. It would have 
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been impossible for them not to. Aside from a small network of like-minded intellectuals, 
they had no ties to any counterhegemonic social forces at the local level. By the late 1950s, 
they had long-since ingrained the habit of vesting their hopes for the future in a foreign 
nation-state.  
Against the backdrop of the Cuban Revolution and the Sino-Soviet split, third world 
anti-colonial nationalism moved from one among their list of possible historically 
progressive world forces to the prime position. Sweezy and Huberman traveled to Cuba in 
the spring of 1960, and from that moment on they threw their undying and unmitigated 
support behind Castro as an individual and behind the Cuban project. Although Cuba had not 
been on the Monthly Review radar in the early stages of the revolution, despite popular 
sympathy and favorable coverage in the more mainstream U.S. media, after Castro and his 
small band of guerillas assumed power Sweezy and Huberman were instantly primed for it to 
fill the role of mass struggle they had been searching for. As Sweezy said in a letter to Baran, 
“I badly need to see and feel and be revived by a real revolution.”139 Baran for his part 
initially did his best to dissuade Sweezy from making the journey. The two were in the throes 
of the opus, and Baran’s eagerness to see it completed outweighed his desire to see and 
partake in the revolution.140 Castro and Che Guevara instantly charmed Sweezy by offering 
him his first opportunity to apply his economic analysis in a technocratic advisory capacity. 
Sweezy’s letters to Baran from Cuba portray the revolutionary regime in heroic dimensions, 
without any hint of qualification or doubt.141 The Monthly Review editors received a friendly 
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welcome. Working at the Agricultural Reform Institute, they were treated as experts on 
planning. Sweezy delivered a speech, which he reprinted in MR. 
 Support for the revolution was the beginning of a process of trying to reconcile 
nationalism with Marxism, while merely displacing the historically progressive force from 
the Soviet Union onto the Third World. Throughout the early 1960s, their support for Cuba 
did not diminish, and it was the opening sequence in a turn to Latin America as the locus of 
international revolution. They developed a distinct analysis in which Latin American anti-
imperialist struggles, even when led by calls for an all-inclusive, cross-class nationalist 
alliance, would objectively move toward socialists ends. The driving force of this process 
was not the logic of class struggle in the third world, but the unassailing force of imperialism. 
Because the US would not be able to tolerate even the slightest reform to the exploitative 
structure in its semi-colonial Latin American neighbors, it would respond violently, pushing 
nationalist regimes unalterably into the socialist bloc and compelling even greater 
expropriations and planning. Their analysis thus continued to be mired in the predominant 
mode of Cold War analytical nationalism characteristic of both Stalinist Marxism and 
modernization theory.  
 
Filling the Void: Radical Intellectual Enthusiasm for the Cuban Revolution 
“The position we took was at the time a very unusual one, which was that the 
Cuban Revolution was a socialist revolution, and I think that’s been borne out. We 
were totally devoted to it, enthusiastic- naively, I suppose- about this wonderful 
revolution.” ~ Paul M. Sweezy, 1999.142 
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Sweezy and Huberman were among the first in the United States to write a book-
length study of Castro’s ascension to power, from any perspective. In their capacity as editors 
and regular contributors to Monthly Review, they had grown accustomed to a quick 
turnaround on writing projects. But their book, Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution stood out 
even by their own rapid standards. After traveling through Cuba for three weeks in late 
February and early March of 1960, the MR editors produced their study of the origins, nature, 
and trajectory of the revolution in just under four months. This is a remarkable 
accomplishment considering they went into the project with very little background 
knowledge of Cuban history or politics, but the end result reflects the haste with which it was 
produced. The bulk of the book appeared in the summer double-issue of Monthly Review. At 
the end of the summer the pair convinced Baran to accompany them on a second trip to 
Cuba, the results of which were summed up in a brief post-script to the MR articles, which 
Monthly Review Press released as a book before the end of the year.143 
To properly understand the significance of Anatomy of a Revolution and Monthly 
Review’s articles on Cuba, they must be situated in relation to the broader concurrent 
discourse on Castro’s regime. From the 1950s to around the end of 1960, Castro was not a 
major polarizing figure in American discourse. For most of the 1950s, left-liberal 
intellectuals did not pay much attention to Castro’s 26th of July Movement. The New York 
Times did more to shape impressions of the Cuban guerrillas prior to the revolution than any 
of the political or literary little magazines on the New York intellectual scene. Monthly 
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Review, for example, did not run a single article on Castro or the 26th of July Movement prior 
to Anatomy of a Revolution, and this despite a growing presence of Latin American issues on 
the pages near the end of the 1950s. New York Times journalist Herbert Matthews portrayed 
Castro as a middle-class liberal intellectual and the revolution as worthy of US support; even 
reflecting the best of American republican values. Castro did much to sustain this 
interpretation. He had frequently portrayed his movement as the defender of the 1940 Cuban 
Constitution, and he played up his liberalism in his pre-revolutionary interviews with 
Matthews and in his immediate post-revolutionary speaking tours in the US. 
The Castro-as-liberal imagery worked in tandem with the equilibrium narrative of US 
past and present underlying the major academic tributaries to modernization theory. The few 
major public intellectual works to appear on the scene concurrently with Anatomy of a 
Revolution interpreted the regime as the progeny of the American (North and South) 
revolutionary tradition, carrying the torch of the “New World” begun by the US in its war 
against England and the legacy of Simón Bolívar. Waldo Frank exemplified this 
interpretation. Seventy years old when he visited Cuba in 1959, Frank had accrued a long 
career in left journalism and deep knowledge of Latin American literature and culture, 
though not about Cuba specifically. Frank was of the generation of American men of letters 
pulled to the left by the romance of the Russian Revolution. In the 1930s he had headed the 
Communist Party fronted League of American Writers. Like Sweezy then, his first political 
orientation was as a fellow traveler, though his intellectual activity took place outside the 
university. Frank sympathized with Trotsky’s self-defense from Mexico following the 
Moscow trials. He split from the Communist Party and like so many anti-Stalinist 
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intellectuals made peace with US capitalism in proportion to growing horror at Soviet 
totalitarianism throughout the 1950s. 
This biography shaped the impression of Castro’s regime advanced in his 1961 book, 
Cuba: A Prophetic Island. Frank’s book stood between the liberal pro-Castro New York 
Times articles and the sharp condemnation of the revolutionary government that would 
follow the Cuban Missile crisis. The government commissioned the book, intended as an ode 
to the revolution. And the book did portray Castro in a positive light, though Frank could not 
resist airing his reservations Castro’s charm and bond with the masses could lead to 
dictatorship. More importantly, Frank’s anti-Communism determined his hope that the new 
Cuban government would move into the US diplomatic orbit, which in turn led him to temper 
his narrative of US foreign policy toward Latin America. He emphasized the 1898 Teller 
Amendment, declaring Cuba’s right to “independence and liberty,” rather than the repeated 
military invasions under the Platt Amendment or the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe 
Doctrine. Frank’s narrative depicted a republican revolutionary tradition, dating back to José 
Martí, stymied by the sugar economy under US companies and Cuban oligarchs. Yet, he 
envisioned a future of closer US-Cuban relations. By carrying on the republican tradition, 
Castro would help infuse its spirit anew into the United States.144 
Monthly Review countered with a narrative in which the revolution would be 
objectively compelled to enact socialist measures to overcome a long legacy of US economic 
imperialism. The neo-Marxist theoretical scaffolding underlying Anatomy of a Revolution 
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reveals itself from the opening observation that the “problem was sugar,” and proceeds to 
frame a laudatory historical narrative, bordering on a hagiography of Castro, topped with an 
empirical demonstration of the revolution’s accomplishments and probable future. Through 
each of these phases, the analysis rested on a few interrelated concepts, which collectively 
amounted to a theory that exchange on the world market systematically benefits industrial 
capitalist countries at the expense of agricultural or raw material producing countries. 
Sweezy and Huberman thus inverted Ricardian comparative advantage, an intellectual move 
that had already gained currency in Latin America through the work of Argentine economist 
Raúl Prebisch, and which would garner worldwide attention through briefly influential 
dependency theory (see next chapter). In Sweezy and Huberman’s analysis, investment in 
sugar displaced investment in other economic sectors as Cuba became a specialized sugar 
producer in the global economy, which forced Cuban consumers to rely on imports to meet 
most of their basic material necessities.145 In the Ricardian system of thought, then implicitly 
dominant in the North American academic economics profession, that should not have been a 
problem. Rather, specialization should have increased the global division of labor to the 
mutual benefit of Cuba and its trade allies. Huberman and Sweezy asserted more than 
demonstrated that Cuban dependence on sugar export, to be refined and processed elsewhere 
in the global economy, placed them in a position of vulnerability and disadvantage relative to 
industrially developed countries. They made little effort to process in terms of Marxist 
categories exactly why that should result in unequal distribution of the benefits of capitalist 
production. 
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Nonetheless, proceeding from the (probably correct) assumption that monocrop 
export produced a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis more powerful trading partners, they 
posited several interrelated theoretical claims. The pre-revolutionary Cuban government was 
unable to achieve (or even formulate) realistic state-directed economic development goals 
when state revenue depended on sugar sales, and sugar prices fluctuated wildly on world 
markets. Foreign investment only resulted in types of “development” that facilitated, and thus 
reinforced, the monocrop export economy. These economic processes shaped the incentive 
structure of ruling elites, resulting in class structures unique to underdeveloped countries. 
Specifically, the class structure resulted in a bourgeois class torn between nationalist anti-
imperialism and sympathy to the goals of global capitalism and a landowning oligarchy 
deeply entrenched from its economic function as the producer of the nation’s primary 
export.146 The ruling class bloc in Cuba was composed of a vacillating bourgeoisie and a 
semi-feudal landowning oligarchy, which together presented a definite obstacle to 
industrialization and robust capitalist development. 
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the book is the authors’ reliance on non-
logical rhetorical strategies to paint a sympathetic portrait of the new regime. They evidently 
went to great lengths to pitch the book to a non-academic audience, and the result is a simple, 
bordering on simplistic, tone and style. Anatomy of a Revolution opens with a juxtaposition 
between a short first chapter describing Cuba’s “Rich Land” and a slightly longer second 
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chapter describing the island’s “Poor People.” Setting up their description of poverty, 
Huberman and Sweezy wrote “three hundred twelve pesos means $6 a week. That’s what the 
average person had to live on in Cuba in those years. It wasn’t enough.” Further in the 
chapter, they identify the culprit in a terse, four-word paragraph: “The trouble was sugar.”147 
Passages such as these abound, indeed constitute the norm more than the exception, leaving 
little doubt that the authors made a deliberate, concerted effort to wring any academic- or 
even particularly literary- language out of the book. They routinely employ analogies to US 
experiences to provide a frame of reference for understanding Cuban hardships. The $6 per 
week income amounted to only half of the average income in Mississippi, the poorest part of 
the United States.148 The normal level of unemployment in pre-revolutionary Cuba equaled 
US unemployment in the worst year of the Great Depression.149 When they got to 
descriptions of Castro as a person, they could hardly contain their giddiness. Following a 
series of juxtapositions casting the land, the peasants and the workers as hapless victims of 
imperialist capital and its local political cronies willing to “bend the knee,” Castro entered 
the story as the man with the audacity to speak with the voice of the exploited peasantry. 
With “characteristic energy and singleness of purpose,”150 Castro led his small revolutionary 
force to victory, allegedly in the name of the peasantry. In the Cuba Sweezy and Huberman 
visited in early 1960, Castro as a single individual had become “the embodiment of the 
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revolutionary will and energy of the peasantry.”151 Based almost entirely on their assessment 
of Castro alone, the Monthly Review editors concluded by the summer of 1960 that Cuba had 
already become a socialist society, founded on peasant control as embodied in the individual 
person of Fidel Castro. 
Mills, who had already moved closer to Monthly Review and American Socialist in 
the late 1950s, amplified the basic message of Anatomy of a Revolution by stitching much of 
the economic analysis into his more famous book, Listen Yankee. Mills had little prior 
knowledge about Cuban history or culture before deciding to travel to the island.152 In the 
late 1950s, following the publication of Power Elite, he had moved closer to European 
Marxist intellectuals, which solidified his impression that the “young intelligentsia” in the 
advanced nations would provide the impulse for progressive change moving forward. In 
1959 and 1960 he travelled to Brazil and Mexico respectively. The radical enthusiasm he 
encountered in Latin America thrust a new prospective progressive agent into his 
consciousness: the “hungry-nation bloc” as exemplified by Castro’s Cuba. When Mills 
travelled to Cuba in August of 1960, he met with Fair Play for Cuba Committee founder 
Robert Taber who introduced him to the organization’s national student leader—and future 
Studies on the Left editor—Saul Landau.153 Mills and Landau spent two weeks in Cuba 
interviewing revolutionary leaders, including three eighteen-and-a-half-hour days of one-on-
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one interviews with Castro, who had publicly proclaimed his admiration for Mills’s Power 
Elite. 154   
Though Listen Yankee sold more copies than any other book Mills wrote—four 
hundred thousand copies—it has not held up well.155 If Huberman and Sweezy felt 
unconflicted about ascribing the voice of the peasantry to Castro the individual, Mills took 
this logic one step further; he used interviews with the leaders of the revolutionary 
government to literally speak to the American public in a fictionalized Cuban voice. The 
three-and-a-half eighteen hours days Mills spent interviewing Castro consumed at least a 
quarter of Mills’s two-week trip, and it is safe to say that Castro’s views enjoy the 
preponderance of representation in the amalgamated voice of the hypothetical Cuban 
addressing his Yankee audience. But, this “Cuban” narrator was also Mills, and the form 
Mills chose to present his analysis makes it impossible to disentangle his own views from 
those of his interviewees.  
In the discourse swirling around Cuba in the uncertain days between late 1959 and the 
Bay of Pigs invasion in April of 1961, Mills’s political orientation in Listen Yankee more 
closely approximates Huberman’s and Sweezy’s than any other. Like the Monthly Review 
editors, Mills was enamored with Castro. Those who ascribed the origins of the revolution to 
the peasantry, the middle classes, or anti-imperialist ideology got it wrong. The revolution 
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really began when a “man [Castro] said No! to a monster.”156 Adulation for Castro was not 
uncommon, but in very subtle ways had become a point of divergence in the liberal and 
radial intellectuals gathered around the FPCC. Frank’s Prophetic Island, published just three 
months after Listen Yankee, mitigated its heroic imagery of Castro. Similarly, subtle yet 
meaningful differences divided Mills’s classification of the political regime from others on 
the “democratic socialist” US left. Contributing what would be a central trope of New 
Leftism, Mills’s argued the Cuban revolutionaries had escaped the “terribly destructive 
process” of old leftism, and did not fit into any of the ideological molds of the Cold War.157 
Mills described the policies of the revolutionary as “non-ideological” and “plainly anti-
Stalinist.”158 Bracketing the paradox of being simultaneously non-ideological and 
(ideologically) anti-Stalinist, this most likely reflected Mills filtering his interpretations of 
what he observed through the lens of his long-held pragmatist predisposition than anything 
he culled from interviews with the leaders themselves. Still, this interpretation did not stand 
far outside the intellectual center of gravity in late 1960 through early 1961. Most of Mills’s 
cohort within the old “Third Camp” orientation hoped Castro’s government would be the 
bearer on the world stage of the political utopian they had clung to throughout the 1950s.  
But in the narrative of US foreign relations with Cuba, Mills stood squarely apart 
from virtually every current other than Monthly Review. He, like Sweezy, portrayed the 
revolutionaries liberating the Cuban pueblo from decades of economic exploitation at the 
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hands of US imperialism, and, in doing so, opening up a real possibility for the restoration on 
a world level of a non-Soviet socialist vision for the future. Mills did not pull any punches in 
his condemnation of US corporate, government, and military exploitation of the Cuban 
people. The Platt Amendment, which converted Cuba to a US protectorate, served to protect 
the interests of the $50 million of US corporate capital invested in the island’s sugar 
production. The terms of this agreement were enforced through repeated military invasions. 
Manhattan investors controlled 40 percent of the island’s sugar production, and in their 
interests the US supported the Batista regime, guilty of castrating men and raping women. 
Cuba was simply an “imperialist colony” of the United States, and for Mills this was the first 
historical fact that must be acknowledged to grasp the logic of the revolutionary dynamic 
unfolding on the island. 
The period from 1960-1962 was crucial in defining the image of Cuba in US popular 
consciousness, and in that period Monthly Review’s and Mills’s interventions stood out as a 
unique position. Dissent and Liberation magazines produced analyses closest to Mills and 
Sweezy and Huberman, but the contrast stands out all the more in the proximity. Michael 
Walzer at Dissent and David Reynolds at Liberation recognized the legacy of colonialism in 
both the causes of the revolution and the continuing conduct of Washington’s contemporary 
treatment of Castro’s regime. Ultimately far more morally opposed to authoritarianism than 
Washington imposing limits to self-determination, Walzer wound up in a posture more-or-
less commensurate with modernization theory. He believed the cultural, political, and 
intellectual traditions of the United States could be held up as a model to be emulated, but 
only if contemporaries recuperated the “radicalism” in American liberalism. This radicalism, 
if recovered by intellectuals and infused into the public, could influence the Kennedy 
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administration to open diplomatic relations with Cuba and facilitate a transition to socialism 
without recourse to dictatorship.159 While perhaps similar to Mills’s warning to Washington 
not to intervene lest risk pushing Castro into the Soviet camp, Mills used this more as a 
rhetorical device to highlight the hypocrisy of a foreign policy he saw as largely immune to 
pressure from below. For Walzer, Kennedy could be pressured not only from social forces 
from below, but even ideologically converted to “radicalism,” an ideal which Walzer de-
moored from any structural foundations and infused with quasi-mystical attributes. 
While the self-described democratic socialists were trying to infuse the spirit of 
radicalism into the Kennedy administration, the main core of the vital center doubled down 
on the liberal consensus myth to ideologically justify the foreign policy the administration 
actually pursued. One month before he authorized the CIA to orchestrate the Bay of Pigs 
invasion, Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress. Though the roots of the Alliance for 
Progress extend back to the late 1950s, the hardening line toward Cuba and the ramped-up 
modernization efforts toward the rest of the Western hemisphere sung in chorus. Kennedy 
and his advisors dangled the carrot of increased aid to the members of the Organization of 
American States while simultaneously ostracizing Cuba to illustrate the consequences of 
straying from the Western commitment to “personal dignity and political liberty.” To further 
this objective, Kennedy enlisted the aid of academic experts to formulate a concrete 
modernization program culled from an interpretation of US history. Historian Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr., who coined the very phrase “vital center,” played a crucial role in the 
Kennedy administration’s efforts to control the narrative. The US could and should engineer 
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a “middle class revolution” in Latin American countries, which would bring “such 
necessities of modern technical society as constitutional government, honest public 
administration, a responsible party system, a rational land system, an efficient system of 
taxation.” With such obvious benefits, resistance to the spread of modernity was explicable 
only with recourse to Walt Whitman Rostow’s wildly successful Stages of Economic 
Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Rostow identified a “take-off” point, at which the 
mechanism of capitalist accumulation and reinvestment became self-sustaining. While 
crucial in the transition from backwardness to modernity, the take-off stage disrupted 
primitive institutions and dislocated social forces from the “semi-feudal” to “modern” labor 
systems. While ultimately this would benefit everyone by instituting, in Schlesinger’s words, 
a “framework of civic freedom,” the transition would be messy and present opportunities for 
Communists to depict capitalism as inherently wrought with class antagonism.160 It is 
impossible to overemphasize the extent to which this rested on an assumption that US 
modern liberal capitalism had transcended class conflict. 
The anti-Communist historian Theodore Draper furthered Kennedy’s policy aims by 
propagating a “betrayal” narrative in intellectual discourse that provided a sense of continuity 
between the early liberal enthusiasm for the 26th of July Movement and the growing 
diplomatic tensions. Draper published several articles in the New Leader, later collected into 
a volume entitled Castro’s Revolutions: Myths and Realities (1962). Under the editorship of 
Daniel Bell for a short period following World War Two, the editorial line of New Leader 
closely maps onto the trajectory of the anti-Stalinist left. From a moderate democratic 
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socialist line in the late 1940s, it had become a common public forum for the staunchest 
defenders of the Soviet-aggressor Cold War narrative by the late 1950s. Every notable 
Trotskyist-cum-neoconservative graced the pages of New Leader in the 1950s and 1960s, 
including Bell himself, Irving Kristol, and Max Eastman. Draper’s articles appeared in the 
wake of Bay of Pigs, and sought to justify the shifting strategy by portraying Castro and his 
guerrillas as knowing, conscious misleaders of the social forces they galvanized to make the 
revolution. For Draper, the non-Communist portrait of Castro that had been propagated by 
New York Times columnists in the 1950s accurately captured the middle-class origins of the 
revolutionaries and the liberal rhetoric they employed to gain support for their movement. 
The US should and would support a revolution that proceeded with the values Castro 
espoused in this period. But by pursuing socialist policies and moving closer to the Soviet 
bloc, Castro betrayed his own revolutionary principles and the Cuban people.161 With the 
Alliance for Progress, the Kennedy administration very consciously tried to engineer “middle 
class revolutions.” They enticed regimes to pursue middle class values with foreign aid, and 
threatened them with isolation, economic sanctions, and military intervention if they failed to 
stay within the confines of civic freedom represented by those middle-class values. Draper’s 
articles sought to shore up a domestic consensus behind this program by casting Castro as a 
dictator and a threat to US national security. 
In The United States, Cuba, and Castro, published by Monthly Review Press in 1962, 
Williams wielded Sweezy and Huberman’s interpretation in a polemic against Draper. He 
charged recent authors, including Draper, Karl E. Meyer, Tad Szulc and Nicolas Rivero, of 
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trying to “circumnavigate” the issue of American empire in their accounts of Cuba. Though 
Williams polemicized with several authors, Draper functioned as the primary foil against 
whom he constructed his narrative. Like Mills and Huberman and Sweezy, he sought to 
convince readers that US imperialism deserved its fair share of blame both for the radical 
turn in the revolution and for the deteriorating diplomatic relations between Washington and 
Havana. Williams proceeded from much the same set of assumptions underlying his 
historical scholarship throughout the 1950s, which he had just synthesized into his 
groundbreaking book Tragedy of American Diplomacy. He argued in effect that Castro’s 
revolutionary army represented a national movement with broad, cross-class support seeking 
to fulfill rather than “betray” the national goals embodied in the Cuban Constitution of 1940. 
Trying to break free from the suffocating dichotomies of Cold War thought, Williams 
interpreted the Constitution as simultaneously democratic and socialist, the realization of 
non-Communist non-capitalist society around which radicals worldwide could pin their 
hopes. The hypocrisy, or tragedy, of US foreign policy lay in its inability to uphold its 
putative commitment to democracy when doing so threatened capitalist property relations. 
 Though not his most successful book, The United States, Cuba, and Castro elicited a 
heated exchange between Williams and Draper which revealed a good deal about the 
interpretation of Marx that Williams had assimilated, and which elicited a show of support 
from the student radicals then cohering around Williams at the University of Wisconsin, 
Madison. New Leader published Draper’s rebuttal to Williams book. In the reply, titled “The 
Strange Case of Professor Williams,” Draper tugged at some of the empirical and logical 
threads of Williams’s argument, and used the fraying edges to impugn the author’s integrity 
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as a professional historian.162 Draper, like many Cold War liberals, had more-than-passing 
familiarity with Marxist theory acquired through his affiliation with the Communist Party in 
the 1930s and his authorship of the authoritative historical account of the American 
Communist Party. Among his other arguments, he dismissed Williams’s (and, by proxy, 
Monthly Review’s) peasant-based class analysis of the Cuban Revolution, which, he claimed, 
rested on a dubious interpretation of Marxist theory. Draper ridiculed Williams for allegedly 
designating Castro a member of the peasantry, and for suggesting that the peasantry could 
constitute the ‘driving force’ in a socialist revolution, an idea Draper claimed Marx would 
have found “unthinkable.” Williams spent some length on this question in his response, 
constructing what was then a relatively uncommon interpretation of Marx out of select 
passages from Capital, especially Volume III, Marx and Engels correspondence, and some 
contemporary secondary literature. Williams quoted at length from a draft of a letter Marx 
wrote to Russian socialist Vera Zasulich to demonstrate a basis for assuming Marx would not 
have found peasant-led revolution in a colonized country “unthinkable.” In Williams reading, 
both Marx and Engels believed the peasantry could ‘drive’ the revolution in dependent, 
colonial or semi-colonial countries, and the commune could even serve as the basis for 
transition directly to socialism, but only if assisted by revolution in more advanced capitalist 
states.163 
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 It is worth pausing for a moment to dwell on Williams curious interpretation of 
Marxism, because he had tremendous influence over the graduate student editors of Studies 
on the Left, and through them a voice in the student New Left more broadly. 1) Compare 
against the predominant view of “orthodoxy.” Usually dated to the Second International, and 
used to characterize all major leaders of European Marxism. Originated with Kautsky, who is 
thought to have applied a rigid and deterministic interpretation of Marxism as science. As the 
theoretical leader of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), Kautsky held great 
theoretical influence over the sections of the Second International. Thus, he is thought to 
have spread this rigid, teleological interpretation widely, including to the Russian Social 
Democratic Party (RSDLP, which would split into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks). This was 
the dominant interpretation of the intellectual history of Marxism at the time, the basis on 
which Marx was then and since often cited as claiming “I am not a Marxist,” and generally 
then and now what is meant when one refers to “orthodox” Marxism. Williams is thus 
recuperating a “heterodox” interpretation of Marxism, one in which world-systemic forces 
and the outcomes of class struggles can alter the trajectories of capitalist development in 
individual nation-states.  
 Williams, based on his own reading of Marx, intuits something like a theory of 
Permanent Revolution. Go over this in relation to the question of “hegemony” as originally 
introduced into the Marxist movement. Then consider the fact that he is applying something 
like a theory of permanent revolution as the outcome of uneven and combined development, 
under the hegemony of a tiny group of petty bourgeois intellectuals.  
To varying degrees, Mills, Williams, and Huberman and Sweezy all suffered from 
uncertainty about the intended audience for their interventions surrounding Cuba. 
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Huberman’s and Sweezy’s book fairs the worst on this score. The tone and emotional appeals 
suggest some conscious effort to galvanize US workers and farmers in support of Cuba. But 
this squares poorly with the fact that they had clearly written off both groups as potential 
revolutionary, or even reformist, social forces in the United States, a predisposition they held 
before, during and after their encounter with the revolution and their redaction of the book. 
To the extent that they maintained hope that the US had “at least the potential of producing a 
meaningful Left at some time in the future” Sweezy, at least, identified that potentiality 
exclusively in a “relatively small group of intellectuals, especially young students of 
outstanding ability and insight.”164 Here, Monthly Review and Mills were in perfect 
agreement. It is thus fitting that their perspective would get taken up primarily by young 
graduate students and, eventually, inform and undergird the perspectives of a generation of 
academic Marxists. 
From a Marxist perspective, Sweezy and Huberman’s and Williams’s interventions 
surrounding Cuba must be considered a tremendous piece of revisionism. Their unmitigated 
adulation of Castro is, perhaps, understandable. Intellectuals often find revolutions 
intoxicating, and are attracted to idealistic leaders. But to classify the society as socialist, and 
the leadership as the voice and will of the peasantry seriously misrepresented the real history 
of the revolution and abandoned a simple Marxist principle that oppressed classes must 
liberate themselves. Their admiration for the voluntarist approach reflected and grew directly 
from their frustrated efforts to push the New Deal to the left, and their increasing disillusion 
with local revolutionary prospects. One can easily detect the excitement when they recount 
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the heroic tale of 12 men who toppled an army of 30,000.165 This must have had a cathartic 
effect given their sense of the power disparities they faced in their own, more local struggles. 
 
The New Generation Responds 
Almost instantaneously, young intellectuals who had been moving into the orbit of 
the rearticulated left-liberal space began applying the lessons of the story of the Cuban 
struggle constructed by MR, Mills and Williams to social opposition in America. The 
University of Wisconsin, Madison, experienced some of the earliest rumblings of campus 
radicalism that would be a defining feature of 1960s American social life. This was due in no 
small part to the addition of William Appleman Williams to the faculty in the history 
department in 1957, and the longer presence of Mills’s closest sociology colleague Hans 
Gerth. Two years Williams arrived, Williams published his most famous book Tragedy of 
American Diplomacy, much of the analytical basis and substantive content of which had 
appeared in installments in Monthly Review, The Nation, and American Socialist.  
 Whatever else Williams may have accomplished in the history profession, he earned 
the loyalty and shaped the intellectual horizons of a generation of graduate students in 
Madison. According to biographer Paul Buhle, the publication of Tragedy had the effect for 
Williams of “solidifying a radical, dissenting scholarly climate of opinion around him and 
probably pulled [him] further to the left.”166 As we saw in his polemic with Draper, Williams 
openly defended a Marxist interpretation of the Cuban Revolution, and demonstrated that he 
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had been reading in and around the tradition. In Tragedy of American Diplomacy, he laid out 
a sweeping revision of US history linking progressive reformism to the drive for constant 
expansion, all ultimately traced to economic motives of ruling elites. University of Wisconsin 
graduate students in 1959 placed this theoretical framework at the center of Studies on the 
Left, a new journal intended to provide the US counterpart to the British New Left Review. 
The journal’s founding editors were virtually all students of Williams and/or Gerth. 
Throughout its nearly ten-year run, the journal would boast most of the big names of 1960s 
campus radicalism, as either editors or regular contributors. With the benefit of hindsight, it 
provides a who’s who guide to 1970s academic leftism.167 
 The initial political and intellectual orientation of Studies on the Left reflected the 
outlook of the late 1950s radical-liberal intellectual formation centered around the Monthly 
Review interpretation of imperialism. Like Mills’s depiction of the leaders of the Cuban 
revolution, the Studies on the Left crowd believed they represented something new, fitting 
neither into the mold of Cold War liberalism nor the tired and sterile debates of the “Old 
Left.” Following Williams’s lead, they unflinchingly critiqued the “devil theory of 
communism,” with which nominally progressive intellectuals wrote a blank check for US 
imperialism.168 This drew harsh criticism from the 1950s democratic socialist cold warriors. 
Dissent editor Irving Howe asked Studies editor Tom Hayden “how he could be an editor of a 
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journal that was part of the Soviet World.”169 This was, of course, an exaggerated 
interpretation, revealing more about Dissent’s capitulation to Cold War intellectual pressures 
than anything about the tone or outlook of Studies on the Left. Editors and contributors 
refused to give Washington a pass, but they also distanced themselves from any of the “old” 
debates within Marxism, not for moralistic reasons but, essentially, because they found them 
boring. They were not, at least not yet, in any meaningful sense “part of the Soviet world.” 
James Weinstein, the journal’s leading editor, used the space of the journal to launch a 
critique of historiography of the American Left which would form the basic underlying 
framework of his 1967 book The Decline of American Socialism. Published by Monthly 
Review Press, Decline of American Socialism located the great tragedy of American Leftism 
in the effort to ape Bolshevism, a perspective influenced by Williams, Sweezy, and the 
editors of American Socialist in the 1950s.  
 The main theoretical framework employed by the Studies on the Left crowd was 
heavily influenced by the Monthly Review theory of monopoly capitalism. An almost 
absurdly large group sat on the journal’s editorial board. At various times this group included 
those who would become the leading scholars of the “corporate liberal” interpretation of US 
history. Though Studies editors would popularize the term, Monthly Review had worked out 
the political economy behind corporate liberalism in the 1950s, which found regular 
expression in the “Review of the Month” section, in articles from the editors and close 
associates such as Paul Baran and William Appleman Williams, and in Baran’s Political 
Economy of Growth, which introduced the theory of monopoly capitalism behind his and 
                                                 
169 Quoted in Buhle and Rice-Maxim, Empire, 140.  
  
134 
 
Sweezy’s Monopoly Capital. As discussed earlier, from the perspective of a structural logic 
of capitalism, Baran’s and Sweezy’s economic thought differed little from left Keynesians 
such as Joan Robinson. They shared the view that capitalism in the era of the modern large 
corporation had developed tools for macroeconomic regulation that kept the system largely 
free from major episodic crises. For Baran and Sweezy, “wasteful expenditures” and 
operating below full capacity functioned as the safety valves that released the mounting 
surplus and kept the whole rotten system turning over. This, incidentally, also formed the 
basis of their fundamental agreement with Mills over the reactionary nature of the American 
working class, which benefited from some of the wasteful expenditures and thus could only 
be considered “immiserated” in a spiritual, rather than a material, sense. It also provided a 
framework for thinking about “welfare,” in any form, as serving a vital economic function 
for capital to dispose of its growing surplus, the basic political economic theory undergirding 
corporate liberal historiography. The Monthly Review line had long been that welfare and 
warfare served the same economic function for the ruling class, but the ruling class preferred 
warfare because too much welfare elevated the social position of the working class, 
potentially threatening property relations. 
 The Studies editors assimilated Baran’s and Sweezy’s political economic theory of 
monopoly capitalism and shaped it into an empirically rigorous interpretation of modern US 
history, from which they drew political conclusions. For corporate liberals, a segment of 
corporate capital pushed statist liberal reformism from the Progressive era through the New 
Deal. State agencies served corporate interests by regulating capitalism and reigning in its 
excesses, or at least purchasing domestic harmony through foreign exploitation. Like 
Monthly Review, and despite their admiration of Mills, this analysis resisted any deviation 
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from a strict “ruling class” analysis of US political history. Because of the influence of 
Williams, foreign policy was overrepresented in the analysis, and Studies on the Left 
unabashedly characterized Washington as an imperialist power at a time when this 
interpretation was not in vogue, even among the young student radicals who would so 
enthusiastically advance that interpretation later in the decade.  
 The theoretical overlap between corporate liberalism and monopoly capitalism came 
out clearly in an exchange spanning several issues of Monthly Review in 1960-1961. Ronald 
Radosh Wisconsin history graduate student Ronald Radosh elicited sharp rebukes from old-
school Communist Party stalwarts when he published an article entitled “American 
Radicalism: Liberal or Socialist,” in which he severely critiqued the American Left for its 
decision to buttress corporate liberalism in the era of the “united front” against fascism. For 
Radosh, FDR, and even Henry Wallace, were expansionists who consciously understood 
their Progressive agenda for domestic reform depended in the final analysis on extending the 
domain of American capitalism. Programmatically, at least, this critical interrogation of the 
Popular Front, inaccurately conflated with the “united front” strategy pursued by the 
Comintern in the early 1920s, separated Radosh, and other corporate liberal theorists who 
would come to his support, from the traditional line, which had for most of the 1950s hoped 
above all to revitalize some version of Popular Front/New Deal Progressivism. But the 
programmatic shift merely reflected the younger cohort’s cognition of the political economic 
analysis MR had been advancing since around the mid-1950s. 
 The polemic illustrates the evolution of program as the working out of a logical 
tension between the theory of imperialism and the hope for peaceful coexistence. Rebuttals to 
Radosh’s programmatic statement invoked the threat of nuclear war as a defense for 
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continuing with the effort to rebuild a left-liberal alliance capable of staving off a far-right 
government eager for a hot war with Moscow.170 This had been the initial Monthly Review 
line. Until the mid-1950s, the editors placed primary importance on avoiding World War 
Three as the necessary precondition for building socialism, both worldwide and within the 
United States. To avoid WWIII, Sweezy and Huberman had urged readers to throw their 
weight behind efforts to build a “New New Deal” around a foreign policy “which recognizes 
frankly that peaceful coexistence of capitalism and socialism is the only alternative to war 
and that colonial and backward countries have the right to revolt.”171 Yet, they advocated this 
program even while repeatedly critiquing liberal intellectuals for assuming “we” had any 
control over policy and deepening their analysis of the structural importance of the war 
production machine to monopoly capitalism. As Popular Fronters, they seemed to suggest a 
left-liberal coalition could tame US foreign policy and allow the objective superiority of 
nationalized industry and planning to slowly supersede capitalism on a global scale. As 
theorists of imperialism, they denied such a coalition was possible, and portrayed US 
aggressive expansionism as the outcome of an objective structural logic of monopoly 
capitalism, which was the key distinguishing feature separating them from the self-identified 
democratic socialists on the New York intellectual scene.  
 The symbolism 1960s radicals would build around Cuba originated in the works of 
Mills, Monthly Review and Williams, passed through Studies on the Left, and seeped from 
                                                 
170 See especially Robert Forrey, “American Radicalism: A Reply to Mr. Radosh,” 14/11 
(March 1963), 621-627; Max Gordon, “American Radicalism: Further Discussion,” Monthly 
Review 14/12 (April 1963), 693-7. 
 
171 Paul Sweezy and Leo Huberman, “The Outlook for American Socialists,” Monthly 
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there into student organizations forming on campuses throughout the country. The first 
several volumes of Studies were replete with references to Cuba. In the fall of 1960, opening 
their third edition, the lead editorial declared that the “editors consider the Cuban Revolution 
to be the most important and least understood social development in the recent history of the 
Western Hemisphere.”172 Editor Saul Landau- who had accompanied Mills in his voyage to 
Cuba that resulted in Listen, Yankee- assumed a national leadership position in the US Fair 
Play for Cuba Committee, around which cohered many of the forces that would go on to 
form the Students for a Democratic Society. Dale Johnson, who would later co-edit a volume 
on Latin American dependency theory with Andre Gunder Frank, published a short piece 
reporting on campus radicalism in California’s Bay Area. A graduate student at Stanford, 
Johnson was doubtless influenced by Baran and Sweezy, who went on a pro-Castro 
propaganda offensive at Stanford in the 1960-61 academic year. After returning from Cuba 
with Sweezy and Huberman on their second trip in fall of 1960, Baran overcame his initial 
reticence and became a devotee of Catroism, a perspective he propagated through a short 
pamphlet entitled “Reflections on the Revolution in Cuba” put out by Monthly Review Press, 
and through a series of broadcasts in Berkeley over KPFA radio.173 Like Mills, Baran 
believed above all that Cuba represented something new; an opportunity to implement a 
planned economy free from the repressive legacy of the Soviet Union. Johnson, in his piece 
titled “On the Ideology of the Campus Revolution” under the “Communications” section of 
                                                 
172 “The Cuban Revolution: The New Crisis in Cold War Ideology,” Studies on the Left 
1/3 (1960), 1-3 at 1. 
 
173 Paul A. Baran, Reflections on the Cuban Revolution, (New York, NY: Monthly 
Review Press, 1962), 8. 
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the fourth issue of Studies on the Left echoed this interpretation. Much more than describing 
the growing radicalism at Stanford and Berkeley, Johnson sought to characterize the 
movement ideologically, and he did so primarily through a comparison with Cuba. American 
students and Castroism shared ideological affinities “to a remarkable degree.” “Most 
important, their motivating ideologies are neither socialism —Marxian or otherwise — nor 
liberalism, although they combine elements of both. Rather, the ideology of both the 
Barbudos of Cuba and the campus revolutionaries is a refreshing combination of humanism 
and rationalism.”174 This last phrase, humanism and rationalism, resembled Huberman and 
Sweezy’s characterization of the revolutionary government as “rational humanist” in 
Anatomy of a Revolution.175 Johnson was the executive-secretary of the Palo Alto Fair Play 
for Cuba Committee, and it is safe to say that the organization’s guiding ideologies drew 
heavily from the late 1950s radical intellectual formation. 
 Another central plank of the New Left thought- Black Nationalism- also made its way 
onto the pages of an early issue of Studies on the Left, by way of comparison with the Cuban 
Revolution. Harold Cruse, who would later author the influential book The Crisis of the 
Negro Intellectual, worked out some of his arguments for the book on the pages of Studies. 
His 1962 article “Revolutionary Nationalism and the Afro-American” praised the Cuban 
Revolution as proof that the axis of revolutionary struggle had shifted decisively away from 
the (white) proletariat in advanced capitalist countries, toward the victims of colonialism, in 
which category he included black people in the United States. According to Cruse, “the 
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Negro has a relationship to the dominant culture of the United States similar to that of 
colonies and semi-dependents to their particular foreign overseers: the Negro is the American 
problem of underdevelopment.”176 In a reply to a critique of his article by Studies cultural 
correspondent Richard Greenleaf, Cruse makes clear he had not intended to start a 
constructive dialogue between the Negro movement and Marxism. Like Mills and Sweezy, 
he assumed as a matter of course that Marx had erred in conceiving the (white) working class 
as a revolutionary force. “The belief in the revolutionary potentialities of white workers is a 
carry-over from 19th century classic Marxism,” wrote Cruse. “In my opinion, the changes 
that have taken place both in the structures and relationships of western capitalism and the 
underdeveloped world have rendered 19th century Marxist concepts obsolete.”177 
 
Conclusion 
 Writing about the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, the historian Van Gosse claimed the 
Cuban Revolution signified the US proto-New Left coming together as part of a “pragmatic 
awareness rooted not in Talmudic disputation about the past, but in human connection with 
the onrushing tide of a revolution in motion.”178 With this statement he captured something 
true, but one-sided. I understand this to be a statement about structure and agency, as 
indicated by his rather offhand comment that Cuba offered a “vision of praxis” in the next 
sentence. He seems to suggest that the symbolic injustice of US treatment of Cuba, and the 
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call for “fair play,” resonated with a more-or-less spontaneous social unrest simultaneously 
breaking out of the mold of 1950s social life, and in their spontaneous fusion newly 
oppositional forces created their own meanings and “pragmatic” solutions. If this is indeed 
what he means, I think he misses something crucial about the episode, because FPCC was an 
organization of intellectuals, and, it was an organization of intellectuals who had long-since 
grown accustomed to leveling their discourse primarily in the direction of the academy, and 
even specific disciplines within the academy. Gosse’s derisory dismissal of “Talmudic” 
disputes about the past notwithstanding, the realignment of social forces within the United 
States taking place concurrent with and partly in response to the Cuban revolution was 
quintessentially, and in the first instance, a matter of competing narratives of US history. 
Faced with the prospect of “losing” Latin America, Kennedy brought historians and 
historically minded social scientists into his administration to articulate and propagate a 
narrative of benevolent US-Latin American relations, punctuated by the occasional error. The 
first intellectuals who would be in and of the “New Left,” properly speaking, cohered around 
an alternative narrative, in which the US imperialist legacy was rooted deeply in its political 
economic structure. 
 But these early New Lefties weren’t “vanguardists” for the simple fact that they had 
no conception of social forces to lead. Beyond vague reference to “publics,” neither Monthly 
Review nor Mills had resolved the question of the audience for their “independent” radical 
intellectualism. Cuba helped them resolve the dilemma into non-existence. Subsequent 
historical scholarship largely discredited the Huberman-Sweezy-Mills interpretation of the 
Cuban Revolution. As the Cuban-born historian Samuel Farber pointed out, the base of 
peasant support for Castro’s guerrilla army never amounted to more than one or two 
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thousand. Ascribing to Castro the “voice and will of the peasantry” is thus empirically 
suspect, but the ideological appeal of doing so for disillusioned and isolated US radical 
intellectuals is obvious. Huberman, Baran, Sweezy, and Mills adulated Castro because, to be 
blunt, it allowed them for the first time to realistically envision themselves in a consequential 
social position, at the head of a revolution they could in the early 1960s still paint in world-
historic proportions. Surely this provided a much-needed boost to their stimmung. 
By characterizing the regime as objectively socialist, because anti-imperialist, 
Huberman, Sweezy, Mills, Williams, and Baran applied a dubious interpretation of Marxism. 
But, regardless of its scholarly merits, the interpretation held symbolic meaning for a 
generation of middle-class, college-educated youths grappling with perceived hypocrisies in 
Cold War liberal ideology. Castro’s allegedly anti-ideological revolutionary government 
spoke to the newness in the US New Left’s own self-identity. Like the Barbudos, radical 
students in the United States wanted the autonomy to shape their own future without the 
stultifying influence of tired debates between Marxists and liberals, among competing sects 
of Marxists, or between the narrower left and right wings of the ‘vital center.’  
The US student New Left’s belief in its own newness is rendered no less historically 
significant by the fact that it was completely illusory. The interpretation that permeated so 
pervasively into New Left thought materialized out of the same, ongoing, contested reception 
of Marxist theory they found so boring and distasteful. Castroism seamlessly stepped into 
Sweezy’s and Baran’s world-historical political prognosis in precisely the place that had been 
previously occupied by the Soviet Union, and the symbolism they constructed around 
guerrilla warriors, and Castro the hero, cannot be neatly separated from their desperation to 
locate a political subject on which to hang their hopes for a socialist future. Only once the 
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new force, Third World nationalism, had moved in could the Soviet Union be fully 
discarded, and sometime around the early 1960s MR shifted into an anti-Stalinist posture. But 
the theoretical and programmatic continuities linking their Stalinist and Castroist phases far 
outweighed the ruptures. They remained essentially committed to the conception of socialism 
they had acquired in the era of the Popular Front, basing their prognosis for the future on the 
ability for Third World nationalist revolutions to plan their way out of backwardness and deal 
a decisive blow, ideologically, politically, and economically to Yankee imperialism in the 
process. 
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Chapter Four: 
Intellectual Cross-Fertilization: 
Andre Gunder Frank, Monthly Review, Argentine Trotskyism, and the Origins of 
Dependency Theory179 
 
In 1974, the scholarly journal Latin American Perspectives launched its first issue, 
devoted entirely to the theme of reassessing dependency theory. This interdisciplinary social 
science journal carried the subtitle “A Journal on Capitalism and Socialism,” and it would go 
on to become the flagship for the academic discipline of Latin American Studies. In the 
inaugural issue the coordinating editors- all of whom held professorships at universities in 
California- identified two main objectives: the journal would “bridge the gap between Latin 
American and non-Latin American scholars,” and push recent research on capitalism and 
socialism past its “primarily descriptive” content into “wider and deeper theoretical analysis 
of the Latin American reality of the sort which is essential for viable political strategies.”180 
Judging by the selection of topic and the tenor of the discussion, the 39 scholars from 
academic institutions in North and South America that constituted the journal’s coordinating 
and contributing editors saw dependency theory as the primary school driving scholarship 
toward both objectives in the recent past. 
 Analyzing the contributions for purpose and audience reveals two distinct rhetorical 
agendas. Reflecting the journal’s mission to publish scholarship promoting viable political 
strategies, many discussions revolve primarily around the political program for proletarian 
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revolution implicitly or explicitly posed in the works of prominent dependency theorists. 
Thus, contributions to a peer-reviewed English-language scholarly journal earnestly, without 
any hint of contradiction, assumed the tone and posture of the vanguard of the working class. 
Strongly hinting at Maoist or Stalinist political affiliations, contributors largely criticized 
their interpretation of dependentistas’ prescriptions concerning when and under what 
circumstances workers should form alliances with other classes, and the relationship between 
the struggle for national liberation and socialist revolution. So, facing the left, academics in 
and around the dependency perspective engaged debates over the heritage of revolutionary 
Marxism, with discourse apparently deeply embedded in what contemporary scholars would 
call the sectarian left. Yet, simultaneously, much of the discussion revolved around the 
strengths and/or weaknesses of dependency theory as an objective social scientific model. 
Here, contributors shift their rhetorical posture to the right, defending or critiquing 
dependency in the language and assumptions embedded in mid-to-late twentieth century 
North American academic social science, implicitly or explicitly searching for models that 
could generate falsifiable hypotheses that could withstand the rigor of scientific scrutiny. 
 In chapter three, we saw how Monthly Review led the charge in insinuating a specific 
interpretation of the Cuban Revolution into public discourse. Baran’s and Sweezy’s political 
economic analysis, the basis of what would come to be called “neo-Marxism,” operated 
rhetorically as a trumpet call for a rapidly mobilizing social bloc that would alter the political 
course in the 1960s. But Paul Baran was a professional economist with socialist 
predispositions, not a revolutionary socialist with specialized knowledge in political 
economy. His ideas operated, in the first instance, on the terrain of academic economics, and 
thus came couched in the conventions of the professional economist and judged by those 
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standards. While Baran remained marginalized, even ostracized, in the profession for most of 
his career, he did develop and sustain a running critique of development economics, arguably 
the most vibrant sub-field within the discipline in the early years of the Cold War. The most 
theoretically advanced articulation of his and Sweezy’s system of thought prior to the final 
publication of their “opus” in 1966, Baran’s Political Economy of Growth, cohered as a work 
around an intervention in development economics, and only implicitly suggested a specific 
program of action for revolutionary socialists, either in the United States or in the 
underdeveloped world. This dichotomy between public and academic audiences 
characterized neo-Marxist thought throughout the 1960s, and to fully grasp its logic we must 
now turn our attention to the peculiar way the ideas of Latin American anti-Stalinist Marxists 
seeped into North American intellectual discourse couched in the academic language of 
development economics and modernization theory.  
 Dependency theory most clearly illustrates this complicated interplay between 
academic social science and anti-imperialist rhetoric as the ideas that shaped the programs 
and outcomes of real social struggles in the US and Latin America in the 1960s. The meaning 
and implications of dependency theory varied widely depending on who was using it, for 
what purposes, and, especially, in what institutional context. In both North and South 
America, it functioned simultaneously as an intervention in the academic fields of 
development economics and sociology, and as a historical narrative implying a specific 
program for anti-capitalist revolution. When it assumed the form of a social scientific model, 
it entered a conversation shaped by the conventions of objectivity and value-neutral 
scholarship. When deployed to frame a program of revolutionary struggle, its proponents 
spoke in overtly partisan tones.  
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 The intellectual biography of Andre Gunder Frank encapsulates many of these 
contradictions. As a young, educated man radicalized by his impression of the Cuban 
Revolution, Frank embodied the experience of the early New Left intellectual. He imbibed 
the symbolism Sweezy and Huberman helped build around that event, and his radical 
journalistic and scholarly efforts would virtually all reach North American audiences through 
the filter of Monthly Review. As a development economist educated entirely within the period 
of the Second Red Scare, his intellectual biography illustrates the consequences of burying 
Marxism. Almost completely ignorant of the Marxist tradition, and lacking any background 
in political leftism of any kind, either Old or New, he stepped mid-stream into long-running 
debates over the relationship between liberal (“bourgeois-democratic”) and socialist goals in 
Latin America’s struggle for national liberation, and interpreted all manifestations of nation-
statist Marxism as the “orthodox” position. He cognized these debates with the only 
intellectual tools he had at his disposal, which were those running through North American 
development economics and modernization theory in the 1950s. Frank’s story explains how 
dependency theory entered English-speaking, North American discourse in its strange, 
amalgamated academic and rhetorical form. Through an examination of Frank’s life and 
thought, we can also untangle the different intellectual strands that fed into this hybrid form, 
which helps understand its divergent impacts in academic thought and social movements 
through a crucial transformative period in American history. 
 
Biography of a Fairly Typical Development Economist 
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Andrew Frank came to the US in 1933, at the age of four, when his Jewish novelist 
father fled Nazi Germany.181 He was thus of the generation that came to social and political 
consciousness in the context of the early Cold War, and began his college education at the 
height of McCarthyism. Little information remains about Frank’s early life, but by all 
indications he was both a bright and restless youth. His education maps onto all the hotspots 
of 1960s radicalism, but in the years before they became such. He went to high school in Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, the hometown of SDS founder Al Haber and the place that Tom Hayden 
would pen the first draft of the famous New Left manifesto, The Port Huron Statement. 
Frank received his bachelor’s degree from Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania, where 
dozens of student radicals in the early 1960s would drop out of college to live amongst the 
poor. After being ousted from a PhD program in economics at the University of Chicago in 
1951, Frank moved to California’s bay area to, in his words, “pass time among the Beats of 
the San Francisco coffee shop scene.”182 The bay area would witness the first scenes of 
student radicalism to shock the conservative national conscious, but not until several years 
after Frank had moved back to the Midwest.   
 Frank re-entered the Chicago economics PhD program in 1955 when he took a 
research assistant position under development economist Bert Hoselitz at the Center for 
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Economic Development and Cultural Change (EDCC). By the mid-1950s, development 
economics had grown from a minor area of interest to a vibrant subfield within the discipline, 
thanks in no-small part to Washington’s desire to present the decolonizing world with a non-
Communist path to modernity.183 As professional economists devoted increasing attention to 
explaining the lack of economic growth, their debates evolved against the backdrop of 
broader changes in the methods and theoretical assumptions within the discipline. The 
peculiar problems of “backward” nations fit more neatly into the theoretical models of the 
institutionalist approach prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s, and early contributors to the field 
felt free to borrow theoretically not only from the most institutionalist readings of Keynes, 
but even from the Marxist tradition. But the logic of Cold War anti-Communism worked to 
squeeze Marxist approaches out of the economics profession entirely, and reduce the broader 
institutionalist moment out of which Keynesianism emerged to a narrower set of fiscal and 
monetary tools for managing cycles. By the late 1940s, business and intellectual elites had 
already begun to close ranks against the ideology of a controlled capitalism, mobilized by 
Friedrich von Hayek’s warning that all planning would set any given society on the Road to 
Serfdom, the title of his 1944 book.184 The growth of the university system in post-war 
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United States channeled resources into academic economics, fueling a hyper-specialized 
division of intellectual labor that fostered improved techniques. Responding to the material 
incentives, economists of the era devoted more intellectual energy to mastering the new 
approach, centered on manipulating data and formal mathematical modelling. 
 An uneasy analytical tension drove development economics forward through the 
1950s. As Baran routinely pointed out, the very need to explain prolonged stagnation served 
as a resounding indictment of any alleged universal benefits of capitalism. And, indeed, 
many of the important theoretical contributions to the field implicitly assumed technocratic 
experts, rather than entrepreneurs, would take the lead in economic development of backward 
countries. Even Henry C. Wallich- economic advisor to Eisenhower who would later become 
a leading neoliberal thinker- believed in 1952 that the state, responding to the “widespread 
desire for higher living standards,” would provide the driving force for consumer-based 
expansion in underdeveloped countries in the absence of an innovative entrepreneurial 
class.185 Yet, most development economists grounded their analyses in the rhetoric of Cold 
War anti-Communism, and were anxious to differentiate Western-style “free economy” from 
the socialist alternative, which came to mean even the most tepid forms of planning as the 
decade wore on. Moreover, they continued to apply institutionalist methods and assumptions 
to analysis of “underdevelopment” even while the center of the gravity of the broader 
profession moved toward neoclassical synthesis, with its narrower methodology, and the 
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political climate domestically became less sympathetic to the political implications of 
institutional Keynesianism. 
 Being so indelibly wrapped up in Cold War thought, development economics had a 
blind spot when it came to theories attributing causal influence for underdevelopment to past 
or present US imperialism. Development economists applied what can be described as a 
discrete comparative method to their study of the causes of underdevelopment. They 
gathered statistical data measuring economic factors such as per capita income, gross 
national product, unemployment, etc. of different nation-states across the world, or even at 
different moments of their history, then used that data to derive a model of successful and 
less successful utilization of available factors of production.186 This method assumed rather 
than proved that the causes of underdevelopment could be located within the particular 
history of the discrete geopolitical entity of the nation-state, and that scientific study of the 
phenomena should thus gather as much data as possible of individual nation-states, and 
compare that data to explain current economic disparities. Initially economists agreed that 
insufficient native capital formation precluded industrialization. The solution then was to 
generate capital, either internally through increased savings or externally through foreign aid 
and/or private investment from the developed world. Within the consensus on the necessity 
of capital formation debates revolved around how to administer investment of scarce capital 
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to optimize the accumulation and reinvestment of new capital, with the primary source of 
contention between advocates of balanced or unbalanced growth. As the field developed the 
focus shifted from capital formation to fomenting a culture of development by investing in 
human capital. According to the human capital line, the third world lacked entrepreneurial 
spirit and technical know-how, which could be corrected through education and technical 
assistance rather than capital importation. Notwithstanding important differences in their 
analyses and prescriptions, the various trends in development economics in the United States 
and Britain in the 1950s all shared a commitment to solving underdevelopment through 
planning. 
As development economics tilted toward prescribing investment in human capital, it 
intersected with modernization theory, a broader intellectual current running through the 
social sciences in the middle decades of the twentieth century. At its core, and bracketing the 
many variations, modernization theory sought to categorize societies on a continuum from 
traditional to modern, and identified the prevalence or absence of a culture of 
entrepreneurship as the primary factor explaining the difference. A multi-disciplinary 
approach drawing in sociologists, political scientists and economists, modernization theory 
derived from the predominance of a particular reading of the German social theorist Max 
Weber, a reading transmitted to American audiences through the work of Talcott Parsons.187 
Modernization theorists thus tended to adopt a structural functionalist approach, yet, like 
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development economists, they applied this theory to questions of 
development/underdevelopment within a similar discrete comparative framework. They 
conflated the concept of society with that of nation-state, and they tended to view the latter as 
discrete entities that had, up until the 1950s, been moving along the teleological path to 
modernity more-or-less independently of one another. Having explicated the dynamics of the 
process, modernization experts could help underdeveloped societies along the path.188 
Although some development economics certainly fit within the precepts of modernization 
theory, it is important to view the two as separate fields of study, because modernization 
theory came out of a holistic social theory that attributed equal weight to non-economic 
factors such as culture and politics in its classificatory social scheme. In practice, the 
approach adopted an essentially empiricist method, arranging societies according to 
statistically observable criteria into groups, then categorizing those as “stages” of 
development.189 Normatively, modernization theory evinced some level of commitment to 
“planning,” led by Western technocrats, as a solution to Third World stagnation. 
Bert Hoselitz, Frank’s boss and advisor, well-represented the center of gravity in 
development economics at its point of intersection with interdisciplinary, holistic 
modernization theory. Hoselitz edited the journal Economic Development and Cultural 
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Change, the flagship for interdisciplinary scholarship relating to questions of development 
and underdevelopment. He himself wrote several articles integrating cultural and social 
factors into his models of economic development. In one article in the early 1950s, Hoselitz 
argued that urbanization brought non-economic “moral and social-psychological” benefits to 
underdeveloped societies.190 In another article written for the American Historical Review in 
1957, Hoselitz borrowed modernization economist Walt Whitman Rostow’s notion of the 
“take-off” point at which a society sets off on a self-sustaining course toward modernity, but 
insisted that preparation for take-off must focus as much on “institutional arrangements in the 
legal, educational, familial or motivational orders” as in the development of infrastructures 
for material production.191  
At the EDCC, Frank published a handful of short economic articles and wrote a 
dissertation on Soviet economics, the methods, questions and assumptions of which bore the 
stamp of his training as a development economist within the modernization camp. One study 
begun in the mid-1950s would be passed as his PhD dissertation in 1958 under the title 
"General productivity in Soviet agriculture and industry: The Ukraine 1928-1955." In this 
rather short dissertation, Frank analyzed inputs and outputs in Ukrainian agriculture and 
industry to determine productivity in each sector separately and in Soviet Ukraine generally 
from 1928-1955. The major creative challenge for Frank in this project was coming up with 
accurate data. Frank compiled his own statistical series based on international trade and price 
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data, which he claimed allowed him to get through the fog of misinformation coming from 
the Communist state. From his series, he concluded agricultural productivity declined, 
industrial productivity stayed roughly the same and what he called "general productivity" 
declined more than the relative weight of the decline of agriculture over the period of his 
analysis. Frank’s conclusions seemed to suggest that economic development of the third 
world would proceed most efficiently under a “balanced growth” model. The assumptions 
here supported the notion of a technocratic planning agent, and for Frank the goal of the 
exercise seemed to be to demonstrate his ability to generate, manage and generalize from a 
set of empirical data. 
From 1958 until his break with the academy in 1960-1961, Frank toured the various 
camps within North American social sciences of development. He refused to accept 
economists' assumptions that human behavior could be reduced to maximization of material 
interests, and his work regularly incorporated non-material motivators. In his paper "Goal 
Ambiguity and Conflicting Standards: An Approach to the Study of Organization," Frank 
extrapolated a general ideal model of human organization from his interpretation of Soviet 
industry. Frank's paper, which Human Organization published in 1958, focused on the 
decisions available to the manager of a hypothetical enterprise trying to navigate between 
various, often conflicting demands within the Soviet industrial system. Frank argued that 
conflicting demands did not result in wasteful, inefficient and irrational productive outcomes, 
but rather increased productivity. Knowing that not all goals could be met, individual 
managers were empowered to map their own strategy. If they contributed to the overall 
economic, political and cultural goals of the regime, they would not be sanctioned. Frank saw 
this as a way to integrate the goals of production with the needs and values of society in a 
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way that seemed much more organic than simply responding to the anarchy of market 
pressures. On the one hand Frank’s line in this piece places agency in the hands of the 
individual manager, but on the other it could be read as an apologia for bureaucratic 
schizophrenia.   
Along the same lines, Frank wrote a favorable review of Albert O. Hirschman's book 
The Strategy of Economic Development in which he especially praised the author's concept of 
"linkages" for its attention to non-market motivating factors.192 Hirschman’s book included 
an analysis of enclave industries linked as “satellites” to the larger metropolitan economic 
centers in underdeveloped countries, a concept that did not make it into Frank’s review but 
presumably lodged itself somewhere in his consciousness, to be replicated later in his own 
model of the structure of global capitalism.193 Frank opened his review of Hirschman's book 
by pointing out the obsolescence of Alfred Marshall's version of laissez faire, which Frank 
described as a static model, against which he transposed Hirschman's more dynamic model 
of "built in destabilization." It must be noted that Frank’s sympathy with a “dynamic” growth 
model is a step away from the socialist views he would later espouse. For development 
economists, a static model applied concepts of classical liberal economics to determine 
optimal efficiency in allocation of resources. Whether determined by market signals or the 
central planner, the optimum allocation at any given moment was a real, and thus on some 
level knowable, quantity. A “dynamic” model on the other hand envisioned humans in a 
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struggle against nature, which contained intangibles such as unforeseen, and unpredictable 
spurts of ingenuity. Prescriptively, then, dynamic models at the level of their assumptions 
advocated creating the institutional conditions for such ingenuity to thrive, including free and 
competitive access to capital and the profit-motive to incentivize ingenuity. By throwing his 
intellectual support behind built in destabilization, Frank was turning toward a greater role 
for market forces and a culture of entrepreneurship to set off the “dynamic” growth 
potentialities of capitalism. Moving away from his earlier acceptance of balanced growth, 
Frank agreed with Hirschman’s claim that a developing economy required a certain amount 
of imbalance, the correction of which would spur innovation and entrepreneurship, and spill 
over into other sectors through forward and backward linkages.  
Development economics was simultaneously the point at which the analytical nation-
statism of the New Deal was most pronounced, and where it rubbed against the greatest 
tensions. The very assumption of reified nation-states passing as discrete entities along their 
respective paths was belied by the foreign policies increasingly under the sway of the theory 
of the development economists. It was only a matter of time before the reintroduction of the 
discourse of imperialism wound its way into critique of development economics as just 
another avenue of imperialist exploitation. This attack, when it came, came from the inside, 
leveled by a disillusioned young economist who had failed to the answers he sought within 
academia. 
 
Frank as an Early New Leftist 
 In 1958 Frank stood at the threshold of a fairly conventional career. He had worked 
within the heart of the modernization school, which was at the height of its prestige. He 
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managed to publish a few articles, was networking with scholars in other disciplines, and 
held an assistant professorship at Michigan State University. Yet, just three years later he 
made the decision to eschew the academic life to live as a radical intellectual. Although not 
the only reason, a conflict with the Michigan State University Police undoubtedly has 
something to do with Frank’s decision. In February of 1958, MSU's Department of Public 
Safety cited Frank for parking in a space reserved for Physicians. Frank ignored the citation, 
and on June 24, 1958 the director of the Department of Public Safety summoned Frank to 
appear in court.194 Frank refused the summons on the grounds that the university's 
Department of Public Safety had no public authority to issue citations, setting off a long 
exchange with A.F. Brandstetter, the director of Public Safety, which culminated in a 
criminal warrant for Frank’s failure to appear. In April of 1959, Frank was arrested in his 
office, an affront which convinced Frank that the American police state had advanced beyond 
the point of no return. He likened his arrest to the ROTC controversy that had recently taken 
place on MSU campus. Frank probably had countercultural inclinations well before this, as 
for example indicated by his allusions to his time among the “beats” of the San Francisco 
coffee shop scene, all of which just points to discontent simmering throughout the 1950s. 
 His personal run-in with the law was probably just an incidental factor in Frank’s life-
trajectory, ultimately less important than the broader structural and cultural factors bearing 
down on the consciousness of his generation. Records from his life in this period are very 
limited, but it is possible to make a few inferences about his personality, and the social, 
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intellectual and cultural factors motivating his professional and political turn. Academically, 
he began in the 1950s to align himself with Marxist or Marxisant currents. It is difficult to 
say when he read Baran’s work, but it obviously made a major impact on his thought. He 
also increasingly thumbed his nose at economics in favor of anthropology, where he 
sympathized with the work of Eric Wolf and Sidney Mintz, Marxist-influenced 
anthropologists working on peasant studies in relation to global capitalism. Whatever else 
one can say about Frank, he had a genuine intellectual curiosity that constantly pressed him 
to challenge his own assumptions. At MSU, in East Lansing Michigan, he was no doubt 
exposed to early murmurs of the countercultural/student New Left. Michigan was, not 
accidentally, ground zero for 1960s student radicalism. In the 1950s, Michigan in general and 
Detroit in particular was still the epicenter for the U.S. automobile industry, which also 
meant the epicenter for the strongest segment of organized labor which had grown with the 
help of Popular Front radical organizers. Many student New Leftists were “red-diaper” 
babies, the children of Communist parents who had flocked to Michigan when it was the 
center of working class militancy. Frank had spent his adolescent years in Ann Arbor, and 
knew future Students for a Democratic Society founder Al Haber personally. 
Clearly, he had not yet found answers to appease his intellectual curiosity, and he 
approached the topic of Third World development with earnest concern. Frank’s knowledge 
of the underdeveloped world drew mostly from books and models. He wanted to observe his 
subject matter firsthand. On June 16, 1960, the Michigan State University Board of Trustees 
approved Frank's request for an unpaid leave of absence to last from September 1, 1960 to 
  
159 
 
August 31, 1961.195 He had some money from a research grant, and he presented the leave of 
absence as a research trip, but he had no concrete plans. In fact, his first goal appeared to be 
aimless world travel, starting with Europe where he had several contacts.196 31 years old, 
educated, with no significant ties holding him to the United States, Frank embarked upon a 
journey that, perhaps unbeknownst to him at the time, would ultimately forsake the 
comfortable life of American academia and elude any sort of economic security for at least a 
decade. 
 It is also beyond question that the Cuban Revolution, and, more specifically, the 
narrative of that revolution by radical US intellectuals, influenced Frank. Frank made the 
most of his yearlong research leave from MSU. Although officially his leave began in 
September, Frank went abroad in June of 1960, setting off a two-year stint of nearly constant 
travel. He first spent a month in the Soviet Union, funded on a research grant from MSU. He 
had accepted an invitation from the Wenner-Gren Foundation for anthropological research to 
participate in a conference in Austria on "Economics and Anthropology: Capital, Saving and 
Credit in Peasant societies" to be held August 21-August 27.197 After the conference, he 
returned to the United States and briefly moved to Boston before setting off first fort Cuba, 
where he spent a month, then moving on to Eastern Europe and Africa.198 Frank was thus in 
Cuba in the fall of 1960 amidst a profound personal and existential transformation. He joined 
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the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and his trip coincided with the release of Huberman and 
Sweezy’s book, which had a big impact on the outlook of leading figures within that 
organization.  
Frank’s correspondence from his travels after Cuba reveal a restless soul critical of 
the role of the U.S. government in world affairs, disillusioned with development economics 
and searching for something more gratifying to do with his life. He did not save the carbon 
copies of letters he sent, but it is clear that respondents found Frank idealistic, that his letters 
posed, in David Reisman’s words, “profound questions” about his place in the world, and 
that Frank actively sought work outside of the academy well before he resigned from 
MSU.199 Through conversations with people he met abroad Frank worked the countercultural 
inclinations he had been harboring since at least the mid-1950s into a sophisticated critique 
of the role of Washington in world affairs, and in particular its use of development aid as a 
rationale for pursuing geopolitical interests.200 This idealism motivated his decision, made 
from a hospital bed in Cairo, to reject the life of a North American academic. His resignation 
letter, of which he sent a “public” copy to be published in the MSU newspaper, reads as a 
sort of a mea culpa for his participation in a discipline that, in his words, “far from aiding, 
detracts from economic development.” Frank, moreover, blamed his colleagues’ systematic 
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sidestepping of the negative impact of U.S. development policy on the general complacency 
of society as a whole, which enables foreign policy.201 
 
Encountering Marxism: Frank and the Genealogy of Dependency Theory 
“I have never had the temerity to claim to be a Marxist; and nowhere in my 
published—or unpublished—writings can or will anyone find such a personal claim.” 
~ Andre Gunder Frank, 1974.202 
 
To the extent that Frank still occupies a place in North American academic thought, it 
is for his role in developing dependency theory. The exact nature of that role is a matter of 
some debate, as is the explanatory value of the theory as expounded by Frank and his cohort 
of dependentistas. Most extant English-language scholarship identifies Raúl Prebisch and the 
other “structuralist” economists surrounding the Economic Commission on Latin America 
and the Caribbean (CEPAL) as the major Latin American antecedents both to Frank’s ideas 
specifically and to Latin American dependentistas more generally.203 Prebisch, the former 
president of the Argentine central bank, formulated his theory while working for CEPAL as 
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an exile from Peronist Argentina. He came across a paper written by fellow UN economist 
Hans Singer that empirically demonstrated a secular decline in terms of trade for developing 
countries. Similar to his own as-of-yet unsubstantiated assumptions, Singer’s work inspired 
Prebisch to formulate the general tendency into a “manifesto” for Latin America, entitled The 
Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems, which he presented at 
the ECLA meeting in Havana in 1949.204 The “Prebisch-Singer” hypothesis gained 
proponents in Latin America throughout the 1950s, and became the theoretical justification 
for a set of policies collectively known as “developmentalism” in the late 1950s and early 
1960s. 205 Analytically, CEPAL thinking is said to have contributed the “core-periphery” 
model, which neo-Marxist dependentistas such as Frank appropriated, and CEPAL is thus a 
link in the evolution of thought leading to dependency theory. Prescriptively, cepalistas 
called for opening the region to foreign capital but setting a high tariff on consumer imports 
to promote domestic manufacture. 
 In this widely-circulated origin story, the life and death of dependency theory played 
out almost exclusively on the academic stage. The structuralist core-periphery model, as 
originally expounded by Prebisch and advanced by his protégé Celso Furtado, was out there 
in the academic ether, circulating among Latin American scholars attempting to insinuate an 
independent perspective into international discussions of the causes and consequences of 
unequal international economic development. Structuralists empirically demonstrated 
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deteriorating terms of trade for agriculture and raw materials relative to manufactured goods 
on the world market. Thus, economies locked in a primary good export structure 
systematically lost ground to advanced economies in the world economy. From this empirical 
demonstration of exploitation and vulnerability on the world market, it was a short step to 
posit a systematic and deliberate structure of exploitation in the world capitalist system. 
Though dependency theorists rather than CEPAL structuralists made the intellectual leap, the 
dots had already been provided and all that remained was to connect them. 
 Following closely Frank’s immersion as a dependency theorist reveals this narrative 
is not wrong so much as one-sided. As a trained development economist, Frank certainly 
knew of and engaged the work of Prebisch, Furtado, and other structuralists. But, on his tour 
of Latin America he also encountered a strand of thought predating structuralism and 
reaching its most polished expressions simultaneously with CEPAL’s most important 
discoveries, although the two remained largely independent from one another both in terms 
of questions and methods. From its earliest inceptions, Latin American Marxism had 
struggled to apply categories derived from European capitalist development to their own 
region’s history.206 To what extent were Latin American economic institutions pre-capitalist; 
Latin American variants of their European counterparts during the feudal ages? Or, in 
contrast, to what extent were they products of capitalism, shaped in and through a 
relationship to international markets during the colonial era? For Marxist militants, the 
answer to these theoretical questions would determine revolutionary strategy and tactics, in 
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particular the types of class alliances and fronts with other political organizations they 
deemed acceptable in contemporary local anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist struggles. 
While Frank travelled through Latin America conducting his “informal interviews” 
and reading up on Latin American history, his early writings demonstrate an engagement 
precisely with the problem of defining colonial Latin America relative to medieval Europe. 
He grappled with questions circulating among the revolutionary left, pertaining directly to 
the strategy for mobilizing a broad-based anti-imperialist social movement, much more 
intensely than academic theories in this period. The first article to come out of his travels, 
published in Monthly Review in 1962 under the title “Mexico: The Janus Faces of 20th 
Century Bourgeois Revolution,” hinted at his later thought by suggesting that production of 
crops for export explained the comparatively unequal distribution of the benefits of capitalist 
growth in post-feudal Mexico versus the more equitable distributions in countries that 
achieved their bourgeois revolutions prior to the twentieth century. Yet, unlike his later 
analyses, Frank in “Janus Face” accepted the prevailing consensus that Latin America had a 
feudal past similar to medieval Europe, from which flowed the implicit conclusion that they 
would eventually morph into replicas of northern capitalist democracies.207 In this 
transitional phase, Frank was still more modernization theorists than dependentista, arguing 
that the barrier to Latin American and social development could be found in the persistence 
of a feudal sector of the economy, which acted as an institutional drag inhibiting the country 
from achieving “take-off.” This was indistinguishable from the concurrent mode of thought 
in the Kennedy administration, as expressed by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., quoted in the last 
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chapter. It is also commensurable, though not identical, with concurrent CEPAL 
developmentalism, which wanted a strong national state to empower entrepreneur-led 
industrialization through the combined use of protectionist measures (import-substituting 
industrialization) and the strategic use of foreign private capital and government aid. 
 Frank formed the broad contours of his most important and lasting contribution to 
dependency theory while living in Brazil between 1963 and the spring of 1964. Immediately 
after marrying Marta Fuentes in Chile in December of 1962, the young couple moved to 
Brasilia, where Frank took a temporary visiting professorship. He taught a graduate seminar 
in sociology and set out to process the data he had gathered over the preceding year. In his 
seminar, he worked with Ruy Mauro Marini, Theotonio dos Santos, and Vania Bambirra, all 
of whom would become important figures in Latin American development theory. The four 
worked together as colleagues again later in the decade at the Centro de Estudios 
Socioeconómicos at the University of Chile, Santiago.208  
In moving to Brazil to study development in the early 1960s, Frank entered into a 
highly charged intellectual atmosphere. In no other Latin American country had the 
“developmentalist” perspective achieved a greater level of political support than in Brazil in 
the late 1950s under the presidency of Juscelino Kubischek.209 Prebisch’s protégé Celso 
Furtado- arguably in the long-run the most influential of all the ECLA structuralists- stood at 
the intellectual center of the developmentalist program in Brazil, actively seeking to insinuate 
Prebisch’s work and the ECLA line into political discourse. He served as director of a 
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regional planning agency, the Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast 
(SUDENE), from 1959-1964. As extraordinary minister of planning for the government of 
João Goulart he fought to move economic policy toward autonomous development, opposing 
in particular participation in the Alliance for Progress, the arch-typical U.S. modernization 
program.210  
Frank’s most immediate network included not the Brazilian chapter of CEPAL, but a 
group of young economists and sociologists who can be characterized in a range from 
slightly left CEPAL collaborators to far-left critics seeking a more transformative solution to 
the problem of underdevelopment. He attended the first international conference for students 
from underdeveloped countries in the summer of 1963, and he presented at a symposium 
with Octavio Ianni and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who “talked about development in 
much my terms.” Anti-dependency-theorist Robert Packenham spent a good deal of time 
debating whether Cardoso or Frank deserve credit for originating neo-Marxist dependency 
theory. He suggested that both of their ideas came out in the late 1960s, with Frank’s just a 
couple years earlier.211 In fact, in the early 1960s the two had a collaborative working 
relationship, and Frank claimed that Cardoso responded favorably to his first articulations, 
presented as a critique of the concept of a Latin American feudal stage of development.212 
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Rodolfo Stavenhagen, who worked in Rio, also heavily influenced Frank, possibly as much 
as Baran or Sweezy up to that point. In a letter to Stavenhagen, Frank referred to plans that 
had fallen through earlier that year to bring the Mexico-born sociologist, then working at the 
Centro Latino American de Pesquisas em Ciencias Sociais in Rio, to the University of 
Brasilia for a talk.213 Frank frequently referred to Stavenhagen as a co-thinker in his 
correspondence with Sweezy. 
In Brasilia Frank began working on the first piece that would appear in his most 
famous collection. He outlined his thoughts for an article that would become “Capitalism and 
the Myth of Feudalism in Brazilian Agriculture” in June of 1963, just prior to moving from 
Brasilia to Rio. For several months, he had been intending to dismantle the myth that Latin 
American underdevelopment could be attributed to the legacy of its feudal past. As he told 
Sweezy, however, by the time he sat down to write, his focus had shifted. Because “some 
Marxist types” in Brazil had already begun to take on the claim that Latin America was 
feudal, Frank aimed instead “to demonstrate, or at least to suggest…that the apparently 
feudal relations in the countryside were constructed and are here and there maintained by the 
capitalist structure of the economy, and even of agriculture.”214 Although aiming to disprove 
all variants of the argument that Latin American institutions were feudal, Frank in particular 
attacked the "dual society" thesis, proponents of which claimed that Latin American and 
other colonized countries contained both feudal and capitalist sectors. Nominally attacking 
both the “bourgeois” and “traditional Marxist” proponents of the dual thesis, Frank referred 
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to the former only in the introduction. The main body of the essay consisted primarily of a 
critique of what he understood to be “traditional Marxism” on the question of feudalism and 
capitalism in Brazilian agricultural production. In the “Myth of Feudalism” Frank for the first 
time posited a global capitalist system extending back several hundred years to the epoch of 
the mercantile expansion of the European metropolis. Mercantile capital penetrated and 
colonized Latin America early, and any institutions resembling those of Europe in the feudal 
era were actually forged within the furnace of capitalist expansion, and therefore capitalist.215 
Understanding all the subsequent work that went into CU as extending and deepening 
his argument against the myth of feudalism allows us to resituate Frank’s intellectual 
biography within al tradition distinct from both Latin American structuralist economics and 
neo-Marxism a la Baran and Sweezy. The correspondence with Sweezy shows that 
reinterpreting the “feudal” history of Latin America is the main entry point for Frank into his 
version of dependency theory, and throughout the book that would eventually be published 
Frank approaches this question as a hypothesis of underdevelopment which he is testing 
through analysis of historical empirical data. It is the central axis around which all of the 
subsequent organization of his thoughts revolves, at least throughout the 1960s. It is not clear 
who he meant by the “Marxist types” that had begun to address this question in Brazil. 
Although in his essays on Brazil in CU, Ianni, Cardoso and Stavenhagen are three of his most 
commonly cited opponents representing what Frank called the “traditional Marxist” position 
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supporting feudalism, it is not so clear that they held those positions at that point.216 In a 
letter to Sweezy, Frank claimed that Cardoso defended his thesis on feudalism against “a 
vicious emotional attack from a partyline panelist” when the two presented on the same panel 
at a symposium in 1963.217 Stavenhagen, for his part, would publish his own theses rejecting 
both the “dual thesis” and feudal legacy of Latin America in 1965 on the grounds that both 
the “archaic” and the “modern” sectors “represent the functioning of a single global society, 
of which both poles are integral parts.” 218 Stavenhagen’s short article ran a full two years 
before Monthly Review Press put out the first edition of CU, but that should not be taken as 
an indication that Stavenhagen rejected the myth of feudalism before Frank, nor vice versa. 
Rather, just as in the case of Cardoso, it shows that many of those most associated with 
dependency theory developed this idea simultaneously, and in close collaboration with one 
another. 
Frank’s Dependency Theory in the Intellectual History of Latin American Marxism 
 
“Silvio Frondizi’s ‘Imperialismo y Burguesía Nacional’ is the only serious Marxist 
attempt to draw on [theories of imperialism] and interpret current reality on the 
continent that I know. Others merely quote the masters then mechanistically apply 
them supposedly and come out with crap.” ~ Andre Gunder Frank, 1964.219 
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The stimulation for this major theoretical breakthrough came from Frank’s 
engagement with an anti-Stalinist Marxist tradition in Latin American thought, especially in 
Argentine. A few works not widely read among North American development economists 
had a profound impact on Frank’s thinking. Among these included Sergio Bagú and Silvio 
Frondizi, both of which Frank took as exemplars of the argument against the myth of 
feudalism. To properly understand these influences on Frank, and how he perceived in 
relation to orthodox Marxism as he understood it, we need to go on a digression of the longer 
history of Marxist thought in Latin America. 
 The Russian Revolution generated pro-socialist sensibilities among workers’ 
organizations and intellectuals throughout the world, and Latin America was no exception. In 
several countries throughout the region, including Mexico, Argentina, Chile and Brazil, left 
leaders heeded the Comintern’s call to form Communist Parties in 1919. Initially, only loose 
ties bound these parties to the International organization. Historians have interpreted the 
scant direct support from the Comintern to nascent Latin American Communist parties as an 
indication that Bolsheviks had little interest in the non-European countries in general and in 
Latin America in particular.220 This interpretation misconstrues the real situation by 
confusing the Comintern’s “interests” with its organizational capacities, and those of Latin 
American Communist Parties. The Soviet Union undoubtedly assumed a leadership position 
in the Third International and through the 21 points for membership sought to institutionalize 
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a certain “model” derived from their successful revolution. Much of the negotiations 
surrounding incorporation of national sections into the international organization entailed 
adapting the model to local particularities while retaining its core principles. One should not 
underestimate the logistical enormity of the task, which ran up against a multilateral 
knowledge deficit among all national sections of the local culture and politics of every other 
national section (including Russia), language barriers, technical organizational inexperience, 
ongoing worldwide social crisis, and hostility and repression from capitalist governments.221 
The leaders of the largest sections, including Russian Bolshevik leaders, were certainly 
“interested” in revolutions in all parts of the world, including Latin America.222 But their 
ability to develop an independent analysis of Latin American particularities was limited by 
the relative weakness of the Latin American delegations, the technological limitations of the 
time (universities worldwide had not yet developed robust ‘regional studies’ programs), and 
the severe time constraints under which the first several meetings took place. Given the lack 
of specific attention to Latin American particularity and scant ground-level organization in 
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the region in the early 1920s, historians claim the Comintern “discovered” Latin America at 
its Sixth Congress World Congress in 1928, and as a consequence the region’s Communist 
history lacks a significant “pre-Stalinist” period comparable to that of the U.S.223 
 Although weaker than in other parts of the world, Marxism as an intellectual current 
in Latin America predates the region’s so-called discovery by the Comintern. Early Latin 
American Marxists include Julio Antonio Mella and Luis Emilio Recabarren, founders of the 
Cuban and Chilean Communist Parties respectively. Mella and Recabarren, situated their 
analysis of local and imperialist power structures within the mobilizing narrative of European 
Social Democracy of the first decades of the twentieth century. They posited certain definite 
conceptual relationships, illuminating structural pressures acting on local and imperialist 
actors. In terms of maintaining capitalist property relations, and the regime of accumulation 
as such, imperialist and local bourgeoisies formed a transnational bloc in opposition to the 
local proletariat. At the same time, national bourgeois classes existed in competition with one 
another, as did factions of the domestic bourgeoisie. Like European Social Democrats, they 
saw the role of these ideas to be bringing a narrative of liberation to what they believed 
would be a receptive audience. More than in later years, they believed the Third International 
offered a robust, democratic and essentially just institutional context in which to unite 
domestic struggles behind a unitary, transnational objective. They thus opposed nationalism 
to construct a transnational historical narrative of proletarian liberation, the major moments 
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of which include the Paris Commune and the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917.224 In 
these early formulations, Latin American Marxists depicted a bourgeoisie with enemies on 
two fronts. The Latin America bourgeois, they argued, feels animosity and resentment 
towards the imperialist bourgeoisie, but more than that fears the threat from below to its 
property relations. The imperialist bourgeoisie seeks allies to maintain stability to exploit 
markets, from which it wants to exclude other imperialist powers. In the best-case scenario, it 
will not dominate “but rather wants to rent their services and even improve their situation, 
provided it can exploit them for its own purposes.”225 This already recognized that 
unevenness taken to an extreme level created a temporary stasis in competition, an idea later 
developed more fully by Silvio Frondizi with his concept of global integration.  
 In the early-to-mid 1920s, the Comintern had not yet condemned as heterodox 
deviations these applications of Marxist categories to local Latin American peculiarities. 
Mella, writing in the middle of the decade, and the Peruvian Jose Carlos Mariátegui believed 
they were applying the correct interpretation of the “united front” tactic discussed at length 
among all sections and adopted as a formal strategy at the Comintern’s Second Congress. In 
essence, the united front represented the attempt to draw a baseline set of strategic principles 
from the lessons of Bolshevism, and in a certain sense formalized their conception of uniting 
broad social layers behind proletarian hegemony. This would be applied differently 
depending on the local context, which remained to be worked out in practical struggle and 
included mitigating circumstances such as the level of capitalist development of a given 
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country and the extent to which political authority allowed workers’ parties to operate 
openly. But at a certain level of abstraction, it also contained “universal” principles, the first 
and foremost of which was to maintain the political independence and revolutionary 
perspective of Communist Parties while forming coalitions with other organizations sharing a 
common “progressive” objective, meaning the fight for the greatest level of political liberties 
and economic advancement for the laboring classes. Mella’s strategy of opposing Yankee 
imperialism without ceding the national liberation struggle to the local bourgeoisie included a 
long quotation from Lenin, advising that Communists in “colonial and underdeveloped 
countries” should enter only “into temporary alliance with bourgeois democracy…but should 
not merge with it, and under all circumstances should maintain the independence of the 
proletarian movement, even in its most rudimentary forms.”226 Mello and, later, Mariátegui 
polemicized primarily against APRA, and their characterizations of the latter rested on a 
political sociology bearing remarkable continuity with the concept of permanent revolution 
to level a critique that could just easily be directed at Latin American Communist Parties in 
the Popular Front era. 
 Mariátegui in particular constitutes an important and complicated figure whose 
thought must be grasped to get a sense of what was lost in the construction of a Stalinist 
orthodoxy in Latin American Marxist thought. Scholars of Latin American Marxism often 
stress the heterodoxy and creativity of Mariátegui’s thought, opposing him to the more 
dogmatic center of gravity and aligning him with “Western Marxists” such as Antonio 
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Gramsci, György Lukács and Karl Korsch.227 But, even when scholars specifically identify 
Stalinism as Mariátegui’s foil, their definitions of Marxism consistently equate orthodoxy 
with rigidity and thus fail to understand Mariátegui on his own terms, for the latter 
undoubtedly believed creative adaptation of the revolutionary proletarian narrative to local 
contexts captured rather than betrayed the essence of Marxist orthodoxy. Mariátegui grew up 
in the small southern Peruvian town of Moquegua. His young consciousness grasping for its 
first impressions of the world encountered not just the Latin American periphery, but the 
Peruvian periphery of Latin America, and a relatively small provincial satellite within Perú. 
In this context, he developed an intimate connection to his country’s Indigenous population, 
a connection he retained throughout his life and which left an indelible mark on his mature 
social thought, which contained among the most developed Marxist sensibilities of the 
question of race of his time. Though lacking a formal education, he demonstrated from an 
early age an appreciation of culture and a knack for writing, which he cultivated as a 
journalist in his teenage years in 1910s. His early journalistic accomplishments in the short-
lived periodicals Nuestro Epoca and La Razón earned him a period of European exile at the 
hands of the repressive government of Augusto Leguía. As an exile, Mariátegui undertook 
his first serious study of European social thought, interacted with Italian and French 
Communists, and returned to his country in 1923 a “convinced and committed Marxist.”228 
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Mariátegui’s understanding of Marxism explicitly linked the limits of determinism 
with the need to give concrete local particularity to universal categories. From his return to 
Perú in 1923 until his death in 1929, he consistently polemicized as a proponent of Marxism. 
Most of these polemics appeared on the pages of the magazine he founded and edited, 
Amauta, and the shorter-lived Labor, but his collected works also include university lectures, 
letters, and a few short books. Mariátegui’s work reveals several recurrent themes, many of 
which pertain to central theoretical dilemmas in development studies and anticipate the 
dependency approach. He consistently worked on the classification of Peruvian agrarian 
institutions, exploring the extent to which they could be understood as products of native 
Peruvian history or the legacy of colonialism. His answer: they are both. Inca civilization had 
a system of centralized agrarian communism under autocratic control. Spanish colonialism 
wiped out the central institution, the ayllu, and replaced it with the encomiendo in the 
agricultural producing coastal and highland regions and the mita in the mining areas. 
Mariátegui characterized these as feudal institutions primarily based on the enforced, semi-
slave nature of their labor regimes. Only in the coastal region did capitalist forms of 
exploitation of the native labor force emerge. It is worth noting that Mariátegui’s criterion for 
determining how to classify these institutions is free versus unfree labor, in contrast to much 
of later dependency theory which would define “feudalism” and “capitalism” according to 
their relationship to the world market. 
Mariátegui explicitly drew a distinction between particularities produced by a 
country’s discrete history, and those produced by unitary history of the modern capitalist 
system, a world-systemic approach that ultimately earned him the ire of Popular Front 
Marxism. “An Indigenous, organic, native economy develops alone,” he wrote. “It alone 
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spontaneously determines its institutions. But a colonial economy is established on bases that 
are in part artificial and foreign, and subordinated to the interests of the colonizer.”229 
Scholars see Mariátegui’s reconciliation with colonial nationalism as the most heterodox 
element of his thought, but it is probable that he believed he was the most orthodox 
interpreter on the South American continent of the Marxist tradition on questions of 
nationalism and internationalism. Mariátegui’s encounter with European Marxism postdated 
the disintegration of the Second International in a wave of wartime patriotism, and it 
coincided with the rise of hyper-nationalist fascist movements. While European nationalism 
all along the line served reactionary ends, Mariátegui believed colonial nationalism had “a 
totally different origin and impulse. In these peoples, nationalism is revolutionary, and 
therefore ends in socialism.”230 He was not an uncritical nationalist, but rather approached 
nationalism as an objectively real phenomenon, and therefore a valid social question to be 
analyzed dialectically. In an astute analogy, he argued that nationalism stands to 
internationalism as Galilean physics stands to Einsteinian relativism; similar to “relativists 
before Galileo’s physics, internationalists do not discard the entire nationalist theory.” Rather 
than viewing the two exclusively and fundamentally in antagonism, he aimed to show how 
internationalism could best serve its world historical cause by reproducing and supplanting 
the mobilizing rhetoric of nationalism on a higher level. Moreover, he interpreted neither 
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nationalism nor internationalism as inherently revolutionary or reactionary, but rather 
considered how each could serve either purpose depending on their class content.  
Ultimately, Mariátegui ran afoul of the Comintern in a particular moment of one of 
the latter’s deviations, damaging his reputation as a Marxist and dampening enthusiasm for 
his ideas among dedicated political Marxists on the continent. Much like Lenin in his time, 
Mariátegui in the late 1920s polemicized along a “left” and a “right” front. From the right, he 
fended off criticisms of Marxist Eurocentrism from Victor Haya de la Torre’s Alianza 
Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA). Late in the 1920s, however, he was forced to 
defend his interpretation of Marxism from the left against an assault from Comintern 
affiliates, then passing through the “ultra-leftism” of the so-called third period. Due to health 
restrictions (he was missing a leg and he would die within a year) Mariátegui was not able to 
attend the first Latin American conference of Communist Parties, held in Montevideo in June 
of 1929, and he sent in his stead Julio Portocarrero and Hugo Pesce. At the conference, 
delegates advanced their interpretation of the line formalized at the Sixth Comintern 
Congress in 1927, in which the semi-colonial status of Latin American gave rise to objective 
social coalitions committed to upholding feudal political institutions domestically. As such, 
the imperialist bourgeoisie, in the form of big trusts, and the local landholding oligarchs 
constituted the two immediate enemies, and only a nationalist “bourgeois-democratic” 
revolution could sweep away the two allied enemies and “create the conditions for 
independent economic development.”231 At this juncture, Codovilla couched his recognition 
of the bourgeois-democratic nature of Latin America’s revolution in the ultra-left, class-
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versus-class rhetoric of the third period. But the significance rested in his ability to anticipate 
the importance that Stalinism would place on the bourgeois-democratic nature, and the 
apparatus as a means of enforcing a strict interpretation.232 
With the passing of Mariátegui from the scene, the center of gravity of Latin 
American Marxist thought moved to Argentina and the quality of that thought entered a 
pronounced period of Stalinist orthodoxy. Oscillations, even wild ones, were built into 
Stalinism. These oscillations flowed naturally from its raison d’être: protecting the national 
security of the Soviet Union and maintaining the power of the bureaucracy. Political 
imperatives at any given moment can change drastically on the constantly shifting terrain of 
international relations. Yet, as a world movement requiring dedicated, self-sacrificing 
revolutionaries in every country, Stalinism was compelled to justify each political oscillation 
in terms of some timeless Marxist principle. As numerous historians of Marxist thought have 
noted, the end result was a tremendous stultification of Marxist theory internationally. If this 
seemed contradictory in general, in the case of Argentine politics from World War Two 
through the 1950s, it appeared downright schizophrenic. As US-Soviet relations moved from 
wartime alliance to Cold War hostility, Argentine Stalinists struggled to keep current in their 
articulations of the correct “Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist” approach to Peronism, the dominant 
domestic political force throughout most of the period, and Washington, the unquestionably 
dominant international force in the Western hemisphere after the war. Following the tactical 
programmatic deviations throughout the period is difficult, as in many cases a line would be 
over before it began. Yet, reviewing the period as a whole, a constant, even consistent 
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theoretical refrain emerged from the cacophony of deviations. In all cases, the security needs 
of the Soviet Union came first. Argentine Stalinism consistently rejected even rhetorical 
claims that socialist revolution could be placed on the immediate horizon for Argentina or 
Latin America. They sought the most favorable alliances with liberal and even centrist parties 
in a continual effort to have representation in some sort of coalition government that could 
orient foreign policy toward overt support for the Soviet Union. This meant pandering 
constantly to nationalist, populist sentiment. It meant emphasizing “national unity” over class 
conflict, and it meant appropriating liberal appeals to liberty and democracy. 
Frank drew the impressions that went into his battle against the myth of feudalism 
from this expression of Latin American Marxist orthodoxy, and the intellectual contestation 
against this current from anti-Stalinist Marxists. Silvio Frondizi, whose work Frank lauded as 
the almost exclusive example of non-dogmatic Marxism, solidarized himself with an anti-
Stalinist Marxist political current during his 1940s encounter with Peronism, and that 
experience deeply shaped the content of his book El Sistema Marxista.  
Frondizi suffered directly at the hands of Peronism, and his work reveals the sharpest 
and most anguished need for political reorientation. Born in Paso de los Libros in 1907 to 
Italian immigrant parents, Frondizi was the twelfth of fourteen children. The large family 
placed a high value on culture and education, and the three youngest sons, Silvio and his 
brothers Arturo and Risieri, would all become prominent Argentine intellectuals. Arturo, 
closest to Silvio both personally and in age, went into politics. He helped form the Unión 
Radical Intransigente in 1950 and held a leadership position within the party for nearly forty 
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years, including a four-year stint as the President of Argentina from 1958-1962. 233 Silvio and 
Arturo were in classes together from the years of their primary education in Concepción, 
through their university education at el Colegio Nacional Mario Moreno in Buenos Aires, up 
to and including law school at the University of Buenos Aires. At law school, their career 
paths began to diverge. Silvio concurrently enrolled in the Nacional Instituto del Profesorado, 
and emerged in 1930 with both a law degree and a professorship in history. While Arturo 
went on to practice law, eventually moving into politics, Silvio continued his postgraduate 
study, and in 1936 received his doctorate in jurisprudence.234 
 As a young doctor of philosophy in the late 1930s, Frondizi was drawn into the newly 
formed philosophy department at the Universidad Nacional de Tucumán (UNT). Argentine 
students began agitating against the traditional system, which tied universities to the church, 
as early as the end of the nineteenth century. In 1918, students throughout the country 
organized a national federation pushing for university reform, including the nationalization of 
many of the largest universities and the creation of widely accessible public education, which 
achieved results throughout the 1920s under the sympathetic presidency of Hipólito 
Yrigoyen. The student movement protested the 1930 coup, led by General José Felix Uriburu 
with the backing of US Standard Oil, and the subsequent dictatorship. To quell this 
opposition, the military regime expanded a number of universities throughout the country, 
including UNT. In December of 1936, the Inspector General of Schools, Don Pascal 
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Guaglianone, in an effort to increase the role of humanities in public education, presented a 
proposal to add a department of philosophy to UNT, which previously had offered courses of 
study only in Engineering and Pharmacy. In 1937, Julio Prebisch took over as rector of UNT, 
and attracted a group of humanist philosophers to form the new department, many of whom 
had recently fled from Nazi Germany or the turmoil of the Spanish Civil War. At the center 
of this new faculty stood Manuel García Morente, who had served as the deacon of the 
University of Madrid before escaping first to France then to the United States with the 
eruption of the Civil War. As director of the new department, Morente designed a curriculum 
with an emphasis on history, theory and method. To execute his vision, he reached out to 
progressive young professors in different parts of the country, including Risieri Frondizi to 
teach logic. Risieri came to teach logic, and secured a position for his brother Silvio to teach 
political theory.235 
 Frondizi’s comfortable, middle-class academic life came to an end in 1943. The 
military coup in June of that year placed Gustavo Martínez Zuviría as Minister of Justice and 
Public Instruction. Openly identifying as a fascist, Martínez Zuviría made it his mission to 
fight against the education reform of the late 1930s, and replace the liberal, humanist 
curriculum with religious education. Tucuman underwent a complete fascist overhaul of the 
local government, and UNT set out to implement the new religious curriculum. Frondizi 
refused to submit. In November of 1943 he denounced Academic Council of UNT and wrote 
in an open letter to his colleagues and students: “The jackals and crows circling around 
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modern culture have it wrong, it is not yet a cadaver and will not be; those of us who know 
and love our culture are disposed to defend it, because its death would mean our own 
death.”236 By 1946, Frondizi had been stripped of his professorship, and relocated to Buenos 
Aires to work as an attorney and integrate himself into the political circles of his brother 
Arturo. 
 The rise of Peronism politicized Frondizi for the first time. He approached politics as 
an academic matter while at UNT, but having been forced out of his position by the changing 
political winds, he turned his attention to his country’s current political crisis with a 
newfound sense of urgency. Later in his life, he saw this as a decisive turning point in his 
transition from a “petty bourgeois intellectual” to a “revolutionary socialist.” After having 
been a titled and published professor, he personally experienced the crisis by having to live 
for a number of years on a very modest salary.237 His first serious effort at analyzing his 
contemporary Argentine political and social reality, a pamphlet entitled La Crisis Política 
Argentina, reveals a definite shift to the left in Frondizi’s thinking. For Frondizi, Peronism 
emerged out of a nearly two-decades-long crisis of leadership in Argentine politics. In the 
early years of the twentieth century Radicalism carried the promise of progress for the 
Argentine people, but rested on a foundation of heterogeneous and antagonistic social 
groups. Hipólito Irogoyen allowed the conservative landowning oligarchy and the church to 
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retain political influence, creating a constant drag on progressive legislation at odds with the 
almost mystic aura of modernity surrounding the Radical label. The Radicals’ inability to 
resolve these contradictions and the absence of a developed socialist movement to take up the 
mantle opened the door for traditional conservative forces, operating through the military. 
Once in power, however, the conservative dictatorship could only keep Radicalism at bay 
through force and fraud, which caused the repression and corruption that generated enormous 
popular hostility and ultimately made the dictatorship untenable. The coup of 1943 
represented the failure of dictatorship to rule through brute force, which convinced the forces 
behind the scenes of the dictatorship of the need to adopt populist measures. Frondizi saw 
this as positive insofar as it represented the entry of the masses into Argentine political life, 
and negative in that Peronism, lacking a true left element, missed a historic opportunity to 
sweep away for good the old conservative landowning oligarchy. While not presented as a 
contribution to Marxist thought, nor employing any theoretical discussion of the Marxist 
method, La Crisis Política placed antagonistic social classes at the center of its analysis.238 
 Frondizi was living in Buenos Aires during the 1945 campaign, and he had long since 
begun to take seriously the politics of his country, but he was manifestly unsatisfied with the 
Democratic Union as an alternative to Peronism. In 1946, he taught courses on “the current 
state of the political problem” (Estado actual del problema política) at the Colegio Libre de 
Estudios Superiores. Colegio Libre was a step down financially from his full-time 
professorship at UNT, but it did not carry the same censorship as the quasi or outright 
fascists who controlled both the UNT and the local government in Tucumán. The more 
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liberal atmosphere provided him the space to gather intellectual collaborators who formed an 
incipient political movement, which they initially called the Acción Democrática 
Independiente (ADI), but would later adopt the name Grupo Praxis.239 They published a 
periodical entitled El Ciudadano (The Citizen), and, rather than impotently opposing the 
Peronist avalanche through what they saw as an unprincipled alliance with liberalism, 
dedicated their intellectual energies to building a cadre organization around a concrete 
analysis of the social foundations of Peronism. Within this intellectual space Frondizi first 
took up a serious study of Marxism, which he had earlier called an “outstanding example of a 
simplistic thesis.”240 
 As he stepped into the fray of organized political Marxism, Frondizi was repelled by 
the politics of the Stalinist Communist Party of Argentina. The formal wartime alliance 
between the Soviet Union and the United States determined a particular mode of thought for 
Argentine Stalinism, which lasted through the war and entered a period of transition 
corresponding to the rise of the Cold War. Hyper-nationalist, even patriotic rhetoric found its 
way into the CPA’s speeches and pamphlets. Identifying “Nazi-fascism” as the supreme 
threat, the CPA sought alliances with any anti-fascist forces, a perspective summed up in the 
oft-repeated slogan “unity without exclusions.” The Communist line throughout this period 
was, in effect, an extreme form of Popular Frontism. In 1941, the Argentine Communist 
Party began aggressively pushing for the unity of all national democratic forces against a 
perceived domestic fascist movement. Argentine politics during the so-called “infamous 
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decade” from 1930-1943 hardly exemplified democracy, but the Communists perceived a 
greater threat building up behind a growing popular hostility and resentment to the corruption 
and repression of the various successive presidencies supported by la Concordancia, the 
multi-party coalition that maintained power from 1932 to 1943. Codovilla claimed “only the 
creation of an ample democratic front” could keep the state out of the hands of the fascists.241 
This anti-fascist coalition materialized in response to the 1943 coup led by the United 
Officers’ Group (GOU) against Ramon Castillo, the last in the long line of Concordancia 
presidents. Parties opposed to military rule, regardless of their populist foundation, came 
together in the Democratic Union, a coalition composed of the Communists, the Socialist 
Party, the liberal Radical Civic Union, and the Democratic Progressive Party. With the 
backing of US ambassador Spruille Braden, and by extension Washington, the Democratic 
Union squared off not against the corruption of the conservative la Concordancia, but rather 
against the military coup that ousted Ramon Castillo. 
 The unity line dominated the party’s national conference in December of 1945, to 
which the Communists invited delegates from the other parties in the Democratic Union 
coalition. In his address to the conference, Codovilla, recently returned to Argentina, 
emphasized the line of the preceding years, in which the party had converted itself into the 
“passionate champions of unity…Unity among all of the parties and forces of democracy, 
unity of the Argentine nation, to detain the advances of reaction and fascism.”242 Throughout 
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the speech, Codovilla presented the Communists as great Argentine patriots, and he without 
exception referred to the party’s role as the vanguard not just of the working class, but rather 
“the working class and the people (el pueblo).”243 Delivered in the brief historical moment 
between the end of World War Two and the full onset of the Cold War, Codovilla’s address 
to the Argentine Communist Party reflects a very different vision of the prospects for the 
postwar era. He celebrated the Soviet Union, the United States and England as heroes of 
worldwide democracy.244 Against his perception of anti-Communist forces stirring in the 
United States, he invoked the legacy of the two greatest contributors to the victory: Stalin and 
Roosevelt.245 He denounced Peron’s anti-Yankee rhetoric for its inability to see the 
progressive forces within the United States.246 All of this would appear astounding in just a 
few years, and indeed was essentially out of touch with concurrent developments in Soviet-
US relations that already rendered such a collaborative view obsolete. Yet, it perfectly fit the 
program pushed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during the war to meet the 
temporary demands for its own security.247 
 All the theoretical assumptions of Stalinist nation-statism underlay the wartime 
positions of Argentine Communism. For Codovilla, nationalism not class struggle drove 
forward the earlier transitions from feudalism to capitalism, such as the French Revolution, 
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as well as the Latin American independence movements. In fact, according to Codovilla, “all 
liberal and progressive movements throughout history have developed thanks to active 
solidarity of the people among themselves.”248 Codovilla mentioned classes very little in his 
speech on national unity, but his conception of the basis of popular unity clearly reflected 
what would become the go-to strategy of Latin American Stalinists throughout the postwar 
era. Against Peronism, which had its support in the backward elements of the working class 
and the peasantry, the Democratic Union drew support from progressive workers, 
progressive industrialists and democratic Catholics. The largest problem with the movement 
was that it had not yet won over conservatives. Although he did not make it explicit, 
Codovilla essentially called for workers to follow the domestic bourgeoisie, here called 
“progressive industrialists” on the path to a bourgeois-democratic revolution which, based on 
the view of a cooperative relationship between the US and USSR, would evolve over time 
peacefully into socialism. Moreover, Codovilla clearly saw this struggle as an internal matter 
for Argentine national development. He said in no uncertain terms that the Argentine people, 
by which he meant a nation unified behind the leadership of industrial capital, must rely on 
its own force rather than any international support.249 There is a striking similarity between 
the CPA’s variant of Marxism and the US consensus historiography and functionalist 
sociology undergirding modernization theory. Indeed, if Codovilla is taken as a 
representative of “orthodox” Marxism, then it is correct to say orthodox Marxism and 
modernization theory rest on similar teleological, nationalist and functionalist metanarratives. 
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 1946 marked a transitional year for the program of Argentine Stalinism. The primary 
reason for the shift was undoubtedly the changing outlook for Soviet international relations. 
In April of 1945 Jacques Duclos, a leading figure in the French Communist Party, published 
an open letter in the party’s theoretical journal Cahiers du Communisme criticizing certain 
aspects of the wartime program of the Communist Party of the United States. Under the 
leadership of Earl Browder, the CPUSA throughout the war had a pushed a program of 
patriotism and cooperation with the US government, rhetorically very similar to the 
Democratic Union era CPA program of “unity without exception.” The Duclos letter, based 
on information that could have made it to the author only with the express consent of 
Moscow, signaled a change in tactic at the level of the CPSU, which already anticipated 
tension with their US allies as the war came to a close.250 Like in other countries, including 
France, the implications of the Duclos letter worked their way into the Argentine Communist 
Party program slowly. A second likely reason for the shift is that the Democratic Union’s 
raison d’etre had collapsed with the landslide victory of Peron in June of 1946. No longer 
able to portray Peronism as a foreign fascist threat lacking a popular base in Argentine 
society, the Stalinists were forced to reevaluate their stance toward the new regime.  
 The new line found its first clear articulations in the party’s eleventh congress in 
August of 1946. Unlike at the conference of December of 1945, which had included other 
members of the Democratic Union, party leaders addressed an audience composed 
exclusively of party members at the congress, and their speeches differed drastically in tone 
even if only moderately in content. Codovilla began his opening address with a brief sketch 
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of the history of the CPA. Claiming to be original founding members of the Comintern, 
Codovilla presented a mythologized party history of uninterrupted class struggle, which 
stood in sharp contrast to his public presentation just eight months prior, in which he had 
portrayed progress historically not as the outcome of struggle but of unity of the people.251 In 
addition, whereas Codovilla’s and Ghioldi’s speeches during the Democratic Union almost 
completely lacked any reference to the working class as the central force of progress, 
Codovilla’s main speech to the congress identified workers as one of two contradictory social 
groups pressuring Peron and capable of shaping the outcome of Argentine politics.252 Yet, 
despite the return to revolutionary rhetoric, the program Codovilla called for at the eleventh 
congress derived from the same nation-statist and interclass collaborationist premises as the 
earlier formulations. In order to “liquidate the economic and social backwardness that exist in 
our country, and in order to realize the agrarian, anti-imperialist revolution,” argued 
Codovilla, it is important not to “fixate too much on the past in order to find motives for 
disunion between the workers and the popular masses, but rather focus the view on the 
present, where there exist abundant motives to push for union of all Argentines and 
inhabitants of this country who are lovers of progress, well-being and liberty.”253 Codovilla 
remained committed to a vision of a cross-class national democratic movement to liquidate 
the backwardness emanating from the feudal structure of Argetina’s agrarian economy.  
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 The CPA became more denunciatory of the United States between 1945 and 1947 as 
relations soured between Washington and Moscow. The eleventh congress witnessed the first 
substantive change in the party’s position toward the Soviet Union’s wartime allies. When 
Ghioldi delivered a speech at Luna Park, almost exactly one year previously, a giant banner 
adorned with portraits of Stalin, Truman, Roosevelt and Churchill hung above the stage.254 
Similarly, Codovilla’s speech at the party’s conference in December of 1945 hailed 
Roosevelt and Stalin as the great heroes of the war, the international saviors of democracy, 
and the symbolic figures around which capitalist and socialist countries would build a 
peaceful, collaborative and democratic future. On the basis of the wartime alliance, the 
Communists invited US intervention into Argentina’s domestic political affairs, and US 
economic interests in the Argentine economy were downplayed against the traditional 
English monopolies. Within one year, the Cold War had made its way into the consciousness 
of the leaders of the Argentine Communist Party. With the US and the Soviet Union coming 
into open contact over competing interests in the postwar European landscape, the threat of 
“Yankee imperialism” rapidly moved from non-existent in the immediate aftermath of the 
war to the primary threat by the eleventh congress, more dangerous even than Peronism. “To 
detain the advances of imperialism,” Codovilla told the congress, “we are disposed to march 
together with all political and social sectors, as much from the Peronist camp as from the 
camp that sustained the Democratic Union.”255 By 1947, the Communists were as 
vehemently anti-Yankee as any other domestic political force. In a speech to the Central 
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Committee in April 1947, Codovilla blamed the United States, not the Argentine 
Communists for the change in position. The war had opened space for a wave of democratic 
reform to sweep through Latin America, led by the newly political conscious masses. 
Interestingly, Codovilla in 1947 portrayed Peronism as a response to this democratic wave 
rather than the head of a Nazi-fascist threat to suppress it. Whereas Roosevelt’s Good 
Neighbor had facilitated the entry of the masses into Latin American politics, Truman’s 
return to dollar diplomacy sought to suppress it. US imperialists, backed by the Truman 
administration, had replaced Peronism as the central forcing propping up fascist elements 
within Argentina.256 
 Through the courses he taught at Colegio Libre Frondizi first developed his theory of 
global capitalist integration, which saw the light of day in mid-1946 in an article entitled “La 
evolución capitalista y el principio de soberanía” (The evolution of capitalism and the 
principle of sovereignty).257 The truncated article, sent to the Overseas News Agency, came 
out as an independent pamphlet in Argentina near the end 1946, and almost immediately 
drew an attack from the CPA, in an article by Ghioldi published in “La Hora” in March of 
1947. In his response to Ghioldi’s criticism, his first public piece to include any serious 
discussion of Marxism, Frondizi drew out the political implications of his theory and the 
Stalinist critique. Still primarily concerned with understanding the social foundation of 
Peronism, Frondizi began with the current state of evolution of the capitalist system on a 
world scale. He divided the evolution of international capitalism into three phases. The first 
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phase, identified by Marx, was the competitive phase, which witnessed the consolidation of 
national economies. To this phase corresponded the program of bourgeois-democratic 
revolution. The second phase, identified by Lenin, emerged from the contradiction between 
social production and individual accumulation. Monopoly formed out of competition, which 
consolidated advanced capitalist states into imperial powers. On the international plane, 
inter-imperialist conflict among capitalist nation-states characterized the second phase. In the 
third phase, through which Frondizi saw his contemporary world passing since the end of the 
war, the capitalist part of the world was being integrated and organized under US leadership, 
and in its own interests.258  
 Ghioldi most sharply disagreed with the implications of Frondizi’s ideas on the 
question of decolonization. Frondizi believed that, due to the entrance of the masses into 
politics worldwide, the old political form of colonialism, no longer tenable, would be 
replaced with economic coercion through manipulation of international markets. Thus, 
Frondizi had stumbled upon the exact formulation that had been raised, and quickly squashed 
at the Sixth Congress. Nearly twenty years later, Ghioldi had only become more intransigent 
in his hostility to this view, exacerbated by the changing security needs of the Soviet Union 
as the Cold War picked up momentum. Ghioldi insisted that the claim that the US would 
abandon overt political colonialism flew in the face of Washington’s current efforts to 
colonize Greece and Turkey, a piece of hyperbole clearly linked to the deepening rift over the 
division of Europe among the former allies. Not only was this inconsistent- Frondizi had 
already predicted the US subsuming the entire global economy in its own interest at the 
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moment when Ghioldi hailed Bretton Woods as the pinnacle of democracy under a banner of 
Roosevelt with the backing of Spraden and the Democratic Union- Frondizi showed quite 
clearly how it derived from an effort to undermine any revolutionary program in colonial and 
semi-colonial countries. “The integration of a global capitalist front” argued Frondizi, 
“irremediably calls for the formation of a global anticapitalist front and invalidates the 
argument of the necessity that our country complete the so-called ‘bourgeois-democratic 
revolution.’”259 Frondizi’s theory of integration implied a community of interest between the 
national and imperialist bourgeoisie, and stood in stark contrast to the doctrinaire view of 
universal historical stages of discrete nation-states characteristic of Stalinist Marxism. More 
fully grasping the transnational nature of the ruling class bloc in the capitalist world-system, 
Frondizi overtly rejected any potential for a national solution to a transnational problem. 
 Whereas Frondizi’s ideas developed in polemic with Argentine Stalinism, he had a 
much more symbiotic relationship with the Argentine Trotskyist movement. The history of 
Latin American Trotskyism proceeds through a labyrinth of often tiny sects. Following this 
history can be dizzying, and extracting something of theoretical value from either their 
publications or their internal discussions can be difficult because they have a propensity to 
focus an inordinate amount of their effort to factional and sectarian disputes. Historians tend 
to dismiss the idea of deriving any theoretical value from inter-sectarian polemic, which they 
usually write off as little more than interpersonal bickering.260 Robert J. Alexander, a 
preeminent historian of both Stalinism and Troskyism in Latin America, argued that 
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personalities were at least as important as issues in the persistent factionalism in the 
Argentine Trotskyist movement, and, in fact, he focused much more attention on the personal 
animosities than the underlying theoretical differences between the two main rival Trotskyist 
groups.261  
 The role of personal disputes in keeping Argentine Trotskyism divided and isolated in 
its nascent years is difficult to dispute, and was even recognized by the groups themselves. 
Under constant pressure to unify from the International Committee of the Fourth 
International, which in the 1940s was itself still a unified body, one of the Argentine parties 
sent a statement to the SWP in New York, the headquarters of the Fourth International, 
acknowledging the extremely personal and acrimonious nature of the polemic among the 
various Argentine groups claiming the heritage of the Fourth International. Undated and 
unsigned, the proposal for a unification and reorganization was probably written in 1940 as 
the outcome of the formation of the Liga Obrera Socialista (LOS), which brought together 
the group led by Pedro Milesi and that of Antonio Gallo, as indicated by a number of veiled 
or not-so-veiled criticisms of the polemical style of the Grupo Obrero Revolucionario (GOR) 
and its divisive leader Liborio Justo. The LOS explained the excessively personal attacks on 
rival parties as the outcome of an objective and subjective factor. The former, a series of 
defeats for the working class, superseded and conditions the latter, the political inexperience 
of their movement.262 
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 By 1941, the Fourth International was pushing the factions of Argentine Trotskyism 
to unify. The two main factions complained of the inability to do so while continuing to insist 
on lfundamental differences, and in justifying their divisiveness they were forced to advance 
their thinking about the problem of “national liberation.” The GOR sent the SWP a letter 
complaining about the division in the movement in early 1941. In this, they attempted to 
spell out the programmatic differences between the group, led by Liborio Justo, and the 
newly formed LOS, headed by Milesi and Gallo, who had their own history of factional 
disputes. The GOR put forward a position that resembled that of the “democratic 
dictatorship” of the proletarian and the peasantry, the position advocated by the Bolsheviks 
up until Lenin’s April Theses, with the exception that the alliance behind the GOR’s 
formulation is that between the proletariat and those segments of the local bourgeoisie who 
would initiate a struggle against imperialism.263 The Executive Committee of the SWP 
responded that it would be best to unify, as they did not think the issue warranted a continued 
split, and if the parties were unable to unify they would honor their request to acknowledge 
one of them as the sole Argentine affiliate of the Fourth International, but before doing so 
would want a better understanding of the two positions. The SWP encouraged the two groups 
to elaborate their positions in the form of a thesis that could give more concrete meaning to 
the dispute in order to develop “slogans that express the immediate interests and aspirations 
of the working class.”264 
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 In response, both groups sent their theses on the question of national liberation to the 
Executive Committee of the Fourth International. The LOS denied in the case of Argentina 
the importance of an agrarian revolution to liquidate the remains of feudalism. The abstract 
call for “national independence” for semi-colonial countries, part of the theses of the 
founding congress of the Fourth International, when applied to the particularities of 
Argentina’s level of economic backwardness, which included a population composed of 43% 
proletariat, a highly concentrated industrial sector, and an agricultural sector that was, in its 
essence, capitalist, meant that the fight against imperialism would necessarily have to be 
waged directly by the proletariat, in opposition to the local bourgeoisie which was 
fundamentally linked to imperialism. For that reason, they denied that anti-imperialism 
should be the axis of local struggle, and even more so since the slogan of “national 
liberation” was rhetorically muddied by its overuse by virtually every sector of the Argentine 
left, including the rival Trotskyist GOR, the nationalist Apristas, and Stalinists.265 
 The GOR, in their thesis, defined national liberation as the principal political 
bourgeois-democratic task for the Argentine proletariat in its struggle for socialism. The 
content of national liberation consisted of nationalization of imperialist trusts, cancelling the 
external debt, and developing the domestic productive forces. This was to be achieved 
politically through the mobilization of the oppressed, anti-imperialist petty bourgeois 
elements under the leadership of the proletariat. In its initial message, therefore, the GOR put 
forth a populist program that both prescriptively (policy solutions offered) and 
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programmatically (strategy for achieving power) looked quite a bit like other Latin American 
populist solutions such as the Chilean Popular Front and Peronism in Argentina. 
 Gallo, leader of the Liga Obrera Socialista advanced a perspective against national 
liberation in “La Burguesia Nacional y El Imperialismo,” a thesis presented at the party’s 
first national congress in 1941. To solve the puzzle of the relationship between the national 
bourgeoisie and imperialism, Gallo went back to the transition from feudalism to capitalism 
in the European metropolis. The early stages of capitalist primitive accumulation began in 
England in the sixteenth century with enclosures and expansion of markets at the hands of 
the commercial bourgeoisie. Spain fell behind in its capitalist development when the 
bourgeois revolution failed and the nation unified under the church, an institution of 
consumption, rather than the productive bourgeoisie. According to Gallo, North American 
colonization under the proto-bourgeoisie explains the subsequent trajectory of the north, and 
the colonization of South America by the clerical class explains Latin America stagnation. 
Argentina, unlike many other Latin American countries, realized a bourgeois revolution with 
its independence movement, and in Gallo’s time Argentina was already capitalist. He 
supported this claim through examining the Argentine population, which he claimed was 
over fifty percent “proletarian” in the sense of earning their living through wages in industrial 
employment.266 Because a proletariat and capitalism, and thereby struggle between workers 
and capitalists, already existed in Argentina, “the proletarian strategy should be socialist 
revolution.”267 Gallo saw the Radical and Conservative parties as, respectively, the rear and 
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advance guard of reaction. Radicalism, despite its nominally populist rhetoric, drew its 
support primarily from the urban petty bourgeoisie. The Socialist and Democratic parties, for 
their part, represented the “escape valve” for capitalism; reformism with authentic roots in 
the Argentine working class, combined with certain layers of the petty bourgeoisie. The 
advance guard of the working class, meaning the very same Liga Obrera Socialista, should 
theoretically combat the reformist parties, even if in certain moments they made the tactical 
decision to form a temporary alliance with a common enemy, expressed through the slogan 
“strike together but march separately.” His analysis drew extensively from the Trotskyist 
tradition in which he operated, and developed systematically earlier articulations and their 
application to Argentina. In contrast to the concurrent Stalinist call for “unity without 
exclusions” of all democratic forces, Gallo insisted that his party must combat all forms of 
patriotism, and distance itself from any responsibility for defending bourgeois democracy.268 
 By the late 1940s, Frondizi was seriously engaged in a work more comprehensive in 
scope that anything he had written before, and in both the research and redaction he drew 
heavily from the Argentine Trotskyist movement. The debates over national liberation 
discussed above lived on through the younger generation of comrades, many of whom 
regrouped in the tumultuous mid-1940s around the young Nahuel Moreno’s Grupo Obrero 
Marxista (GOM). Moreno had participated in both tendencies at different times, and as the 
leader of the small GOM, he pushed his group not only to familiarize itself with the debates 
over the question of national liberation, but to study industrial and agrarian censuses. In his 
efforts, he enlisted a brilliant young Marxist named Milcíades Peña to help with the research, 
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and the pair issued a series of pamphlets in 1948 firmly rejecting any “feudal” Latin 
American history. Frondizi had a partly collaborative, partly contentious relationship toward 
the Moreno Trotskyist sect. He drew heavily from their ideas and incorporated them into his 
own work. Peña even helped with the redaction of a crucial chapter of Frondizi’s opus. He 
contributed to their theoretical journal Estrategia, but he never joined the movement and was 
denounced by Peña in the late 1950s as a “petty-bourgeois” intellectual. However, there is no 
doubt that the exchange of ideas among Frondizi and Peña was a fruitful one, and both 
authors produced major works in the 1950s that must be included in any discussion of the 
origins and development of the concept of dependency in Latin America. 
Less directly concerned with the feudal or capitalist nature of Latin American 
colonialism, Frondizi’s contribution to the dependency perspective rested on his close 
attention to twentieth century Argentine political developments in relation to overall 
processes within global capitalism. His theory of “global capitalist integration” (integración 
capitalista mundial), formed in the late 1940s in polemic with the Stalinists, provided the 
central organizing thread of his analysis. He argued that, whereas advanced capitalist nations 
made their bourgeois-democratic revolutions in a period of capitalist ascendency, semi-
colonial countries would have to do so in a period of extreme capitalist crisis, which could be 
interpreted as an argument that Latin America remained “pre-capitalist.”269 The analysis 
undoubtedly contained elements of a “metropolis-satellite” model, as demonstrated for 
example in his discussion of how the spread of railroads under English capital turned Buenos 
Aires and, to a lesser extent, el Litoral into “privileged appendices of imperialism, 
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intermediaries and minor co-participants in the exploitation and ‘colonization’ of the less 
favored regions.”270 Moreover, the theory of global integration contained some overlap with 
Sweezy’s and Baran’s analysis of monopoly capitalism. Concentration of industry accounted 
for the U.S. rapid rise to unchallenged leader of the capitalist world.271 Monopolization of the 
economy produced something like fascism domestically within the United States, a 
phenomenon most fully expressed in the direct merger between monopoly and government in 
the Eisenhower administration.272 The massive disparity between Washington and other 
capitalist powers mitigated the conflictual nature of imperialism for a prolonged period, and 
the multilateral institutional regime established after World War Two reflected the U.S. 
government’s efforts to institutionalize its dominant position by facilitating the smooth 
functioning of globally integrated capitalism.273 This regime enabled Washington to 
“manipulate for its own benefit the terms of trade with Latin American countries, because of 
technical superiority and dominion of the global market.” This latter sentence reveals 
Frondizi unique, independent arrival at the well-known structuralist observation that 
deteriorating terms of trade on world markets constituted the central mechanism through 
which U.S.-based monopoly capital exploited the periphery. 
 In Frondizi’s work, the concept of “dependence” referred not to the exploitative 
structure of the world market, per se, but rather to the behavior of domestic ruling classes in 
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relation to that structure.274 For Frondizi, Stalinism obfuscated a long tradition in Marxist 
thought viewing the problem of revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries as 
essentially one of the bourgeois inability to assume leadership of the “bourgeois-democratic” 
revolution.275 Relegation to the periphery of the global economy did not preclude Argentine 
industrialization, but rather that industrialization took place under the auspices of foreign and 
domestic capital reinforcing the primary export sector of the economy, linking the interests of 
Argentine capitalist landowners, urban merchants, and industrialists into the integrating 
global economy. The transition from Britain to the U.S. as the dominant source of foreign 
capital entailed a shift in the imperatives of imperialism. The high level of concentration of 
U.S. capital necessitated the export of heavy industry and decreasing the production costs of 
raw materials flowing into the metropolitan center. These increasing opportunities for 
industrialization within the new globally integrated economic regime created greater tensions 
among the various sectors of Argentine capital, as the landowning class with its political 
authority in the countryside dependent upon rural labor had reason to resent to the growing 
urban industry.276 Peronism arose as the mediating factor of these various capitalist fractions, 
and represented the ultimate expression of a local class alliance intent on preserving the 
status quo even at the cost of remaining subordinated to the global capitalist metropolis. 
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Typically considered the originator of the thesis of Latin American colonial 
capitalism, Sergio Bagú in reality developed his thoughts at the same historical moment in 
which Frondizi had an early version of La Realidad Argentina in draft form, and Peña and 
Moreno had already formalized early Argentine Trotskyist debates over “national liberation” 
into a series of pamphlets resoundingly rejecting the notion of an Argentine feudal history.277 
A combination of archival research from the colonial era and an impressive synthesis of 
relevant English, Spanish and Portuguese language historical literature, Bagú’s intervention 
built on narrower regional empirical economic histories of various Latin American countries 
from the 1920s and 1930s, and stands as a testament to the cumulative nature of historical 
scholarship. The fact that Bagú’s book has fared better than Frondizi’s or Peña’s work in 
historical memory can perhaps be attributed to its more academic and less overtly polemical 
nature, but a contemporary political perspective is nonetheless discernible in the text. In a 
thinly-veiled defense of socialism, the book begins with a survey of the social, political and 
economic structures of pre-colonial South and Central American civilizations. Hearkening 
back to Mariátegui’s admiration for pre-colonial Peruvian civilization, Bagú portrayed 
ancient Aztec civilization as a centrally planned economy built atop a foundation in 
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communal agriculture and virtually free of unemployment or hunger. Far from “backward,” 
the Aztecs represented the high point of Latin American civilization, and indeed stood 
superior to any modern society in its lack of scarcity.278 
 Analytically, Economía de la Sociedad Colonial contains many of the insights of 
dependency scholarship, and empirically it laid the foundation for later works, but its 
exclusive focus on the colonial era sets it apart. For Bagú, the history of the development of 
the colonial political economic structure cannot be told independently from that of the 
political economic evolution of the Spanish and Portuguese metropolises, in turn only 
comprehensible in relation to “Occidental Europe.” Apparently unfamiliar with Maurice 
Dobb’s concurrent work, Bagú draws on some of the same literature as Dobb, but ultimately 
his analysis of why Spain and Portugal became raw material exporters to English capitalism 
rather than manufacturing centers lacks Dobb’s close, consistent attention to the 
contingencies of class conflict in the historical process. The Reconquista effectively inverted 
Iberian feudalism relative to the rest of Europe. Resistance weakened the control of feudal 
lords in the ninth, tenth and eleventh centuries, then later belatedly strengthened them at the 
hands of a crown indebted for support.279 The final re-conquest took place against the 
dissolution of feudalism in occidental Europe, which Bagú portrayed as essentially an 
evolutionary, objective process of the growth of market economy. Like Dobb, Bagú located 
early merchant capital in the Hanseatic League and Italian cities, but unlike Dobb he did not 
explicitly question the theoretical link between trade and accumulation, although the implicit 
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assumption clearly emerged that exchange, in and of itself a value-producing activity, 
produced the profits that allowed a continuous merchant accumulation to slowly facilitate the 
spread of markets and the corollary erosion of local autonomy on which feudal production 
depends.280  
 Yet, in Bagú’s work we see the limits of comparing the “transition debate” to 
dependency as a conceptual framework for understanding the unique trajectory of capitalist 
development in what is now the global south. Much of the Sweezy/Dobb debate hinged on 
competing interpretations of the spread of markets as an objective historical force in the 
disintegration of the feudal social order. For Sweezy, expansion of markets incentivized 
production for export, eroding the localized political authority central to the feudal order. For 
Dobb, money economy and markets themselves could not possibly have that effect without 
the prior transition to a class of free laborers selling their labor power on the market, which 
itself must be explained as the contingent outcome of class struggles in the feudal 
countryside in various parts of Europe. As Bagú showed, the discussion simply does not 
pertain to the formation or motives of the Latin American colonial ruling class. The latter 
came into the world already linked to the growing sphere of circulation, and the presence of a 
ruling class consistently looking to maximize gains on exports to some degree accounts for 
the formation of the subsequent economic structure. Yet, while the market was important, so 
were labor systems, and Bagú’s history bears little resemblance to the formalistic 
“metropolis-satellite” model often associated with dependency theory. Thus, for example, 
where mobilization of colonial labor did not lend itself to concentration, self-sufficiency and 
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repressive exploitation of labor characteristic of feudal modes of production, such as mining 
economies in Peru and Mexico, towns developed to supply wage workers with their material 
goods. In the Brazilian economy, based on large, isolated sugar plantations with slavery or 
slave-like labor conditions, production was as much tied to the international market, but no 
towns were erected and plantation owners exerted monopoly control over both sugar exports 
and imports of supplies for the largely self-sufficient estate.281 Here, in the work of Bagú, we 
see attention to the variation in agriculture labor systems that would preoccupy dependency 
and modes of production theorists in the early 1970s. 
 
Taking on the Myth of Feudalism 
 Frank’s tool set for interpreting these multi-faceted, long-running, complex debates 
over Latin American history and development policies did not include Marxist analytic 
categories, nor much knowledge in the intricacies of inter-party polemic. As a graduate 
student in economics, Frank had not studied Marx or any of the classic Marxist writings on 
imperialism, as he himself repeatedly admitted to Sweezy.282 He became a proponent of 
socialist revolution as a product of his times, based on his favorable impressions of the 
Cuban revolution and his disillusion with what he saw as the hypocrisy and contradictions of 
American foreign policy during the Cold War. Yet, his distaste for Cold War hypocrisy 
extended to the Soviet Union, which Frank had visited twice for research. He had 
undisguised disdain for many self-proclaimed Marxists in Latin America, who he viewed as 
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dogmatic and unoriginal thinkers. In particular, he resented the Brazilian Communist Party 
members, whose rigid adherence to Marx’s formula of historical stages led them to reject 
Frank’s “revisionist” thesis that later industrializing countries had skipped the feudal stage 
and been incorporated directly into a global system of mercantile capitalism.  
Sweezy instantly supported Frank’s vision underlying his “myth of feudalism” piece. 
He encouraged Frank’s effort to recast Latin American institutions as a product of the 
historical development of capitalism- as a consequence rather than cause of 
underdevelopment- but urged Frank to situate his work as a contribution to the Marxist 
tradition rather than a refutation. Over the next couple years, as Frank wrote the other articles 
that would go into CU, Sweezy worked closely to give the various pieces theoretical 
coherence, and he systematically pushed Frank toward a certain conception of Marxism. For 
Sweezy, the idea that development and underdevelopment are two sides of the same coin had 
precedent in Marx’s conception of primary (not primitive) accumulation.283 This 
interpretation of primitive accumulation was not uncontroversial. In the late 1940s Sweezy 
had invoked primitive accumulation in his polemic with Dobb.284 As Robert Brenner would 
note later in the 1970s, Sweezy’s conception that primitive accumulation, the literal 
extraction of resources from colonies, fed early industrialization linked directly to his belief 
that the spread of markets provided the crucial stimulus to capitalist development.285 Sweezy 
pushed Frank to engage this theoretical tradition by reading Volume I of Capital, and Rosa 
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Luxemburg’s Accumulation of Capital, which perhaps not coincidentally are the only two 
works of classical Marxism to make it into the “References Cited” section of the published 
book. 
Frank engaged non-academic, or at least only partially academic, Latin American 
Marxism in the period immediately preceding his theoretical discovery, which raises some 
crucial issues for understanding the reception of dependency theory in the United States. It is 
possible to tell the story of Frank’s world-systemic turn almost wholly without Prebischian 
structuralism acting as a spur or stimulant in any way. In fact, structuralism had been 
circulating in North American academic thought for some time, and neither Frank nor anyone 
other development economist (possibly excepting Paul Baran) leveraged those insights into a 
break with the discrete comparative method that dominated the academic discipline. Frank’s 
major intellectual break emerged out of the cognitive dissonance he experienced through 
close engagement with the programmatic implications of the Marxist version of analytical 
nation-statism. Frank pitted his ideas against proponents of Latin American feudalism, the 
party-liners who heckled him in 1963, who for their part simply applied the Stalinist version 
of historical materialism to their interpretation of Latin American history. The latter suffered 
not simply from a “dogmatic” application of the historical stages sketched by Marx, but also 
by the reified nation-state as the domain in which that historical progression unfolded, in 
relative isolation from processes adhering at the level of capitalism as a world-system. Before 
opting out of the life of the North American academic, Frank was too close to development 
economics to launch a critique that went to the heart of its basic assumptions. His first 
serious engagement with Latin American anti-Stalinist Marxist thought generated new 
insights and comparisons. 
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Frank and his wife moved to Rio de Janeiro in August of 1963, where he acquired a 
working space at the Latin American Center for Research in the Social Sciences to pursue his 
work on the historical sources of underdevelopment, a job secured through his connection to 
Stavenhagen who also worked at the center.286 Frank’s ideas on underdevelopment had been 
germinating in Brasilia, and he tried to respond to Sweezy’s attempts to get him to engage 
Marxism but claimed he was unable to do so in underdeveloped Brasilia, which lacked any 
adequate libraries to support his reading agenda. In Rio, he began reading works which 
synthesized the classical Marxist positions on imperialism, noting favorably the influence of 
Demetrio Boersner’s “Los Países Subdesarrollados en las doctrinas socialistas,” and the work 
of the brothers Silvio and Arturo Frondizi.287 Paul Baran came to Rio in September of 1963, 
and Frank talked to him several times about his changing views on underdevelopment. 
Shortly after Baran left and having accessed some fresh materials unavailable in Brasilia, 
Frank sat down in October for three solid weeks of writing, out of which he produced a 150-
page manuscript that, once broken up into separate pieces and seriously reworked, formed 
the first draft of some of his most important works.288 
As Frank’s manuscripts poured into Monthly Review’s office in New York in late 
1963 and early 1964, Sweezy and his team edited Frank’s work, provided feedback and 
reading suggestions, and pushed Frank toward a Marxist line. Frank wrote poorly, especially 
in draft form. The task of cleaning up his manuscripts tried the patience of every editor he 
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worked with. Jack Rackliffe, to whom much of the stylistic editing work fell, hated Frank, 
calling him “that little fucking martyr,” among other equally ungracious nicknames.289 
Amazed that Frank had the audacity to ask Rackliffe if he knew of any university work in 
Canada, the latter wrote to Sweezy: “One of the most restful things about metropolitan 
Toronto is the fact that Gunder ain’t here, and I don’t look forward to seeing this happy 
situation changed.”290 Even in the cleaned up versions, Frank’s writing never achieved much 
elegance or grace, not due to lack of effort on Rackliffe’s part.  
 Frank responded sensitively, and sometimes almost violently, to criticism. He 
claimed to solicit and even welcome constructive criticism of the content, but when it came 
he invariably became defensive. He deflected Sweezy’s and Huberman’s critiques by 
attributing the sloppy presentation and thin content of his manuscripts to the working 
conditions in underdeveloped Latin America. Criticisms of his style infuriated him. Tasked 
with working his contributions into printable form, Sweezy and Huberman repeatedly asked 
Frank to be more professional in his presentation. Frank saw this as nitpicking. “If you want 
to learn something about underdeveloped countries that is not available from Harvard, 
Michigan State, or Washington,” Frank told Sweezy, “you may have to learn that you are 
likely also to receive the stuff in underdeveloped form.”291 Frank responded somewhat 
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differently to Sweezy’s substantive critiques of Frank’s ambiguous relationship to Marxism. 
He still tried to defend himself, insisting that his work was substantively different from 
Marxism as he understood it, but conceded that he knew little about it. In response to 
Sweezy’s efforts to get him to situate his work within the Marxist tradition, Frank responded 
“I cannot, at this time, fulfill the task you set me of pointing out to my readers…that what I 
say is true Marxism, the tradition extended, rather than revisionism. I can’t because I don’t 
know the tradition. I am trying to find out what it is, but that takes time.”292 Again, he 
attributed his inability to work his way through Sweezy’s reading lists to the material 
conditions in which he worked, claiming for example that he failed to find a single copy of 
Luxemburg’s book, in any language, anywhere in Brazil.293 
 The manuscript Frank entitled “Capitalism and Underdevelopment” consisted of three 
parts. The last section would eventually be published as a short article under the same name 
in Monthly Review, and consisted of the basic outline of Frank’s thesis. The first section 
would ultimately get scrapped, and the middle section, consisting of a lengthy critique of 
American development studies, would get published originally in the journal Catalyst in 
1967 under the title “Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology.” In 
this article, Frank took aim directly at EDCC, the development studies journal so influential 
at the start of Frank's career. “Sociology of Development,” while not an important positive 
exposition of dependency theory, levels a serious critique against modernization theory along 
many of the same lines that historians would criticize the theory more than forty years later. 
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It is a valuable contribution worth the read for any historian trying to understand 
modernization theory and its response.  
 
Capitalism and Underdevelopment 
 The mid-1960s marked a particularly difficult period of Frank’s life. He left Brazil in 
early 1964, just weeks before the coup that ousted Goulart, and moved first to Mexico in the 
latter half of 1964, then to Santiago in 1965 where Fuentes had family. Frank had published a 
handful of articles, but had not yet made a name for himself as a serious left intellectual and 
had difficulty securing stable work. More than anything he wanted time to work his way 
through his ideas. He had a number of manuscripts in process of editing the sum total of 
which already contained his major contribution to the field, but Frank was a terrible writer 
and his manuscripts needed a heavy overhaul before they could see the light of day.  
 Before he could even think about his manuscripts, Frank needed to provide for his 
material needs and those of his family. Now several years removed from the young man who 
had petulantly resigned from an assistant professorship at MSU, Frank was eager to get back 
into North American academic circles. He sent a form letter off to his affiliates bluntly 
acknowledging his newfound commitments to revolutionary socialism, as he understood it, 
but also appealing for work in whatever capacity he could find it. In the meantime, He 
accepted a short-term job writing a study on Chilean agriculture for $350 from CEPAL, and 
he took a $150 advance from Sweezy based on their informal contract to turn the Brazilian 
feudalism piece into a short book.294 Also, probably largely thanks to behind-the-scenes 
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support from Sweezy, Frank applied to and received a $5000 grant from the Rabinowitz 
Foundation. 295 Harry Magdoff, a Monthly Review affiliate who would soon become the co-
editor following Huberman’s death in 1968, worked for the foundation, which had by 1965 
an established tradition of funding Monthly Review-related projects.  
Throughout most of 1965 Frank tried to fill the gap in his knowledge of Marxist 
theories of imperialism. At the beginning of the year, he had admitted to Sweezy that he had 
never read Marx, Lenin or Luxemburg. By June of that year he claimed in a letter to Hamza 
Alavi, an Indian Marxist and Monthly Review contributor, that he had read Lenin’s 
Imperialism three times, but still had never read Marx.296 In a letter to Sweezy pitching an 
edited volume on imperialism, an idea he harbored for years but never accomplished, Frank 
praised Silvio Frondizi’s “Imperialismo y Burguesía Nacional” from the second volume of 
La Realidad Argentina as “the only serious Marxist attempt to draw on [theories of 
imperialism] and interpret current reality on this continent that I know. Others merely quote 
the masters and then mechanistically apply them supposedly and come out with crap.”297 In 
the chapter Frank mentions, Frondizi concluded that the Argentine anti-imperialist movement 
must struggle against their local bourgeois classes, who had been formed in a subordinate 
position to imperialism and thus had no interest in leading the country in an independent, 
“bourgeois-democratic” revolution. Frank adopted this political conclusion both in CU and in 
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an essay entitled “Who is the Immediate Enemy?”, and it has since been interpreted a major 
thesis underlying “orthodox” dependency theory.298  
Contrasting the way in which the respective authors arrive at the conclusion illustrates 
the differences in their reckoning with Stalinism. Frank, as we have seen, plucked the 
argument wholesale from Frondizi, and juxtaposed it to the Marxist tradition more broadly, 
hailing Frondizi as a rare exception able to apply to Marxist ideas to contemporary problems 
of underdevelopment. Frondizi, in contrast, only arrived at the conclusion through deep 
engagement with a long tradition of Marxist thought on program and tactics of revolutionary 
struggle in the periphery of global capitalism. In his second volume, subtitled La Revolución 
Socialista, Frondizi drew his political conclusions for Argentina through close reading of the 
programs of the entire gamut of Argentine left parties, no matter how small or sectarian. A 
number of Trotskyists and Trotskyist sympathizers, including Peña, helped with the redaction 
of parts of the book.299 He also drew parallels to similar debates in Russia and Eastern 
Europe in the years leading up to the Revolution.300 In short, the political crisis in Argentina 
in the late 1940s represented a particular example of a generally recurring problem for later-
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developing countries within global capitalism, and Marxism as a series of strategic and 
tactical lessons provided valuable tools for understanding and orienting oneself within the 
social dynamics of peripheral capitalism. 
During his precarious year, Frank had also begun to outline his thoughts for applying 
his still developing model of dependency to a case study of Chile. Frank lived in Chile for 
most of 1965, and during that time he took an active interest in Chilean politics and history. 
The political terrain seemed to provide promising ground for the left, which had already 
begun to mobilize around the popular reformist, and self-described Marxist, Salvador 
Allende. Still viewing his main task to be debunking the myth of feudalism, in Frank’s 
reading the “best and most progressive of Chilean economists and historians…say that 
[Chile] used to be a closed economy until, depending on which is speaking, 19, 18, century.” 
Frank told Sweezy in August of 1964 that he had half-written a polemic against this view, in 
which he argued that Chile had since the first encounter with mercantile capital been an 
“open” economy, linked through exports to an expanding capitalist metropolis. Frank 
proposed, and Sweezy agreed, that the piece on Chile and the two he had written on Brazil 
should be combined in a volume to be put out by Monthly Review Press.301 Despite the direct 
pertinence to his earlier debates with Dobb, Sweezy gave no indication either of objecting to 
or supporting the definitions implied in Frank’s use of openness or closure as measures of 
Chilean feudalism and capitalism. Equating links to external markets with capitalism would 
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become a major critique of Frank’s work in the 1970, and Sweezy gave a tacit approval of 
this position.  
At this point, all the features of the argument that would go into Frank’s opus were in 
place. Ultimately, the dual thesis proved just one variant of Frank's larger opponent: Latin 
American historiography that drew on Europe's feudal past to derive categories to describe 
Latin America's political economic institutions. Frank tackled the larger historiography most 
successfully in his essay "Capitalist Development of Underdevelopment in Chile," which he 
wrote in 1964 and 1965 while supported by his Rabinowitz grant. His case study of Chile and 
its Brazilian counterpart marked his most impressive historical work up to that point. Both 
"Capitalist Underdevelopment" essays proceed from the view that the historical development 
of global capitalism explained Latin America's current underdevelopment. Contemporary 
Latin American political economic institutions, such as the latifundia, despite superficial 
similarities to feudal estates, function within and for the purposes of a global capitalist 
system of surplus extraction. Moreover, these specifically Latin American forms of 
mobilizing agricultural labor were formed in and through mercantile colonialism. Unlike the 
closed, autarchical feudal estate, the Chilean Hacienda, a large landed estate run by a patron, 
produced for trade and existed primarily to supply export oriented Chilean urban 
metropolises with their necessary food and raw materials.302  
 Frank's famous metropolis-satellite model came out of his effort to reclassify Latin 
American agricultural institutions as capitalist rather than feudal. The owner of the estate 
exercised monopoly control over tenant farmers and small farm owners on the hacienda. 
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Although admitting that these small farmers produced primarily for themselves, Frank 
insisted that they must be seen as an agricultural working class whose surplus production 
flowed upward to the regional micrometropolis and ultimately to the global 
macrometropolis.303 Frank's study of Latin America's colonial legacy convinced him that the 
capitalist system in the contemporary world functions through a global structure of 
metropolises and satellites. With the US at the pinnacle, as the global metropolis, “a whole 
chain of metropolises and satellites” can be traced all the way down to the level of the most 
rural peasant.304 Even the most rural region, according to Frank's model, links into the global 
capitalist system by producing for a local micrometropolis. The extraction of surplus through 
this global metropolis-satellite structure did not just inhibit economic and social development 
in the third world, it positively precluded it. Frank’s use of the concepts of “surplus” and 
“monopoly” in this analysis come from Baran rather than Marx, drawn from the former’s 
claim that monopoly capitalism creates a consistent inability to produce maximum potential 
surplus, which it would be unable to absorb. Frank’s unfamiliarity with the longer tradition is 
abundantly apparent in the way he uses monopoly, which does not refer as in the work of 
Lenin, or Baran and Sweezy, to a specific historical stage of development of capitalism 
marked by consolidation and concentration, but rather is presented by Frank as a perennial 
feature of capitalism roughly meaning simply any condition of unequal distributions of 
power and control over economic resources.  
 Although the position against feudalism and Frank’s political conclusions were 
influenced by ideas of the Latin American anti-Stalinist left, the presentation remained very 
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much that of a North American development economist attempting to solve the riddle of 
underdevelopment. Throughout the work, there is a certain formalistic, hypothesis-testing 
feel to Frank’s approach toward questions of historical interpretation that do not easily lend 
themselves to that kind of formalism. Latin American historical scholarship is plugged in as 
data in a prolonged string of interrelated “either/or” questions. The reference to Marxist 
categories are clunky add-ons rather than the abstractions framing the historical inquiry. 
There is probably no way of determining how much of an editorial hand Sweezy had on the 
introduction, but there is little doubt that Frank felt compelled to present this as a work of 
Marxism, and that he was not entirely comfortable operating within that tradition. 
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Chapter Five 
Neo-Marxism Embedded: 
Academics, Social Movements, and Reaction in the U.S. and Chile, 1966-1973 
 
As the student movement in the United States radicalized, passing into the “days of 
rage,” its decentralized structure and campus base facilitated the permeation of an academic 
Marxist theory of imperialism tracing its roots to MR’s interpretation of the Cuban 
Revolution. This discourse of neo-imperialism combined the “corporate liberal” 
interpretation of the reformist agenda responsible for pacifying the U.S. worker with the 
definition of “monopoly capitalism” as a mega-metropolis dominating the non-socialist 
world through relations of “neocolonialism” and “dependency.” Student radicals, hyped up 
by the macho, savior image of Castro conveyed by the likes of Mills and Huberman and 
Sweezy, had already proclaimed a “new insurgency” in the early 1960s. As the social crisis 
deepened, the adventurism implicit in this image would become increasingly manifest, 
especially on university campuses. Dependency theory seeped into North American 
academic radical consciousness concurrently with the sharp escalation of student radicalism 
over the war in Vietnam. As student radicals increasingly turned from Castro and Che to Mao 
and Ho Chi Minh as symbolic heroes of the anti-imperialist struggle, academics seized on 
dependency theory to imbue Marxisant anti-imperialist thought with scholarly legitimacy. 
Concurrently, ideas of neocolonialism and dependency framed anti-American 
discourse in the social struggles gaining momentum in South America. Like in the United 
States, dependency theory in Latin America shouldered a dual load, operating simultaneously 
as academic theory of underdevelopment and public rhetoric purporting to offer a 
revolutionary path out of the morass. Unlike in the United States, conventions of Latin 
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American scholarship, informed by the infusion of the Althusserian concept of knowledge 
production as an arena of social struggle, saw this dual role in a less problematic light. 
Scholars of dependency theory established an overtly partisan interdisciplinary research 
center under the auspices of the University of Chile’s economics department, from which 
they mounted a campaign to apply concepts of dependency theory to explore various aspects 
of Chilean national life, and to galvanize the country’s rural and urban proletariat around a 
socialist program. Scholars of dependency, including Ruy Mauro Marini, Vania Bambirra, 
and Theotonio dos Santos, played leading roles in the Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionaria 
(Revolutionary Left Movement, or MIR), which mobilized among the Chilean proletariat to 
push the Allende administration to nationalize industry.  
Neo-imperialist thought operated in different national contexts as either or both anti-
imperialist rhetoric and academic theory of underdevelopment. Each of these contexts 
constituted its own discursive fields, with conventions and literary practices relating to 
different, often implicit goals. As rhetoric in the field of growing social struggles in North 
and South America, it sought to leverage analogies drawn from world-systemic processes to 
clarify the axes of struggle and provide a program and direction for liberation of all 
oppressed groups everywhere. As academic theory, it was judged by the standards and 
practices of problem-solving theory, including the appearance of objectivity and value-
neutral scholarship, and the criterion of falsifiability. It fell short along both dimensions, 
solidifying a program of social struggle in the US that elicited a sharp response from what 
would become the New Right, while posing an academic theory that elicited an equally sharp 
backlash that helped neoliberalism move from the margin to the center in US academic and 
policy-making discourse of Third World development. The dynamics of the multivalent 
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social forces spinning around the axis of neo-imperialist discourse can best be grasped by 
viewing the rhetoric, social science, and political practice of revolution and reaction in the 
U.S. and Chile from the late 1960s to 1973. 
 
Third World Marxism in US Campus Radicalism 
The Sino-Soviet, the Cuban Revolution, and the first articulations of dependency 
theory marked the solidification around “neo-colonialism” as the central concept for 
identifying sources of instability within the capitalist world-system. The premise of neo-
colonialism was expressed succinctly in an editorial in the December 1963 issue of Monthly 
Review: “As long as it remains enmeshed in the capitalist world market, an underdeveloped 
country is ipso facto a subject of imperialist exploitation (manipulated prices for its exports 
and monopoly prices for its imports).”305 Neo-Marxists posited markets as an ipso facto 
mechanism of exploitation. Previously, Smithian/Ricardian theory saw them as a mechanism 
for extending and deepening the division of labor, and initiating the virtuous cycle of 
capitalist development.306 Most pre-Stalinist Marxist theoreticians saw markets as the 
regulating mechanism for the already-established capitalist mode of production, unfolding 
and extending as class conflict in pre-capitalist modes forced workers to sell their labor 
power for wages. For classical Marxist theorists of imperialism, including Lenin and 
Hilferding, markets did not penetrate and transform pre-capitalist societies, but rather served 
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as an indicator of underlying social transformations that had already occurred, as the 
outcome of social struggles, which created the mutual dependence between wage laborers 
and capital on which all processes of capitalism ultimately depend.307 Popular Front 
Marxists, Stalinism as a theory of imperialism, wondered if markets had already become 
obsolete, transplanted by a corporatist economic structure that dampened, if not outright 
eliminated, competition (thus supplanting the law of value as the regulating mechanism). 
With the neo-imperialist formulation, the relation of states and, ultimately, sub-state actors 
would no longer be taken as a given. It would not be assumed that markets would do the 
work of infusing precapitalist societies with the material and cultural benefits of capitalism, 
nor that social groups dependent on the world market for significant portions of the material 
subsistence need necessarily have undergone the same historical trajectories as Western 
capitalism, nor even that the law of value, riddled with contradictions, had exhausted its 
historic mission in the world economy. 
Latin America continued to play an important symbolic role, as the most proximate 
and familiar site of anti-imperialist guerrilla warfare. Monthly Review’s early predictions 
proved prescient, and approaching mid-decade virtually everyone agreed that Castro headed 
a “socialist” regime of some sort. Academic New Leftists seamlessly wove together the 
emerging strands of dependency theory and neocolonialism in their interpretation of the 
significance of Latin American struggles against neo-imperialism. The fall 1964 issue of 
Studies on the Left, devoted entirely to Latin American struggles, illustrates the extent to 
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which Latin American dependency theory, and Frank’s work specifically, had already made 
its way into the analyses of the leading theoretical organ of the New Left. James O’Connor 
and Timothy Harding, who would both make successful academic careers in the 1970s as 
experts in Latin America and theorists of imperialism, took the lead. In two articles, one 
surveying political developments across the region and one offering a historical analysis of 
“The Foundations of Cuban Socialism,” O’Connor demonstrated how the resurgence of pre-
Stalinist conceptions of class structures and alliances intermingled with the circulationist 
concepts of dependency theory in the rhetoric of neocolonialism in the US. In both articles, 
O’Connor identified “the failure of the continent’s national bourgeoisie” and “the ascendancy 
of United States neocolonialism” as the dual determining factors necessary to comprehend 
the logic and trajectory of political movements.308 In an indication he closely followed Latin 
American intellectual trends, he already employed categories of dependency theory to link 
neocolonialism to the specific national class structure of various countries, two full years 
before English-language versions of the major works of dependency theory began circulating 
in North American social science. Imperialism operated through “extensions of the 
metropolitan economy” and “integration of satellite economies,” through which it created a 
situation of “dependence” the end goal of which was the extraction of “surplus.”309 Countries 
in the region could be classified according to their subjugation within this 
neocolonial/dependent structure, and these classifications could in turn explain the likelihood 
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of a class formation conducive to producing a class willing to lead the way in economic and 
land reform.310 
From 1965 to 1966, Baran’s and Sweezy’s ‘opus’ finally saw the light of day, first in 
chapter extracts in Monthly Review then in full in 1966. The product of at least fifteen years 
of intellectual collaboration, the opus came out under the Monthly Review Press in 1966 
under the title Monopoly Capital, and appeared on the scene at a propitious moment. 
Monopoly Capital wove together all the strands of 1950s radical thought into coherent, up-to-
date defense of Marxist political economy, as understood by the authors. It simultaneously 
rationalized Third World nationalism, the Civil Rights movement, and campus radicalism as 
the legitimate inheritors of the revolutionary Marxist vanguard. As in Political Economy of 
Growth, the effort rested on the theoretical move of discarding the Marxist theory of surplus-
value in favor of Baran’s theory of surplus, which the authors now clearly defined as “the 
difference between what a society produces and the cost of producing it.”311 All societies 
throughout human history have produced surplus, and looking at their “modes of utilization 
of surplus” offers the best way to tie together a society’s economic foundation and its 
“political, cultural and ideological superstructure.”312 Whatever its independent theoretical 
value, by its formulation in Monopoly Capital it is clear that “surplus” departed significantly 
from Marx’s concept of “surplus-value,” on which the entirety of Capital hinged. To put it 
simply, Baran and Sweezy measured surplus in terms of prices and quantities of material 
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goods produced, while Marx measured surplus-value in terms of quantities of labor. The 
“transformation” problem—whereby “value” in terms of labor is transformed into prices and 
costs of production—has always proved a theoretical sticking point for Marxist political 
economists. Baran and Sweezy simply theorized it out of existence by erecting their political 
economy of neo-imperialism on the conceptual foundation with more direct, immediately 
observable empirical referents. 
 Beginning with a model constructed around corporate monopoly as the central unit of 
the American economy, Baran and Sweezy engaged economic literature on market structure 
to develop a prolonged argument that capitalism in its monopoly phase continued to organize 
production in the interests of private owners, and thus institutionalized rather than superseded 
the capitalist function. They rejected all notions that modern corporations, under the control 
of socially responsible technocrats, made productive decisions based on broad social interests 
as opposed to profit of controlling interests. Against anti-trust laws, oligopolies set prices 
through “tacit collusion” following the lead of a price setter. Where tacit collusion under 
price leadership breaks down, the state steps in to set prices in an optimal range. Rejecting 
theories of state capitalism, Baran and Sweezy insisted that the state intervenes on behalf of 
corporate interests, not autonomously in the interests of a plurality of social forces. They 
employed this analysis of monopoly market structure to lay the basis for their central claim, 
that monopoly capitalism continued to spur innovation through structural pressures on 
corporations to reduce production costs, which in turn generated a constant increase in 
surplus (quantity of goods greater than the sum total required for all aspects of reproduction) 
which must be either consumed, invested, or wasted. All irrationalities they had witnessed, or 
read about, they ultimately attributed to this central, structural contradiction between the 
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ever-expanding surplus and the relatively more limited means of disposing of it. In its 
monopoly phase, a corporate capital-bourgeois state fusion could regulate output by 
operating below full capacity and maintain demand by manipulating middle-class consumer 
sensibilities. Thus, monopoly capital would be mired in prolonged stagnation rather than 
periodic crisis. 
 Following on the wake of the publication of Monopoly Capital, Sweezy and Harry 
Magdoff were invited as keynote speakers at the first major regional REP conference. The 
New York SDS organized the conference, which was held in McCosh Hall at Princeton 
University February 17-19, 1967. According to the diligent, descriptive reporting of CIA spy 
Alice Widener, the conference kicked off Friday night with a panel discussing the “Port 
Authority Statement.” Authors David Gilbert, Robert Gottlieb, and Gerry Tenney were 
affiliated with the so-called “praxis axis,” or the group within the increasingly factionalized 
student movement pushing for more theoretical engagement with Marxism to develop a 
clearer, centralized program for the unwieldy movement. Gilbert, Gottlieb and Tenney hosted 
the panel, and received comments from Columbia University economist Alexander Ehrlich, 
whose most famous book identified intellectual antecedents to development economics in the 
Soviet Industrialization debates. The CIA informant interpreted Magdoff’s and Sweezy’s 
prominent role in the conference as evidence that SDS was serving as a communist front 
organization. Widener objected most heartily to speakers who characterized the United States 
as the “monster,” defined as “American corporate capitalism.”313 She also took umbrage with 
regular use of the term “corporate liberalism,” which she interpreted (not completely 
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inaccurately) as “American businessmen’s support of measures that improve our economic 
and social system.”314 Monopoly Capital stood at the theoretical center of these offenses, and 
Sweezy’s “tortured Marxist dialectic” was the source of “miscalling of simple truth” at the 
heart of the “ritualistic intellectual process throughout the SDS-REP conference.”315  
 There is some truth to the CIA’s interpretation, as the REP represented a moment in 
which factions of New Left campus radicalism began to cohere around ideas rooted in 
Popular Front Stalinism as it had evolved throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Magdoff, who 
joined Monthly Review’s two-person editorial board following Leo Huberman’s death in 
1968, had professional and personal ties to the left-wing law firm of Rabinowitz and Boudin. 
Founded by partners Victor Rabinowitz and Leonard Boudin, Rabinowitz and Boudin was an 
essentially pro-Stalinist firm dedicated to defending civil liberties of Communists and 
radicals. Leonard Boudin was the nephew of pre-Soviet-era Socialist Party theoretician Louis 
Boudin, whose strident criticism of the nationalistic turn in the Second International and his 
1916 book War and Socialism marked among the first U.S.-based original contributions to 
the Marxist theory of imperialism. Representing the left in the Socialist Party, Louis Boudin 
sympathized with the Bolsheviks and supported the formation of the Communist Party, 
though he would become inactive beyond teaching at New York workers’ school in the 
1920s. Victor Rabinowitz, a CP member for most of his life, began his legal career at the 
elder Boudin’s firm in the 1930s. In addition to his legal work, Rabinowitz created a 
foundation to fund left-wing projects. Magdoff served on the board of the Rabinowitz 
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foundation in the late 1950s and 1960s until he joined the staff of Monthly Review, in which 
capacity he secured research grants for many projects that would be published by Monthly 
Review Press, including Frank’s Capitalism and Underdevelopment. Among other things, 
Magdoff’s work for the Rabinowitz Foundation secured deep ties to New York intellectual 
Stalinism, and facilitated personal connections with the radicalizing segments of SDS 
through, for example, Leonard Boudin’s daughter Kathy Boudin, who become a founder of 
the Weather Underground. 
 Best known intellectually for his New Imperialism, Magdoff contributed to more 
overtly packing discussions of Third World liberation within the frame of the classical 
Marxist theory of imperialism. Trained as a mathematician, and employed for a period as the 
statistician for the Works Progress Administration, he had the methodological savvy 
necessary to validate his claims of American empire with extensive concrete empirical 
referents, precisely the task Baran and Sweezy had avoided in formulating the abstractions 
behind their opus. He was deeply embedded in the New York Jewish intellectual left, and 
held temporary teaching positions intermittently throughout the 1960s at Columbia and the 
New School. His breakout as a publicly known left-wing scholar/journalist came with a 1965 
article published in Monthly Review, and a review of Monopoly Capital published in the 
journal Economic Development and Culture Change still under the editorship of Frank’s old 
advisor Bert Hoselitz.  
 From the mid-to-late 1960s the Neo-Marxist theory of imperialism, rooted ultimately 
in the belief that anti-American nationalist movements provided the only hope for world 
revolution, would exert increasing influence over the line of campus radicalism. Speaking at 
the Princeton REP conference headlined by Sweezy and Magdoff, SDS president Gregory 
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Calvert vented his skepticism over the prospects for locating a viable “agent of social 
transformation” in the US white working class. The implications were dire. Absent such a 
movement, spoke Calvert, “individuals with revolutionary hopes and perspectives must 
orient themselves toward Third-World revolutions and develop those methods of activity 
which will maximize the impact of peasant-based revolutions on the structure of the 
American imperialist monster.”316 The “Port Authority Statement,” first delivered at the same 
conference, reflected the strong influence Monthly Review and Studies on the Left exerted on 
the praxis axis formulations of monopoly capitalism, corporate liberalism, and imperialism, 
which the authors presented as a set of interrelated structural elements determining more 
superstructural social features such as alienation and the forms of social control. While 
authors such as Herbert Marcuse and David Riesman, typically cited as foundational in New 
Left thought, did make their way into the analysis, in general the authors sought to 
incorporate their insights into a “schematic model” grounded in the first instance on the 
structural logic of capitalism.317 
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The growing influence of the Monthly Review perspective came to a head at the last 
conference of the SDS, in June of 1969. The group with the strongest ties to the New York 
intellectual currents who had their formative years in Popular Front Marxism showed up to 
the convention with a controversial position paper to which historians have largely attributed 
the breakup of the 1960s student radical movement.318 Though historians have (fairly) 
criticized the paper, “You Don’t Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind 
Blows,” as a largely incoherent and rambling document, they have devoted insufficient 
attention to its intellectual pedigree, especially considering the perhaps exaggerated role they 
have attributed to it as the harbinger of discord in “the movement.” The faction that would 
soon form an independent organization called Weatherman (later Weather Underground) 
drafted the document discursively in opposition primarily to the “labor metaphysic” program 
proffered by Progressive Labor. To the extent that the document offered a program, it derived 
from the theory that contemporary social struggles would revolve around the axis of national 
liberation from imperialist oppression.319  
 On the question of the revolutionary agent, “Weatherman” thus represented the 
culmination more than the negation of the social theory that had guided SDS since Port 
Huron. Informed by the heavy influence of Mills and Williams, and the steady if more 
marginal dialogue with MR, the leading intellectual cadre of the student movement had long 
been receptive to critiques of US culpability in the Cold War- at least as equal partner if not 
                                                 
318 See especially: Giltin, Sixties, 384-91. 
 
319 Karen Ashley et al., “You Don’t Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind 
Blows,” in Jacobs ed., Weatherman, 51-90 at 51 [originally published in New Left Notes, 
June 18, 1969]. 
  
231 
 
aggressor- while more skeptical of the value of the Marxist analysis of the working class as 
the agent of revolutionary change. The monopoly capitalism and corporate liberalism theses 
worked in public discourse to a single end; they explained the reactionary nature of the U.S. 
working class in terms of the political economy of capitalist accumulation on a global scale 
and a class analysis of the redistributive policies of the New Deal state. By the 1969 
conference, the Weatherman faction had thoroughly assimilated these theoretical postulates, 
and drawn out their logical conclusions for the best way for students to fight capitalism from 
within, without the help of a progressive working class. They explicitly employed concepts 
of corporate liberalism, and the monopoly capitalism theory of crisis as “gradual 
deterioration” rather than cyclical disruptions. In an article written by future Weatherman Jim 
Mellon and published in New Left Notes in preparation for the 1969 convention, whole 
passages came directly from Monopoly Capital. The final section, entitled “Crisis of 
Capitalism,” was, in fact, simply a brief synopsis of Baran and Sweezy’s book, which posited 
a capitalist system no longer driven by price competition, mired in permanent stagnation due 
to insufficient outlets for growing surplus, and a resulting authoritarian government run by a 
wasteful military-industrial complex.320 In the abstract, the Weathermen argued the 
overwhelming majority of the U.S. had become working class, and thus had an “objective” 
interest in socializing the means of production.321 Subjectively, however, the American 
working class had been led into “false consciousness” because of its privileged position 
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internationally. It was up to the student movement to agitate the monster from within, making 
it more difficult for Washington to prosecute imperialist wars, and thus debilitating its 
method for alleviating its own internal contradictions.322 It would be difficult to overstate the 
extent to which this represented a wholesale adoption of every aspect of the theory 
propagated by the MR school since their intervention into public discourse surrounding the 
Cuban Revolution. 
 Weatherman’s program, so misguided in retrospect, flowed logically from their 
theory, which in broad contours reflected that of SDS more generally. Locating the central 
axis of bourgeois/proletarian antagonism at the level of the struggle among nation-states, 
movement intellectuals appropriated concepts of international relations to cognize more local 
forms of oppression. The concepts of “colony” and “caste” pervaded discussions of racial 
and sexual (not yet gender) axes of repression. Much of neo-imperialist theory rested on the 
notion that the capitalist system depended, objectively, on the super-exploitation of colonized 
workers. Different thinkers in different parts of the world varied widely in their description 
of the mechanisms of super-exploitation, and in their explanations of the precise 
contradictions that objectively compelled capitalism to extract super-profits from colonized 
peoples. Yet, in general, all rested on the same assumption, tracing ultimately to Luxemburg, 
that the system depended “objectively” on such exploitation, without which it would be 
unable to resolve its central contradiction between the growing ability to produce and 
relatively more limited ability to consume. Weatherman and the Revolutionary Youth 
Movement internalized the political economic assumption that capitalism could only 
                                                 
322 Ashley, “Weatherman,” 52. 
  
233 
 
overcome its “basic contradiction” through super-exploitation, which they extended to super-
exploitation of women and people of color domestically.323 According to this logic, black 
people face conditions that are not those of being part of a class, but rather are those of being 
a “colony.”324 Consciousness of this super-exploitation would arise as “self-determination,” 
meaning super-exploited groups would mobilize and wage their struggles against imperialism 
separately under the mobilizing rhetoric of nationalism, not proletarian transnationalism.325 
White revolutionaries should allow all nationalist movements to unfold, while supporting 
them through adventurist agitation to impede the monster’s ability to repress and re-
assimilate super-exploited colonial subjects. 
 
Dependency Theory in the Chilean Road to Socialism 
 Concurrent with the radicalization in the United States around a program to disrupt 
and destroy the monster, dependency theorists reconvened in Santiago, Chile and tried to 
embed their theory of global capitalism into the country’s rapidly developing socialist and 
anti-imperialist politics. Following the 1964 military coup, many Brazilian intellectuals 
received asylum in Mexico, making Mexico City- in particular the School of Economics of 
the Autonomous National University of Mexico (UNAM) and the Center of International 
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Studies of the College of Mexico (CEI)- a temporary locus for the continuing development of 
what was already being called dependency theory. Ruy Mauro Marini narrowly escaped 
Brazil by clandestinely seeking asylum from the Mexican embassy in Brasilia in the middle 
of the night, hours after being liberated from his arrest by a declaration of habeas corpus of 
the Supreme Federal Tribunal. In Mexico City, he reunited with Frank, then a visiting 
professor at UNAM, who introduced him into intellectual circles and helped him secure a 
position at the CEI. Marini’s clout grew at CEI as he published a string of articles analyzing, 
according to the categories of dependency, the political circumstances in Brazil leading up 
the coup. In addition, he produced one important theoretical piece that contributed to 
growing debates within the dependency camp, that would be translated into English and 
published in MR.326  
 Marini’s first efforts in exile sought to sum up the lessons of the Brazilian coup. As in 
the case of the Argentine anti-Stalinist left, the concept of dependency provided Marini with 
a tool for framing his analysis of the social roots of Brazilian political formations. Although 
certainly containing many of the elements of the dependency approach, Marini’s main 
contributions to understanding the Brazilian path to military dictatorship resembled nothing 
of dependency theory as a positivist model. His dissatisfaction with the prevailing consensus, 
which saw the coup as a successful effort by the US to exert control over Brazilian politics, 
inspired Marini to sketch a Marxist interpretation of twentieth century Brazilian politics, as 
he understood it. “In a world characterized by interdependence,” he wrote in 1965, “nobody 
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denies the influence of international factors on internal questions, above all as it pertains to 
the so-called ‘dominant’ or ‘metropolitan’ economies and an underdeveloped country. But, in 
what manner is this influence exercised? What weight does it have compared to specific 
internal factors of the society on which it acts?”327  
Marini unveiled his analysis of the social roots of the Brazilian dictatorship through a 
series of articles published in 1965 and 1966. Primarily published in Spanish in Latin 
American journals and political periodicals, except one English-language piece published in 
Monthly Review, the five articles rely on the same narrative structure, differing only slightly 
in their focus.328 In coming to terms with his country’s tragedy, as he saw it, Marini relied on, 
advanced, and gave substantive content to some of the central concepts of dependentismo. 
The narrative arc of his history focused closely on the inter- and intra-class coalitions behind 
successive Brazilian political formations, and the root causes of the social antagonisms that 
led those moments of stability to break down. Catalyzed by the emergence of a nascent 
industrial bourgeoisie in the early decades of the twentieth century, hegemonic blocs arose 
and fell out of the complicated efforts to formulate policies conducive both to the goals of the 
industrialists and those of the traditional landowning oligarchy, the latter of which found its 
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main economic base in the export of agriculture, particularly coffee. For Marini, ‘external 
factors,’ such as the price of coffee on the world market, influenced and shaped, but did not 
determine in any rigid sense, the motives of Brazilian ruling elites. Prices on international 
markets for agricultural exports and for the imported heavy equipment required for 
industrialization mitigated the relative strength of agriculture and industry in the ruling 
coalition, shaped tariff policy and created specific balance of payments and foreign exchange 
pressures. The latter, foreign exchange pressures, were resolved in part through “Instruction 
113,” opening the country to foreign investment, under which circumstance foreign capital 
played an important role in the domestic conflicts, as neither an external factor nor a wholly 
internal one.  
While external pressures run consistently through Marini’s analysis, internal class 
structure and conflict constitute the core analytical thread. The structure of landownership 
played a big part in the analysis. Industrialists willingly passed on a part of the benefits of 
increased productivity to the countryside, in the form of low prices, to maintain political 
stability, and because of the dependence of the entire economy on the foreign exchange 
brought in from agricultural exports. However, due to the highly-concentrated form of 
landownership, this tenuous arrangement suffered under the weight of its own contradictions. 
The uneven distribution of the benefits of increased productivity in the countryside set 
definite limits to the expansion of the domestic market for manufactures, while 
simultaneously increasing the flow of impoverished agricultural workers into the city, 
swelling the “reserve army” and pressing down on wages. Ultimately, the militarization of 
rural and urban workers forced the hand of the bourgeoisie, and constituted the biggest factor 
in the arrangement that gave heavy support for foreign capital. Reflecting, perhaps, the 
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outlook shaped from his social vantage point as a lifelong academic, Marini gave pride of 
place to the student movement as the locomotive force for Brazilian radical politics. 
Particularly in the period following the coup, he placed his confidence in students as the 
social group most likely to galvanize a democratic movement. Leading by example, taking 
their struggle to the streets, students would attract workers and broader democratic forces in a 
social movement capable of breaking the back of military rule.329 
Marini’s analysis relied heavily on the concept of “integration” of international 
capital. His concept resembled Silvio Frondizi’s “global capitalist integration.” Although 
Marini never cited nor discussed Frondizi, given the latter’s heavy influence on Frank and 
Marini’s participation in Frank’s seminar on the myths and realities of underdevelopment in 
Brasilia, it is fair to say that Frondizi influenced Marini’s thought at least indirectly. In the 
work of both authors, “integration” connoted forging transnational links among various 
national capitalist classes. In Marini’s narrative, it was not a foregone conclusion that the 
Brazilian bourgeoisie would align itself with North American capital, and much of the 
country’s political oscillations can be explained by exploring other options, including 
repeated attempts to pursue a more nationally autonomous development strategy in alliance 
at various moments either with the large-landowners or with labor in a “Popular Front.” 
While the first option- a bourgeois/latifundista alliance- continually butted up against the 
contradictions of the unequal structure of landownership, the prospect of coalition with 
workers posed a threat to profit margins through wage increases and, ultimately, a potential 
challenge to capitalist property relations. Through trial and error, Brazilian industrial capital 
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came to accept the alliance with North American capital, which entailed opening its country 
to finance capital and foreign direct investment. Marini understood that suggesting this level 
of cooperation and coordination among various national capitalists ran the risk of departing 
too far from the classical Marxist theories of imperialism, which, especially in Lenin, insisted 
that interimperialist competition would preclude any such supranational organization of the 
capitalist system. But, again like Frondizi, he viewed integration flowing from the extreme 
concentration of North American capital. In the element of his analysis most heavily 
influenced by the Monthly Review School, Marini believed that this concentration changed 
the imperatives of capitalism, impelling the export of department I capital goods rather than 
opening foreign markets for consumer goods.330 
 Andre Gunder Frank bounced around the Western Hemisphere for a few years while 
waiting for his book to come out. He alternated between temporary teaching appointments- in 
Mexico and at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver- and retrenchment in Chile where 
Marta Fuentes had people. After having secured a research position with the International 
Labor Organization, to study rural labor in Chile, Frank made his way back to Santiago. 
Arriving amidst mounting tension in Chilean politics, Frank was detained for several hours 
the airport, and was only released when then-Senator Salvador Allende, longtime figurehead 
for the coalition of left parties, personally showed up to the airport to have him released.331 
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 In Frank’s absence, his former colleagues, with whom he had initiated the 
dependency theory line out of seminars in Brazil, had flocked to Santiago to work at Latin 
America’s new locus of critical thought: the Centro de Estudios Socioeconomicos (Center for 
Socio-Economic Studies). Founded in 1964 under the auspices of the Faculty of Economics 
at the University of Chile, Santiago, the center quickly attracted leading intellectuals from 
throughout South America, and at various times seminars, conferences and symposiums drew 
radical intellectuals from the United States and Europe, including Italian Lelio Basso, the 
French Marxist economist Charles Bettleheim, and the American radical journalist, our old 
friend Paul Marlo Sweezy. The first director, the Chilean sociologist Eduardo Hamuy, did 
not like the clunky sounding acronym CESEC, and decided instead to brand the research 
center CESO, a play on the Spanish seso meaning brain. “We are the thinking part of the 
faculty,” said Hamuy. “We are the ‘brain’ of the faculty.”332 Reflecting on the center’s 
significance more than twenty years after its destruction at the hands of the Augusto 
Pinochet’s military regime, Marini recalled: “CESO was, in its moment, one of the principal 
intellectual centers of Latin America. The majority of Latin American, European, and United 
States intellectualism, primarily of the left, passed through there, by means of participation in 
talks, conferences, roundtables and seminars.”333 As we will see, Marini’s assessment was 
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fair and accurate, and CESO faculty deserve recognition as pioneers in many ideas that 
trickled into North American, English-language scholarship in the form of “world-system 
analysis” in the 1970s through the work of Samir Amin, Immanuel Wallerstein, Giovanni 
Arrighi, and Andre Gunder Frank.  
 With dependency theory as an overarching theoretical framework, CESO promoted 
engaged scholarship in which academics would elevate national consciousness, and the 
pueblo would expand the perspective and inform the directions of academic research. In the 
first years after its formation, CESO faculty reported the progress of their seminars and 
research clusters, which were published and circulated to the rest of the faculty, first in a very 
informal Bulletin (Boletín), then in the Cuadernos del CESO (Notebooks of CESO), which 
ran for several years and combined finished research with outlines and updates.334 In addition 
to synthesizing and updating faculty on progress, the Bulletins and Notebooks editorialized 
on the ideology behind the research agenda, in what can be considered attempts to solidify 
the faculty around an epistemology of science that emphasized socially engaged scholarship. 
Hamuy, the first Director of CESO, argued that social science must learn to deal with actual 
social problems by directly engaging el pueblo “in a give and take in which academics and 
scientists learn from the people, while simultaneously bringing them the scientific method, 
elevating the level of consciousness, learning the problems, etc.”335 Such a social science, for 
                                                 
334 The entire collection of Boletines and Cuadernos are available at the Chilean National 
Library, as are several documents relating to specific seminars of CESO. All ensuing 
citations of Boletines or Cuadernos del CESO were accessed at the Chilean National Library 
in August, 2015, unless otherwise specified.  
 
335 Boletín 2/2 (Nov-Dec, 1967), vii. 
 
  
241 
 
Hamuy, “cannot be value-neutral, since the very social problems it must address, social 
change, economic development, transformation of the structures of power, are by their nature 
political.”336 
 Broadly speaking, the division of labor in the early years of CESO can be divided into 
two categories. In the first category were seminars and theoretical research projects devoted 
to synthesizing the literature on dependency theory, honing the analytic categories, and 
generating ways to measure and strengthen its postulates, and generalize from the disparate 
experiences of various Latin American countries. This group included most of the Brazilian 
exiles, including Theotonio dos Santos and Vania Bambirra initially and, later, Marini and 
Frank. 
  In the context of international developments, the CESO cluster devoted to clarifying 
precisely how dependency theory intervened in the theoretical field of political economy 
contributed important insights to the implications of multinational corporations as the “cell” 
of global capitalism. Dos Santos considered the principle and subsidiary contradictions of 
imperialism in its new “integrated monopoly” phase, and how those related to the 
contradictions of its earlier “industrial-liberal” and “finance capital” phases.337 As in the 
earlier phase, neo-imperialism in dos Santos’s analysis continued to move according to the 
principle dialectic of capitalism, the class struggle manifested in the final instance out of the 
contradiction between the increasing socialization of the means of production, on the one 
hand, the centralization and concentration of private accumulation of surplus-value on the 
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other. However, the multinational corporation constituted the new “cell” of imperialism in its 
integrated monopoly phase, around which capitalism reorganized itself as a world-system 
giving rise to distinct subsidiary contradictions as “mediated” forms of the primary 
contradiction of capitalism. Above all, dos Santos saw a tension between the interests of the 
multinational corporate bourgeoisie, increasingly articulated on a productive terrain without 
respect to national boundaries, and the absence of a supranational state to perform the 
functions necessary for accumulation at the transnational level.338 Bambirra, writing from the 
perspective of the dependent countries, echoed dos Santos’s identification of the importance 
of multinationals. She categorized Latin American states into Type A and Type B 
dependencies, determined by which economic sector attracted the bulk of foreign direct 
investment from multinationals in the global integrated monopoly (integración monopólica 
mundial) phase of capitalism. Where the classic primary-export structure of dependency 
created an urban middle class attached to the service sector surrounding the extraction 
economy, class antagonism required dependent industrialization to continue to realize super-
profits. Multinationals could easily monopolize domestic markets by employing unavailable 
local technology to produce consumer goods, with the added benefit of allowing them to 
productively employ equipment made obsolete in the metropolis by the increasingly rapid 
turnover time for fixed capital caused by the pace of technological advancement.339 This was 
an important and fruitful theoretical line that sought with the utmost theoretical rigor to 
formulate precisely how complex Marxist problems such as the rising organic composition of 
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capital played out on the a transnational terrain of unequal and combined social, political and 
economic development.  
 A division of labor operated between these two pieces. Taken independently, they 
could be accused of “one-sided” analyses. Dos Santos, investigating the contradiction 
between the multinationals’ need for order and the anarchy of international relations, 
appeared to offer an “external” explanation in which processes occurring above their heads 
determined the economic fate of Latin American actors. Bambirra, on the other hand, 
categorized Latin American states according to their types of links to the export economy. 
Missing was the connection between these two, or, specifically, why and how the incentives 
of multinationals and the incentives of local aspiring entrepreneurs get “articulated” in the 
specific types outlined by Bambirra. This aspect would be taken up more fully in “modes of 
production” analysis later in the decade, but likely it was on the CESO agenda and would 
have been pursued within the highly productive intellectual formation there had history not 
intervened. More damning, perhaps, Bambirra here indicated a problem that would plague 
the modes of production literature. There is a good deal of variance within her “Type A” and 
“Type B” categories of dependency. At one end of the spectrum, states even seem to be 
operating outside of the confines of “dependency” in any meaningful sense, generating 
dynamic and more-or-less autonomous industrial sectors that could be perceived in their 
“take-off” in the Rostowian sense. At worst, this would seem to nullify the case for 
dependency as a “block” to robust capitalist development. At best, it suggested an analytical 
looseness to the category, which seemed to yield an infinite regress of typologies, rendering 
the theory incapable of explaining much of anything at all. 
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 The CESO faculty formed around the “ideology and culture” cluster formed a second 
broad category of research, which set out, concretely, to understand the education system as 
an institution either reinforcing or subverting dependent situations. This cluster, composed of 
Marta Harnecker, Tomás Vasconi, Marco Garcia de Almeida, Fanny Contreras, Raquel 
Salinas, Antonio Sánchez and José Bengoa, operated within a research paradigm heavily 
influenced by Althusserian concepts of social formations as the combination or “articulation” 
of multiple modes of production, and of theoretical practice as the epistemology of science. 
The French Marxist philosopher’s influence on Chilean academia ironically owes something 
to the international institutional infrastructure propagating Washington’s development 
program, and the historically contingent fact that John F. Kennedy’s turn to Latin America, 
the Alliance for Progress, happened to coincide with the prominence of the human capital 
line in development economics. The latter, representing a certain logical stage in working out 
the implications of Parsonian pattern variables, suggested that education to help foster a 
culture of entrepreneurship mattered at least as much as capital investment for 
underdeveloped countries. In September 1960 the World Bank created the International 
Development Association, a division that would channel funds, largely contributions from 
the Ford Foundation, into low interest “soft loans” for education planning, under the 
expectation that the economic benefits of funding education requires more time to bear fruit 
than direct capital investment.340 These developments led to the creation in 1963 of the 
International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) under the auspices of the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Housed in Paris, the 
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IIEP initially showed special interest in Latin America, reflecting the predominance of the 
Alliance for Progress. 
 This institutional background explains an influx of Latin American scholars, focused 
on issues of education and pedagogy, in Paris at the height of Althusser’s influence, 
including future CESO faculty Harnecker and Vasconi. Many of these burgeoning scholars, 
like their New Left North American counterparts, had been radicalized by the Cuban 
Revolution immediately prior to travelling to Paris under the auspices of Alliance for 
Progress, Ford Foundation, and USAID grants. In Chilean philosopher Marta Harnecker’s 
firsthand account, the critiques of Marxism she encountered in her visit to Cuba in 1960 
motivated her for the first time to engage those ideas. She thus arrived in Paris in 1963, on a 
UNESCO grant, “with the goal of studying [Marxist] thought in [her] free time.”341 With this 
intention, she naturally gravitated to Althusser, then a professor at the École normale 
supérieure engaged in his close reading of the complete works of Marx’s Capital that would 
result in 1965 in the publication of his influential book Reading Capital. Harnecker 
developed close intellectual and personal ties with Althusser, and through the former the 
ideas of the latter circulated in the seminars of Latin American scholars studying their 
region’s education system. 
 Louis Althusser represented a partial and incomplete effort to break free from 
Stalinist orthodoxy at a point in its international chain of operation that has lain largely 
offstage up to this point in our story. He was manifestly the product of the same social forces 
that produced Baran and Sweezy in the United States, changing what needs to be changed to 
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match the different political and social contexts of France and the United States. Both 
Althusser in France and Baran and Sweezy in the United States were academics who 
undertook an intensive interrogation of Capital from the perspective of the concerns of their 
respective academic disciplines; economics in the case of Baran and Sweezy and philosophy 
for Althusser. For both, this reading took place against the backdrop of their changing 
political allegiances, primarily eroding sympathy for Stalinism following Krushchev’s 1957 
speech and, more importantly, positive sympathy with the positions of the CPC in the Sino-
Soviet split. Where Baran and Sweezy hoped to preserve and update the Marxist theory of 
imperialism by applying the concepts of Capital to analyze the changing structures of world 
capitalism, Althusser saw himself embarking on a project within Marxism that no other 
thinker had yet attempted. He would systematically construct Marxist philosophy from a 
close reading of Marx’s opus, which would recreate the never-explicitly-posed questions for 
which Capital provided answers.342 
 Althusser’s influence entered discourses of dependency and, later, Third World 
Marxism and world-systems theory, primarily through his concepts of social formation and 
of theoretical practice as the materialist epistemological basis for defending science as 
objective knowledge creation without ceding ideology as a terrain of class struggle. For 
Althusser, Krushchevism represented simultaneously an opportunity and a threat. By relaxing 
the most repressive strictures of the Stalinist cult of personality, it presented the opportunity 
for a theoretically rigorous fight against dogmatic definitions of dialectical and historical 
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materialism to be waged from within the Communist movement. But, revealing his sympathy 
with the CPC, Althusser saw the concrete political program motivating de-Stalinization as an 
essentially right-wing, reformist tendency in international socialism, which would ultimately 
pave the way for the restoration of capitalism.343 In this context, restoring Marxism as a 
science was the over-riding goal of the Althusserian project. Epistemologically, Althusser 
defended the scientific nature of the philosophy of dialectical materialism by distinguishing 
the real object from the object of knowledge, positing science as the appropriation of the 
latter by the former through concrete theoretical practice. For Althusser, if not for his many 
critics, this eliminated the sticky problem of materialist epistemology which posed thought as 
the direct, and real, reflection of the object itself, without succumbing to philosophical 
idealism by retaining a materialist basis for the object of knowledge resting on the theoretical 
practice of concretely situated social and historical agents.  
 If theoretical practice provided the conceptual move on which Althusser sought to re-
establish dialectical materialism on scientific terra firma, the concept of “social formation” 
did the same for historical materialism, which for Althusser represented the one true science 
of history. Here the enemy was unmistakably Stalinist dogmatism, which had posited a 
simple and mechanical historical progression through modes of production from savagery to 
Communism. For Althusser and his students, Capital provided both an exhaustive treatment 
of the inner-workings of the capitalist mode of production, and clues to understanding how 
the capitalist mode articulated with other modes to form a spectrum of possible concrete 
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social formations. Althusser and his adherents believed analysis of concrete social formations 
could inoculate Marxism from the most egregious forms of vulgar economic determinism. 
Taking up themes begun by earlier “Western Marxists” Korsch, Lukács, and Gramsci, 
Althusser believed he could reinstate the superstructure as a distinct dimension for analyzing 
a social totality. “History” in Althusser’s words, “’asserts itself’ through the multiform world 
of the superstructures, from local tradition to international circumstance.”344 A social 
formation, even if determined by economics in the last instance, was overdetermined by the 
“accumulation of effective determinations” of multiple, relatively autonomous structures. In 
Althusserian vocabulary, the term “articulation,” meaning “combination,” thus referred both 
to the complex interaction of the relatively autonomous economic, political, ideological and 
theoretical practices of the superstructure, and the combination of multiples modes of 
production, characterized by distinct forces and social relations of production, within a single 
concrete social formation.345 
 Marta Harnecker formed the crucial link between Althusser and the Latin American 
developmentalists-cum-Marxists in Paris. Prior to visiting Cuba in 1960, Chilean Harnecker 
described herself as a “militant Catholic” whose only encounters with the Marxist tradition 
were Georges Politzer, whose work she found excessively schematic, and Charles 
Bettelheim’s Models of Economic Growth and Development (Modèles de croissance et 
développement économique). By the time she returned to Chile in 1968, she had already 
translated segments of Althusser’s work to Spanish in her 1967 La revolución teórica de 
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Marx, and she came back to her country with the intention of spreading the Althusserian 
project. Expecting to do so outside the academy, she was surprised to find that university 
reform under the Frei administration had opened prospects for researching and teaching from 
an overtly Marxist standpoint in the sociology department at the University of Chile.346 She 
quickly affiliated herself with CESO, and established a reputation as an expert in Marxist 
philosophy. 
 Under the influence of Harnecker and Tomás Vasconi, CESO faculty shaded neo-
imperialist concepts with Althusserian hues through their investigations into the Latin 
American education system in relation to the ideological structures of dependency. Vasconi, 
one of the most prolific contributors to the CESO project, brought with him when he joined 
the CESO faculty in 1967 a semi-completed study begun jointly under Insitituto 
Latinoamericano de Planifacación Económica y Social (ILPES), a research institute founded 
under CEPAL, and UNESCO’s IIEP. This coincided with the cresting of the wave of 
modernization theory in the United States, and initial contributors to the UNESCO project 
couched their studies in the categories of development economics and modernization theory, 
either considering education in directly economic terms, as a “factor of production” 
assessable per its explanatory weight in regression models, or qualitatively as an ideal-type 
“pattern variable” on a Parsonian spectrum of development. ILPES employed Vasconi to 
write a critical synthesis of this literature. The product, completed at CESO and published in 
its Cuadernos in September of 1967, marked one of the Center’s first significant original 
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contributions to dependency theory, which, with its application of the Althusserian 
conception of social formations, anticipated the direction dependency research would take in 
the early 1970s as it transitioned first to “modes of production” debates then, ultimately, 
modern world-systems theory. 
 Titled “Educación y cambio social” (Education and social change), Vasconi’s study 
exemplifies how little CESO’s research agenda fit within the mold of later English-language, 
North American scholarly debates over dependency theory. For Vasconi, both major camps 
in the sociology of education, exemplified respectively by John Dewey and Emile Durkheim, 
suffered from a failure to ground the study of education in specific social formations, 
resulting in a high level of abstraction. Rather than studying “education in general,” Vasconi 
proposed studying the “education system” as one among many structures of a concrete social 
formation. As such, Vasconi saw an education system as an instrument of society rather than 
class rule, but one that reinforces the social hierarchies of the social formation by distributing 
and classifying subjects into their social role through a selection criterion based on 
preexisting social grouping, and imposing organizational forms specific to the mode of 
production. Taking on the Parsonian structural functionalist analysis, in which education 
formed one variable on which to classify societies from primitive to civilized, Vasconi 
argued “backwardness” could not help understand Latin America’s specific education 
system, but dependency with respect to metropolitan countries could.347 In colonial Latin 
America, the priesthood established the education system. Like Bagú, Vasconi saw Spanish 
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and Portuguese colonizers as remnants of a precapitalist European social formation that had 
already fallen into a peripheral status relative to the capitalist European core. The education 
system thus took root and grew according to a logic of social distribution that compelled 
educated elites to reinforce semi-feudal patterns of landownership, characterized by large 
estates employ peasant or semi-free labor. For Vasconi, this caused Latin America’s 
“Europeanized” educated classes to “suffer a form of ‘optical illusion’ for which they cannot 
see the problems of their own country.”348 
Popular Unity (UP, for Spanish acronym Unidad Popular), the coalition of left-wing 
political parties that successfully put Allende in power in 1970, cohered in the 1960s around 
the “enormous politico-social energy” unleashed by identifying “dependent capitalism” as 
the common enemy.349 Despite the consternation the U.S. State Department felt over the 
prospect of a democratically-elected “Marxist” in the Western Hemisphere, Salvador Allende 
was much less a Marxist theoretician than an ardent anti-imperialist and Chilean and pan-
Latin American nationalist.350 A man of great confidence comfortable in the upper-echelons 
of Chilean society, Allende developed resentment toward the United States following the 
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CIA’s 1954 invasion of Guatemala. Then Vice-President of the Senate, Allende spoke out 
against the Organization of America States meeting in Caracas, helped organize an anti-U.S. 
“Friends of Guatemala Committee,” and led a march to protest the invasion in June of 
1954.351 While he never made any significant contributions to Marxist theory, Allende did 
have socialist, and specifically pro-USSR political sensibilities.352 The parties within the UP 
coalition collectively had extensive ties to academics working within the dependency theory 
paradigm. Allende personally intervened to bring Marini to Chile from his exile in Mexico, 
and he showed up at the airport in Santiago to have Andre Gunder Frank released when he 
was detained by security upon his arrival from Canada in 1968, the year he began working at 
CESO. 
 While international academics debated the internal consistency and empirical value of 
the postulates of dependency theory, rhetorically it was a socially contested term that could 
mean different things to different political actors pushing for very different social goals. A 
central rift divided the social coalition around Allende, which historians have categorized as 
a “gradualist pole” and a “rupturist pole.”353 Both poles, representing divergent and even 
mutually exclusive goals, paradoxically based their programs on ideas deeply rooted in 
dependency theory, as they understood it. The gradualist program emanated directly from the 
center of the PS and PC, the two dominant parties in the UP, and academically it was 
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represented by Pedro Vuskovic, who had close ties to CESO. Vuskovic was a brilliant 
economist politically housed in the PS, who routinely employed the concept of Chilean 
dependency as he took the lead in formulating both the economic platform of UP in the years 
leading up to Allende’s election, and the real program carried out by the administration in its 
first two years. Vuskovic’s strengths as an economist lay in his fine-tuned attention to detail 
and his remarkable capacity to hold a comprehensive view of the Chilean economy in his 
mind. Through painstaking systematic analysis of each sector of the economy, he established 
the interrelated unity of the different sectors and the fundamental link between this holistic 
view of the economic structure, unequal distribution of incomes, and the legacy of persistent 
barriers to the development of a robust internal market.354 In his meticulous empirical 
analysis, he asserted categorically that “the better part of the product generated in some 
sectors remains unavailable either for consumption or reinvestment within the economy, but 
rather is transferred as profit to foreign capital.”355 
 As a technocrat in the Allende government, Vuskovic struggled to translate his 
economic knowledge into a development program that would appease all elements of the UP 
coalition. His “Basic Program” was at least as much political as grounded in sound theories 
of development economics. Allende’s predecessors, pro-U.S. businessman Jorge Alessandri 
(1958-1964) and centrist Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei (1964-1970), had been unable to 
resolve the competing social objectives of land reform and improved living standards for 
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urban workers without confronting the land-owning oligarchy and foreign capital. Allende 
and Vuskovic knew that they must deliver real material gains to urban and rural laborers to 
maintain a strong social foundation against an inevitable backlash from the traditional elites 
engendered by such redistributive measures. But, they also inherited an economy with 35 
percent inflation and $2 billion in public external debt threatening a foreign exchange 
crisis.356 Intent on ending Chilean “dependence” on foreign capital, and lacking any 
alternative sources to finance his development program, Vuskovic was hamstrung by an 
irresolvable contradiction. The productivity increases that could have resolved the 
contradictory impulses either would have required a tremendous sacrifice by the Chilean 
working class to industrialize without increased consumption, or would have required a 
massive amount of foreign exchange to import higher productive technology from elsewhere 
in the global capitalist economy. Neither of those options were politically tenable. In short, 
Vuskovic faced much the same problem as the Soviet Union in the 1920s, and for his 
technocratic industrialization in one country to have succeeded he would have had to adopt 
the same methods as Stalinism, including prolonged artificial limitations on investment in 
consumption goods. 
 The problems were certainly not strictly economic, and in fact Vuskovic faced 
political opposition from social groups who drew more radical conclusions from dependency 
theory. Competing interpretations of the implications of the theory traced to the academic 
level, where theoreticians consciously committed to socially engaged scholarship earnestly 
debated the social function of academics, the role of the university, and the potentialities and 
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limits of the “Chilean road to socialism” (vía chilena). While a segment of CESO faculty 
lined up whole-heartedly behind the development program of Pedro Vuskovic, another 
segment moved closer to the coalition gaining strength to the left of Allende to articulate 
something very close to the theory of permanent revolution as it had surfaced in European 
Social Democracy in the first decades of the twentieth century. Frank, Marini, dos Santos, 
Bambirra, and Vasconi collaborated with the MIR. As academics and respected intellectuals, 
their opinions carried weight in the MIR, with its heavy rank-and-file student representation. 
Marini served on the central committee, and in general the MIR came under the heavy 
influence of the radical interpretation of the implications of dependency theory. In the words 
of the Martín Hernández, a MIR student militant, “[the] fundamental political character of 
the Marxist theory of dependency is to define the character of the Latin American revolution 
as socialist, and, therefore to criticize the disaggregation (desvinculación, literally, de-
linking) of the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist struggles, and to criticize harshly the 
utopian view that the Latin American bourgeoisie can lead.”357  
 Chile held a special place in the US foreign policy of Latin American 
developmentalism. The nation had the image of an “exceptional” Latin American country, 
lacking the record of politicized military that characterized other Latin American countries. 
Encouraged by this tenure of political stability, continuity and constitutional protection of 
property, US capital invested heavily in the Argentine economy. The country held a virtual 
monopoly over the world copper market, the overwhelming majority of which was produced 
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by the US firms Kennecott Copper Company and Anaconda Copper Company. But the 
legacy of stability was disrupted when outrage over the Eisenhower administration’s 
tampering in Guatemalan internal affairs rippled through Chilean political consciousness.358 
This coincided with and exacerbated the social upheavals surrounding the end of the political 
coalition under the hegemony of the center-right Radical Party that had dominated Chilean 
politics since 1932, and insinuated a strong anti-imperialist current into the gathering 
momentum on the left end of the Chilean political spectrum.359 Kennedy understood US 
investor’s domination of Chilean copper would hamper efforts to restore Uncle Sam’s 
tarnished image in the region and, ultimately, prove a liability in the global struggle against 
Communism. Though ardently anti-Communist, he formulated his approach to Latin 
America at least nominally willing to accept compensated expropriation.360 Both the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations saw Chile as one of the primary arenas for executing 
the development program through the agency of the Alliance for Progress, and between the 
years 1962 and 1970 the program channeled $1.2 billion in “aid,” nominally to support 
Chilean economic development but in large measure to shape the political landscape by 
keeping the growing far-left coalition out of power.361 Through the growing tumult of the 
                                                 
358 Hove, “Arbenz Factor,” 623-663. 
 
359 Winn, Weavers, 59-60. 
360 Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy 
Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America, (Chapel Hill and London: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 1999), 18. 
 
361 Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and 
Accountability, (New York and London: The New Press, 2003), 5; Jonathan Haslam, The 
Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide, (London 
and New York: Verso, 2005), 12. 
  
257 
 
1960s, splintering on social opposition to the war in Vietnam, the modernization-theory-
inspired Latin American foreign policy desperately needed a win in Chile.  
 The Nixon administration’s response to Allende’s election to power stands out as one 
of the most shameful episodes in the long, abundantly blemished history of US foreign 
policy. Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger opposed Allende from the 
outset. They met with business interests invested in Chilean infrastructure and copper, and 
pushed, against the advice of ambassador Korry and much of the CIA, for a military coup 
before Allende could take power. Once Allende had assumed power, in collaboration with 
the CIA and private business, Nixon and Kissinger pursued an all-out strategy to undermine 
the country economically and channel massive funds to far-right, openly fascist groups to 
destabilize the country politically.  
 Given the role of the Chilean episode in buttressing the positivist claims against 
dependency theory, it is something of a historical irony that the success of the measures taken 
to disrupt Chile’s economy under Allende, with hindsight, vindicate many of the 
dependentista’s central claims. Kissinger outlined a program to the National Security Council 
that included dumping copper to reduce the price on international markets, thus undercutting 
Allende’s main revenue source to carry out his social and economic reforms.362 Nixon and 
Kissinger coordinated a multi-pronged effort through Washington’s influence over the Inter-
American Development Bank, the World Bank, and the US Export-Import Bank and 
International Development Agency to institute an “invisible blockade” that would seize 
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Chilean commercial credit and cut off the government’s ability to finance producer goods 
necessary to achieve their modernization program.363 Dependentistas argued that the 
extensive penetration of foreign capital rendered peripheral national economies vulnerable to 
price fluctuations on the world market, and structured their economy such that it required a 
constant supplies of foreign credit. At the same moment that dependency theorists were 
taking a beating by positivist, “value-neutral” North American scholars, the executive branch 
of the US government, the CIA, and leading US monopoly capitalists colluded to undermine 
the Allende regime by strangling the Chilean economy at precisely the strategic chokepoints 
identified by dependency theorists. 
 
The Neo-Marxist Epistemological Struggle and the Age of Fracture 
 While Nixon and Kissinger laid the groundwork for Pinochet’s coup and the first 
experiment in neoliberalism, North American Neo-Marxist and positivist academics waged a 
struggle over epistemology that would end in the same result. Scholars influenced by the 
Neo-Marxist theory of imperialism understood the contradictions of their position in the 
university system that rationalized US foreign policy. Kathleen Gough, a British-born 
anthropologist who worked in the United States then Canada, had close ties to dependency 
theory and Monthly Review. Gough helped Frank secure a position at Simon Fraser 
University in Canada for the 1967-1968 academic year, where a handful of radical professors 
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affiliated with the Johnson-Forest tendency had gathered. In correspondence with Magdoff, 
Gough indicated the spectrum of views among her radical colleagues about the potential for 
being a revolutionary from within the university. One colleague believed the university was 
hopelessly reactionary and should be destroyed, another believed it was “totally irrelevant to 
the struggle (by which he always [meant] armed struggle) and should be used only as a 
source of bread and money for third world revolutions.” Gough, for her part, believed they 
could serve a progressive purpose, by providing a space to analyze society and radicalize the 
youth.364 
 Gough raised the prospect for an anti-imperialist anthropology in a panel at a 
professional convention in March of 1967, triggering a debate that drew in contributions 
from anthropologists throughout the world. For Gough, working in a discipline born of 
“Western imperialism” posed a moral dilemma for anthropologists. In its early years, 
anthropology played the role of liberal “social work and community development effort for 
non-white peoples,” seeking to ameliorate conditions that had “actually been imposed by 
their western conquerors in the first place.” With decolonization, the moral dilemma had 
amplified for anthropologists working in counterrevolutionary countries like the US. As 
Gough posed the question, “[what] does an anthropologist do who is dependent on a 
counterrevolutionary government in an increasingly revolutionary world?” The classical 
ethnographic method of cultural anthropology could hardly be pursued without addressing 
the colonizer/colonized nature of that relation. Yet, without that method, anthropology 
simply dissolves into other social sciences. Gough resolved this dilemma by proposing that 
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anthropologists apply all their knowledge of social change and institutions in smaller systems 
to the study of the global system in alignment with the third world revolutionary forces 
acting in opposition to that system. This means turning attention to the study of imperialism, 
which only a small handful of scholars such as Immanuel Wallerstein, Eric Wolf, and Peter 
Worsley had done. She also pointed to the Marxist literature on imperialism, citing such 
major works as Lenin and Luxemburg, alongside recent works by Baran (1957), Baran and 
Sweezy (1966), and Frank (1967). She lamented that this literature tends to be read casually 
and summarily sloughed off by Western scholars. While heartened that “publications of 
Monthly Review Press, International Publishers, Studies on the Left, and other left-wing 
journals have become a kind of underground literature for many graduate students and 
younger faculty in the social sciences,” she was more discouraged by the lack of dialogue 
between these works and the mainstream of the profession.  
 Monthly Review stood even more directly at the center of a similar debate over what 
we know and what types of knowledge are worthy of pursuit in the discipline of economics. 
When students at the New School fought to bring Harry Magdoff on in a semi-permanent 
capacity to teach courses on the economics of imperialism, the economics faculty sharply 
denounced imperialism as nothing more than ideology. A department memo called the 
campaign an attempt to “convert the Economics Department to a propaganda agency of the 
‘anti-imperialists,’” which they saw as “inconsistent with the goals of a university whose 
fundamental concern is the search for truth.”365 Magdoff’s course explored questions 
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wrapped up with the “development of capitalism as a world economic system” through 
theoretical readings in the history of economic thought and consideration of historical and 
contemporary evidence. Theoretical readings treating “international economic activity” 
included Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, Marx, Schumpeter, Hobson and 
Lenin.366 How the proposed course was more tendentious than any other course in the history 
of economic thought is unclear. The more Magdoff and Sweezy established a reputation as 
experts on the economics of empire among student radicals, the more sharply they were 
hedged out of the profession. 
 Eventually, a caucus of radical economists close to Sweezy and Magdoff did develop, 
first into a loose agglomeration then into an institutionalized Union for Radical Political 
Economics (URPE) with its own organ, the Review of Radical Political Economics. The 
RRPE ran a talk delivered by Sweezy in their second issue as a sort of a mission statement. 
Sweezy argued that the avenues of what Thomas Kuhn called “normal science”—that is, a 
division of labor systematically testing and reformulating hypotheses within a theoretical 
“paradigm”—had been cut off for Marxist economists, at least those situated within the 
United States. Explicitly invoking Frank’s “development of underdevelopment” imagery, 
Sweezy argued it fell to the lot of the third world to push forward Marxist economic theory, 
which they were doing with great aplomb. In the same issue, Herbert Gintis spelled out the 
strategy for the radical economist, in an article titled “New Working Class and Revolutionary 
Youth: A Synthesis and a Program for the Future.” The title alone indicates Gintis’s 
affiliation with the radicalizing wing of the student radical movement that had grown of the 
                                                 
366 “Course Outline,” HMP Box 7. 
  
262 
 
Radical Education Project. The article dug out the implications of Monopoly Capital for 
radical scholars, and shows the continuing legacy of the ideas formulated by Mills, Sweezy 
and Baran in the 1950s. Youth have power only in relation to the universities, the latter of 
which serve the purpose of turning out functional and socially integrated white-collar 
workers. Technologies of capitalism ensured this new white-collar working class would 
enjoy “objective material security,” and thus not become a destabilizing force due to any 
objective structural contradictions of capitalism. Nonetheless, as workers the “objective” 
interests of this group are opposed to the system, a fact which is obscured by capital’s control 
of the cultural apparatus. The task of the youth and the radical scholar is to disrupt the 
cultural reproduction of functional workers that takes place in educational institutions, and 
thus disrupt the social equilibrium rendering imperialist society less functional and opening 
space for third world revolutionaries.367 
 URPE and Gough’s radical challenge to anthropology represent only a small cross 
section of the “radical political economic” currents that entered the academy in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, all of which leveraged their graduate student experiences of 1960s campus 
radicalism to try to insinuate forms of Marxist scholarship into respectable academic 
discourse. Historians around Studies and influenced by Williams started the Socialist 
Scholars Conference in 1964. The SSC hosted three thousand participants at its peak in 1967, 
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and was defunct three years later.368 In addition to the Radical Education Project, discussed 
above, SDS spawned a number of other academic-adjacent organizational offshoots, 
including the New University Conference, Teachers for a Democratic Society, the Movement 
for a Democratic Society, and Radicals in the Profession.369 When scholars affiliated with 
these various movements secured academic positions, they formed caucuses and professional 
organizations in opposition to the main currents in their disciplines. Such radical 
organizations arose in virtually every social science and humanities discipline, and 
established corresponding peer-reviewed academic journals to try to establish a foothold for 
legitimate Marxist scholarship within the academy. In addition to URPE, the Radical Caucus 
in English published Radical Teacher, the Caucus for a New Political Science published 
Politics and Society, the Union of Marxist Social Scientists published Insurgent Sociologist. 
In Latin American Studies, dependency theory had become so pervasive in the established 
professional association—the Latin American Studies Association—that radical scholars did 
not need to caucus independently to organize support for Latin American Perspectives. 
Firmly, if marginally, entrenched in their disciplines by the early 1970s, these various radical 
scholars adopted the methods, conventions and idioms of their fields to defend Marxism as a 
mode of scientific analysis. Though the wrote on a broad range of topics, their widest 
influence was felt in their analysis of the nature of the state and imperialism under modern 
corporate capitalism. 
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 Despite the partially successfully efforts to turn the university into a site of anti-
imperialist struggle, ultimately what Baran called “practical intelligence” carried the day. 
Karl Popper’s defense of the criterion of falsifiability was, from the beginning, a 
preeminently ideological project wrapped up with a restoration of unfettered markets. 
Friedrich von Hayek- who somewhat against his will would come to symbolize the 
restoration of unfettered class power in the United States- built part of his argument around 
Popper’s empiricist Logik der Forschung.370 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, an ardently 
pro-capitalist intellectual network mounted a full-scale propaganda campaign in favor of 
market fundamentalism while simultaneously disingenuously claiming to value scholarly 
objectivity. Milton Friedman would draw the most radical and far-reaching conclusions from 
Hayek’s argument in 1944 that any planning would lead with an inexorable path-dependence 
down the totalitarian road. Surpassing Hayek’s much more tempered claims, Friedman 
painted unfettered markets as the way to secure complete political liberty for the individual, 
while simultaneously leading the technical turn in the profession meant to present economics 
as the “neutral” scholarly pursuit of efficient allocation of resources.  
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Conclusion 
 In his review of Mills’s Power Elite, Sweezy offered his own criticism of what Mills 
in Sociological Imagination would call “abstracted empiricism.” “There is a sort of contrived 
bloodlessness about American academic social science today,” wrote Sweezy. “Its 
practitioners are much better trained than they used to be, but the consequence is not only 
technical competence. No less striking is the way they all fit into a few neat molds, like the 
models of an automobile coming off the factory assembly lines. They all talk alike, deal in 
the same brand of trivialities, and take each other enormously seriously.”371 Throughout the 
1950s, Monthly Review played a central and important role in combatting this narrow 
empiricism and methodological fetishism as it became institutionalized in academic social 
sciences. As a Stanford economist, Baran was one of the few holdouts at the upper echelons 
of the economics profession. In a department that included Kenneth Arrow, who helped lead 
the movement to formal mathematical modeling with his “impossibility theorem,” Baran 
boldly bucked the trend by writing Political Economy of Growth, a book which did not 
contain a single equation or probability matrix. Mills played the same role in his own 
profession. The empirical research he did at Paul Lazarsfeld’s Bureau of Applied Social 
Research buttressed more than determined the central claims that went into New Men of 
Power and White Collar. Mills went to great lengths to make his books increasingly 
accessible to a broad audience of lay readers, which contributed to his image as a “maverick” 
within his increasingly opaque and professionalized discipline. 
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 But, in the long run, Neo-Marxism did become professionalized, expressed almost 
exclusively in disciplinary scholarly journals that adopted the methods, idioms, and 
conventions of the institutions in which they were embedded. Monthly Review editors 
continued to be admired as originators of many of the theoretical questions pursued with 
academic rigor by academic Marxists in the closing decades of the twentieth century. Marxist 
scholars pursued the implications of monopoly capitalism for the labor market, crisis theory, 
and imperialism and dependency theory well into the 1970s, with reverberations of the 
debates carrying over into the 1980s. With a theoretical scaffolding in place, scholars were 
able to dissect analytical components and, applying disciplinary methods, subject them to 
unprecedented levels of empirical scrutiny. The result has been a more sophisticated 
understanding of how to operationalize certain Marxist concepts, and a more robust defense 
of the Marxist political economic system articulated according to the standards and criteria of 
its opponents. 
 But this methodological rigor came with a cost. As they moved fully into academic 
disciplines, radical scholars largely accepted the epistemology of science advanced and 
defended by neoliberalism. As scholars, they were interested in paradigm building, set 
discursively against non-Marxist paradigms that dominated in their fields. They tried to 
establish a viable position for Marxist research within the academy by arguing that Marxism 
better explained social and economic phenomena than other paradigms, by defending the 
moral positions of Marxism as a useful determinant for the types of research questions 
worthy of scholarly pursuit, and by applying their academic theories and methods to analyses 
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of contemporary social issues.372 At least the radical political economists grounded in 
economics and sociology, pursuing these scholarly professional objectives meant implicitly 
accepting a separation between their scholarship and their public propagandistic 
revolutionary activities. Perhaps they could still be revolutionaries in their (diminishing) free 
time, but as scholars they were engaged in very much the same type of hypothesis testing as 
their opponents, with the programmatic implications of debates becoming increasingly 
difficult to distinguish. 
Dependency theory offers a prime example. As articulated by Andre Gunder Frank, 
and pursued in more depth by the Latin American Marxist economists and sociologists at 
CESO, dependency theory pursued broad questions of the nature of the capitalist world-
system as it passed through a historically specific conjuncture. The theory had intellectual 
antecedents in discursive fields outside the academy. The major influences behind Frank’s 
intellectual breakthrough were decidedly not the academic economists at CEPAL, but rather 
non-academic Marxists theorizing their role within national revolutionary movements. 
However hypothetical their visions of leadership may have been, their intellectual production 
was not “academic” in the sense often ascribed to that term. It was, rather, quintessentially 
strategic. Their exploration of the truth content of categories of historical classification could 
not be separated from their assessment of the value of those categories for orienting 
themselves strategically within contemporary political struggles. When Argentine Trotskyists 
in the 1940s questioned the value of the category “feudalism,” abstracted from European 
history, to understanding their own continent’s history, they did so to gain a better 
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understanding of the types of alliances that would form in the struggle against imperialism, 
and how best to position rural and urban workers at the head of the nationalist movement. 
Yet, the debates engendered in North American thought around dependency were far 
removed from the strategic logic of working class hegemony in anti-imperialist struggle. 
When North American radical economists took up the question of dependency in the 1970s, 
they tested empirical claims deemed central to the dependency approach against comparative 
data gathered by the UN. Albert Szymanski published an article in the Review of Radical 
Political Economy showing net capital flowed from the US to underdeveloped states, not vice 
versa as implied in the conception of “surplus” extraction espoused by Baran and then 
elaborated by Frank. Bill Warren took this a step further, by demonstrating empirically that 
capital influx into the Third World developed rather than underdeveloped the Third World. In 
both cases, the implication was that central hypotheses of dependency theory had been 
“falsified” and the theory could thus be “rejected.” Sympathizers with dependency theory 
debated the methods, and the value of the statistical analysis. Perhaps the scholars engaged in 
these debates remained committed revolutionary Marxists, but if so that posture had nothing 
to do with their scholarship. The latter studied social processes as if they were completely 
objective, and they envisioned their role as scholars to be mentally modeling those objective 
processes as accurately as possible.  
 It is tempting to lay this academic Marxism on the New Left student radicals who 
became radical academics at the end of the 1960s. Student radicals tended to become more, 
not less, complicit in the system as they settled into comfortable academic careers. In 1965, 
Hal Draper predicted in ten years student radicals would be “rising in the world and in 
income, living in the suburbs from Terra Linda to Atherton, raising two or three babies, 
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voting Democratic, and wondering what on earth they were doing in Sproul Hall.” 373 One 
does not need to do a deep social history of US academia in the closing decades of the 
twentieth century to suspect Draper’s prediction was prescient. 1960s student radicals entered 
the academy in its heyday, when tenure-track opportunities for professors in the humanities 
and social sciences abounded. 
 But, looking back at the longer history, the turn to academic Marxism began in the 
1930s, and is the ultimate line of continuity linking the Popular Front to the New Left, and 
the subsequent migration of US Marxism into academia. Baran and Sweezy were already 
well-entrenched in the academic discipline of economics in the 1930s. They turned to 
Marxism as a set of interrelated economic concepts at a moment in which Marxist orthodoxy, 
as propagated by the Soviet Union and Soviet-affiliated Communist Parties, was leveraging 
Capital to develop a set of tools to put in the hands of technocratic development experts. 
Simultaneously, Western liberal economists operating in the intellectual traditions of 
American pragmatism and Progressivism were willing to borrow ideas from the Soviet 
experience and apply them to regulate the American economy through the rapidly expanding 
agencies of the US federal state. This dual process, the convergence of Marxism and statist 
liberalism, created the academic space for Baran and Sweezy to thrive as overtly Marxist 
economists in the economics profession. They moved toward Marxism as fellow travelers of 
the CP sympathetic to the Soviet industrialization methods. Prior to the war, they held this 
posture within the academy, pursuing knowledge oriented toward the technocratic policy 
apparatus. Only with the onset of the Cold War, and the rift in the left-liberal social and 
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intellectual space created in the 1930s, did the logic of this position come to seem 
paradoxical. In this climate, Sweezy founded Monthly Review. Though he billed it as an 
“independent socialist journal,” Monthly Review was always situated primarily in an 
academic or academic-adjacent discursive field. The political economic analysis they honed 
throughout the 1950s continued to be essentially technocratic in nature. Initially they 
envisioned making their ideas operational through a progressive political coalition, formed of 
alliance or class compromise between a reformist bourgeoisie and the leading sectors of the 
working class. As the decade wore on, this position became obviously untenable.  
 The intellectual bloc that would pass on to the New Left the concepts of monopoly 
capitalism, corporate liberalism, imperialism and the “permanent war economy” spent the 
1950s arguing with academic trends in the respective disciplines. Historians have thoroughly 
explored the rise and fall of modernization theory as an academic paradigm and as a mode of 
foreign policy. There is a broad consensus that modernization theory abstracted its model of 
“modernity” from a favorable impression of mid-twentieth-century US society. Politically, 
modernization theorists were New Dealers. Academically, they were structural functionalists, 
consensus historians, pluralist political scientists, or fiscal Keynesian economists. Many 
historians have noted modernization theory offered a teleological metanarrative of progress. 
But this is only partially true. Exemplified by Rostow, modernization theorists did posit 
history as a series of sequential stages, terminating in US republican capitalism. Yet their 
metahistorical social theory stressed functional integration and social equilibrium, and thus 
lacked a consistent endogenous theory of social change. Setting themselves against these 
academic expressions of modernization theory, the Monthly Review school and a small 
handful of like-minded liberal or radical intellectuals developed their Neo-Marxist theory as 
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a counterposing holistic narrative. Identifying similar features of mid-twentieth century 
social life as modernization theorists, they tried to conceive of them in a holistic theoretical 
framework that retained concepts of antagonism, mal-integration, and hierarchical power 
structures.  
 It is thus important to note that the rise and fall of the modernization “paradigm” 
played itself out on multiple fields of discourse and social action. On one field, academics 
argued with other academics about the assumptions and value-orientations implied in the 
mental models they constructed. As the structural functionalist sociology and consensus 
historiography became internalized at the level of modernization theory’s baseline 
assumptions, academics and policy-makers working within the common sense could 
subdivide research tasks in a process Thomas Kuhn labeled “normal science,” or practical, 
policy-oriented empirical research. While the paradigm held firm, a fundamentally value-
laden, political project could be defended with recourse to a defense of the principles of 
value-neutrality and scholarly objectivity as cornerstones of the scientific process. 1950s 
proto-Neo-Marxists had to wage the academic part of their debate against these claims. C. 
Wright Mills and Paul Baran took the lead in this effort. Each tried independently to 
formulate a concrete critique that portrayed contemporary US social science as part of the 
symbolic system masking economic and social inequalities. By falling short of “pure 
Reason” or the “sociological imagination,” social science implicitly helped reproduce the 
equilibriums they theorized by reproducing a mass false consciousness. Unlike the most 
extreme post-modernists, Baran and Mills did not reject objective or objectively knowable 
truth. Rather, they tried to question prevailing social scientific convictions while 
simultaneously insisting objective truth could be pursued if the influence of wealth and 
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power on knowledge creation were stripped away. The student radicals and, later, academic 
radicals informed by these ideas would continue to chip away at the same problem, but with 
little ability to resolve the tension. 
 Neo-Marxist theory proved more consequential when it fused with the spontaneous 
social unrest that burst asunder any notions of capitalist equilibrium in the 1960s. Historians 
of the New Left give Mills pride of place in the pantheon of precursors to the New Left. 
However true it may be that students were reading Mills, he can hardly be considered 
responsible for the mass protests that cut through American society in the 1960s. Mills was 
no agitator. Rather, social opposition emerged out of resistance to the inequalities built into 
the structure of American capitalism. It was the type of more-or-less spontaneous antagonism 
Mills, Sweezy, and Baran denied monopoly capitalism would produce. Black people, those 
who least enjoyed the benefits of the “affluent society” mobilized first to oppose the unjust 
system. Disequilibrium is disequilibrium, and the presence of opposition radiated outward 
into broader layers. Young, idealistic, and sensitive to the injustice of the system, students 
moved into the oppositional camp. When they did so, they encountered the radical ideologies 
coming from the 1950s, which had placed a heavy emphasis on foreign policy. The “Third 
World” came to symbolize everything exploitative and unjust about American capitalism. 
“Aid” “development” and “modernization” appeared so many euphemisms for colonial 
control, and if the US government masked exploitative foreign relations behind such 
Aesopian language, why should they not be assumed to do the same domestically. 
“Colonialism” came to serve as a metaphor for all forms of social inequality, the central 
dynamic of which was ideological manipulation to buy into the ethos of modernity. This 
intellectual orientation, and the multivalent social subjectivities it engendered, did more to 
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challenge modernization theory than dependency theory, and it is the most enduring legacy 
of the epistemological debates spurred by Neo-Marxists. 
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